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Abstract
The late 20th and the early 21th centuries are characterised by signif-
icant changes to weather patterns. A growing number of environmental
initiatives have been activated to harmonise this phenomenon, which has
taken monstrous magnitude mainly thanks to the continuing increase in
carbon dioxide emitted by firms. Social and regulatory forces push firms
to adopt a friendly, towards the environment, behaviour. In turn, firms
have to be prepared with adequate tools and knowledge about the poten-
tial climate change effects on their financial performance. These effects can
be direct such as extreme weather events (heat waves, storms, etc.) and
indirect such as environmental regulations. Amid climate change crisis,
this thesis presents three empirical investigations on how climate change
has affected the financial performance. Particularly: (i) “do environmen-
tally performing firms gain financial benefits?” (ii) “does reporting envi-
ronmental information ease investors’ concerns?” and (iii) “can variations
of temperature destabilise the financial system”?
To be more specific, the first empirical chapter investigates the impact
of environmental performance on financial performance. It is argued that
both environmental and financial performance follow a non-linear endoge-
nous relationship. Using data for 288 European manufacturing firms over
the period 2005-2016, the said relationship is investigated under the finan-
cial slack argument and the contrasting paradigms of neoclassical and the
instrumental stakeholder theory. Employing a quantile regression frame-
work enriched with a set of instrumental variables to more effectively ap-
proximate environmental performance, the study finds (i) firms with supe-
rior environmental performance tend to be more profitable; (ii) the rela-
tionship between environmental and financial performance can be charac-
terised as positive and heterogeneous across the conditional distribution;
(iii) financial and environmental performance are endogenously related only
when high profitability firms are examined.
The second empirical chapter analyses the impact of environmental
disclosure on the idiosyncratic risk of European manufacturing firms. Util-
ising a panel data set of 288 firms covering the period from 2005 to 2016
in 17 European countries, the study provides evidence that environmental
disclosure reduces risk asymmetrically. Findings further show that this
relationship can best be justified by the slack resource argument, as well
as, by both the stakeholder and the legitimacy theory. By contrast, predic-
tions based on managerial opportunism appear to be invalid. In addition,
results reveal that the reaction of idiosyncratic risk to environmental dis-
closure is highly heterogeneous throughout the conditional distribution.
At the same time, we cannot establish a strong link between environmen-
tal disclosure and firm’s total risk, implying that environmental activities
are closely linked to idiosyncratic risk. Results remain robust under all
different specifications suggested by three different econometric methods;
namely, (i) panel data techniques, (ii) dynamic panel data and (iii) quantile
regressions.
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The third empirical chapter examines if temperature has an effect on
the systemic risk of European firms. We employ a ∆CoV aR model in
order to measure the potential impact of temperature fluctuations on sys-
temic risk, considering all companies from the STOXX Europe 600 Index,
which covers a wide range of industries for the period from 1/1/1990 to
29/12/2017. Furthermore, in this study, we decompose temperature into 3
factors; namely (i) trend, (ii) seasonality and (iii) anomaly. Findings sug-
gest that, temperature has indeed a significant impact on systemic risk. In
fact, we provide significant evidence of either positive or nonlinear temper-
ature effects on financial markets, while the nonlinear relationship between
temperature and systemic risk follows an inverted U-shaped curve. In ad-
dition, hot temperature shocks strongly increase systemic risk, while we do
witness the opposite for cold shocks. Additional analysis shows that devi-
ations of temperature by 1◦C can increase the daily Value at Risk by up
to 0.24 basis points. Overall, higher temperatures are highly detrimental
for the financial system. Results remain robust under the different proxies
that were employed to capture systemic risk or temperature.
Climate change has profoundly shaped the modern view of finance.
This thesis examines the prominent role of climate change in financial
markets and provides important implications suggesting managerial deci-
sions, recommending policy-making directions, understanding theoretical
connections between environment and profitability and providing optimal
investment decisions.
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1 Introduction
Human activities are estimated to have caused approximately 1◦C of global warming
above pre-industrial levels (IPCC, 2018). The increasing consumption for goods,
that our modern civilisation demands, has raised atmospheric carbon dioxide lev-
els from 280 parts per million to 409 parts per million in the last 150 years. Given
that the current rate of anthropogenic CO2 emissions continues, global warming
is likely to reach 2◦C in the next 50 years (IPCC, 2014). In December 2018, the
United Nations Climate Change Conference which held in Poland, had as its main
conclusion that if we do not tackle climate change, model civilisation will extinct.
Thus, the main challenge is to maintain global warming below the threshold of
1.5 ◦C. Beyond this level, extreme weather events will be more frequent and as
a result the macroeconomic conditions will be deteriorated significantly (Stern,
2007; Dell et al., 2012).
Keeping global warming below 1.5◦C demands firms to adopt an environmen-
tal approach towards the natural environment. However, this proactive approach
might be opposed with the main objective of the firms (e.g., maximise sharehold-
ers’ value) (Dahlmann et al., 2019). Therefore, firms will agree to comply with
the social and regulatory actions against climate change only if the net benefit
from environmental actions out-weights the compliance costs (Hatakeda et al.,
2012). Besides, global warming has multidimensional characteristics whereby
can potentially affect the financial performance of firms. For instance, firms can
be influenced by the environmental regulations such as environmental report-
ing, carbon tax or carbon trading as well as by the perception of the market
participants whose behaviour deviate from the traditional theory of finance and
they might extract utility by turning into environmental investments (Fama and
French, 2007). On the top of that, the contemporaneous topic of climate change
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in a micro-economic level is a rather unexplored field of study and for this rea-
son, there is an uprising stream of scholars, managers and policy-makers that
attempts to make an inference between the firm and the environment (Bebbing-
ton and Larrinaga-González, 2008).
Climate change has profoundly shaped the modern view of finance. In order
to disentangle this nascent field of research, this thesis presents three empirical
examinations. The unedited research questions, that the thesis attempts to posit
and are related to the three empirical examinations, are the following: (i) do
“environmentally performing firms gain financial benefits?”, (ii) “does reporting
environmental information ease investors’ concerns?” and (iii) “can variations of
temperature destabilise the financial system”?
1.1 Motivations of Thesis
The climate change effects on the financial performance is a topical area with
interdisciplinary interest. From an economic point of view, climate change has an
impact on GDP, consumption and productivity (Dell et al., 2014). Even though,
there is well established literature between macro-economy and the environment
(known as climate-economy literature) (e.g., Stern, 2007; Schlenker and Roberts,
2009; Dell et al., 2012) there is still an large unexplored part which is related to
the climate-finance literature.
First, literature has not yet concluded if firms should operate “green” (Busch
and Lewandowski, 2017). For example, empirical literature shows contradicting
findings which further stresses the relationship and makes it imperative to ini-
tially understand what is the main reason of controversy. There is an increasing
volume of funds allocated to “green” projects (Eurosif, 2016). Nevertheless, are
these investments sustainable? In other words “does it pay to be green?”. This
2
is analysed extensively in Chapter 3, which scrutinises the connection between
environmental and financial performance.
Second, regulators underline the importance of disclosing the environmental
activities in an attempt to monitor rising temperature (EU Commission., 2014).
At the same time, reporting environmental information can be described as “win-
win” situation. Thus, not only regulators can gauge the carbon footprint of the
firms but also firms comply with the existing regulations (Aggarwal and Dow,
2012). The question arises is whether symmetric environmental information in-
creases the market concerns about climate change or not. Are investors attracted
by environmental disclosing firms? Or climate change information has a negative
tone for them and results to higher risk. The connection between environmental
disclosure and idiosyncratic risk is examined in Chapter 4. Idiosyncratic risk is
emphasised and consequently analysed because (i) this is referred to specific-firm
characteristics and (ii) it is responsible for the volatility of a market index (Ang
et al., 2006).
Third, global warming is a risk factor which has a negative effect on equity
returns (Bansal and Ochoa, 2011; Balvers et al., 2017). In a similar vein, increas-
ing temperatures can spread uncertainty to the whole financial system (Battiston
et al., 2017). This can be explained by the fact that climate-sensitive assets
are affected directly by the extreme temperatures. Given that these assets are
highly interconnected, someone can argue that the entire financial system can
be affected. Hence, Chapter 5 explores the probability that climate change is a
systemic risk factor that can destabilise the financial markets.
Furthermore, economic theories do not provide a clear inference between fi-
nancial performance and climate change (Brooks and Oikonomou, 2018). This is
because, some theories suggest that it is profitable to operate “green”, while oth-
ers advocate otherwise. This intense conflict among theories generates a fruitfully
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environment to further investigate the reasons behind it and to validate theories
that characterise this relationship. A detailed description of the economic theory
can be found in Chapter 2; in Chapters 3 and 4 theories are empirically tested.
Finally, this thesis is motivated by the increasing number of environmental
regulations particularly in the European Union. Environmental reporting stan-
dards demand firms to disclosure more and more items (EU Commission., 2014).
For instance, not only firms should “cap and trade” their emissions (EU emissions
trading scheme) but also they have to comply with different mitigation policies,
such as Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement. It seems that EU officials are
highly committed to deal with climate change and thus high concerns are gener-
ated, questioning whether EU firms can still be profitable when they also have
to bear the environmental compliance costs. For this reason, all three empirical
chapters test samples including EU firms.
1.2 Research Philosophy
Before proceeding to delve more into the relationship between climate change
and financial performance, it is important to understand the research approach
philosophy of this thesis.
Heraclitus (535–475 B.C) a Greek philosopher is known for his quotes regard-
ing the perpetual changes in cosmos; “there is nothing permanent except change”
(Wheelwright, 1959). Amid climate change, this is a unique opportunity for
firms to change technology and thus gain a competitive advantage (Hart and
Ahuja, 1996). However, how can firms sustain a competitive advantage when
they are between the inertia and the inaction (Durand and Calori, 2006)? How
can managers help diffuse long term objectives while have to integrate the need
for environmental adaptation? How can a firm arbitrate between exploration and
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exploitation while respond to environmental constraints? Among many others,
these are some philosophical considerations leading to the main question which
is; if firms can afford the change towards a green era.
In order to investigate the above considerations, the research philosophy of
this thesis is based on the epistemology approach with positivism doctrine. The
main goal of the epistemological approach is to assess economic theories by col-
lecting real world data. Positivism underlines that the researchers should take an
objective position and should not be driven by their own preferences. In order
to satisfy this assumption, existing theoretical framework should be primarily
considered and tested in order to derive and develop new principles. Positivism
is more closely related to testing theories rather than generating new ones. For
this particular reason, the empirical chapters of this thesis are constructed by,
first deriving the research hypotheses, then collecting the data and finally using
the appropriate methodology.
Moreover, the adopted methodology is a quantitative methodology of econo-
metrics while the data used are secondary from credible sources. Methods em-
ployed in this thesis are checked for their robustness and are chosen adherent to
the previous empirical studies. Similarly, the chosen variables reflect both the
theoretical predictions as well as suggestions from previous studies. Regarding
the methodology of econometrics, in fact this method is closely related to the pos-
itivism doctrine because inferences are made using a deductive approach (theory
driven) and less inductive (data driven) approach. Inductive approach is only
employed in order to compare our main findings with previous literature. There-
fore, our econometrics methods have the main objective to use mathematics and
statistics prevailed by the economic theory.
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1.3 Aims and Objectives
Having discussed about the research philosophy, we now turn to list the aims and
objectives of the study. Besides the obvious aim/ objective of the study, which
is to present an up-to-date review of literature about financial performance of
the firms under climate change (Chapter 2), this thesis develops three empirical
examinations and therefore three aims and several objectives are listed below.
The first aim of the study is to investigate the relationship between environ-
mental and financial performance by exploring the distributional properties of
financial performance. The second aim of the thesis, is to examine if a portfo-
lio with environmental disclosing assets has, on average, less risk than a non-
disclosing asset portfolio. The third aim is to test if weather conditions can
destabilise the financial system.
The objective of the first empirical chapter (Chapter 3) is to examine the
connection between environmental and financial performance for 288 EU manu-
facturing firms for the period 2005-2016. Particularly, we test if the efficiency of
environmental performance (EP) is conditional on the profitability level of the
firm. Existing literature is focused on the conditional mean of the FP distribu-
tion and neglects the highly skewed financial data (e.g. Misani and Pogutz, 2015;
Lewandowski, 2017). By using quantile regressions, we are able to provide new
evidence of the said relationship in different parts of the FP distribution. Existing
literature has addressed the question ”does it pay to be green?”, we take one step
further and address ”how does green react to different parts of the profitability
distribution?”
The second objective (Chapter 4) is to test if disclosing environmental infor-
mation can affect the idiosyncratic risk of firms, considering 288 EU manufactur-
ing firms for the period 2005-2016. By using panel, dynamic panel and quantile
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estimations, we provide evidence that the information regarding climate change
is priced in the financial markets. Modern finance shows that investors critically
evaluate all available information. Therefore, in a period when climate change
predominates in the headlines, a proportion of the investment uncertainty might
be attributed to the environmental information asymmetries.
Finally yet importantly, the third empirical chapter (Chapter 5) examines if
temperature changes can affect the systemic risk of the European market. Given
that temperature can directly trigger macroeconomic alterations (Dell et al.,
2014), we investigate if climate sensitive firms absorb the initial temperature
shock and then, in turn, they generate spillovers to the whole financial system.
1.4 Contributions
The study attempts to provide newcomers in the field; managers, researchers
and policy-makers with an overview of the existing literature regarding the finan-
cial performance (FP) of firms under climate change. Additionally, the climate-
finance research is rather limited, the majority of the studies can be categorised
in the climate-economy literature. Hence we fill this important, yet unexplored
part of the literature with new empirical evidence. Even though, the thesis has a
few conceptual and theoretical contributions (Chapter 2), the main contributions
are empirically related. Particularly, we provide empirical evidence regarding the
climate change and financial performance relationship in an area which is highly
committed to deal with the climate change, the European Union.
1.4.1 First Empirical Chapter: Chapter 3
In the first empirical chapter (Chapter 3), the study goes beyond the traditional
literature and allows environmental performance (EP) estimates to vary across
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the conditional distribution of FP. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first attempt to evaluate the EP-FP relationship with non-parametric techniques.
Particularly, standard quantile and two-stage quantile regressions are employed
(Koenker and Hallock, 2001; Lee, 2007). These techniques help us provide novel
evidence of the relationship at the tail of the FP distribution. At the same time,
we address calls by Horvathova (2010); Albertini (2013); Baboukardos (2018)
who underline that the unambiguous previous results in this examination are
attributed to the intense endogeneity. So, the chapter deals with the role of
endogeneity and non-linearity simultaneously.
1.4.2 Second Empirical Chapter: Chapter 4
The second empirical chapter (Chapter 4) contributes to the literature regarding
the effects of corporate social actions on firm risk (Lee and Faff, 2009; Oikonomou
et al., 2012; Linciano et al., 2018). Particularly, we test the effects of environmen-
tal disclosure on idiosyncratic risk. The relationship is testing by using various
econometric techniques, such as panel data estimations (pooled OLS, fixed and
random effects), dynamic panel estimations (system GMM) and quantile regres-
sions. Moreover, while previous literature uses simple capital asset pricing model
to estimate idiosyncratic risk, we employ the contemporaneous method of Fama
and French (2015) by using a five factor model. This chapter also demonstrates
that the environmental disclosure has heterogeneous effects on the conditional dis-
tribution of idiosyncratic risk, implying that by adding environmental disclosing
firms in a risky portfolio, the overall risk can be diversified.
1.4.3 Third Empirical Chapter: Chapter 5
The third empirical chapter (Chapter 5) provides three main contributions. First,
while previous studies examine the connections between temperature shocks and
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stock returns (Cao and Wei, 2005; Apergis and Gupta, 2017), this is the first study
that examines the effect of temperature shocks on the systemic risk. Systemic
risk is defined, in line with Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016), as the value-at-risk
of each firm and can be easily estimated with quantile regressions at 99% of the
losses distribution. Then we regress temperature and other important control
variables on systemic risk with simple pooled OLS regressions. Second, contrary
to existing literature that used low frequency data, we use 28 years of daily
observations, which can directly account for both the short-term and long-term
temperature effects. Finally, we decompose the temperature series as suggested by
environmental studies (Vecchio and Carbone, 2010) and thus the chapter provides
with meaningful results about the temperature effects. Existing literature did not
decompose the temperature data and this might be problematic in terms of the
interpretation and reliability of the results (Jacobsen and Marquering, 2009).
1.5 Research Hypotheses
Each of the empirical chapters develops a hypotheses section. The main research
question of this thesis is whether climate change can affect the financial perfor-
mance of firms. Particularly, the ensuing hypotheses that we have attempted to
posit are:
In Chapter 3
Hypothesis 3.1: The effect of environmental performance on financial perfor-
mance varies across different levels of financial performance.
While existing literature investigates the mean of the financial performance dis-
tribution, we advocate that the efficacy of environmental performance is probably
based on the financial condition of every firm. This can be well supported by the
slack resource argument, which implies that important distinction should be made
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between high and low profitability firms. This is because different profitability
firms manage their available resources differently.
In Chapter 4
Hypothesis 4.1: High environmental disclosure has a negative impact on id-
iosyncratic risk, under the stakeholder theory.
Hypothesis 4.2: Environmental disclosure can heterogeneously affect idiosyn-
cratic risk at different levels of idiosyncratic risk.
There is a debate in the literature regarding the wider corporate social responsi-
bility of firms and if social actions have positive or negative outcome. Similarly,
there are competing theories indicating that social actions have different effects
on the firm risk. In this instance, hypothesis 1 aims to test for the relevance of
these theories in our context. The second hypothesis is related to the different
levels of risk and thus we ask how disclosing assets can affect portfolios with high,
low or medium risk.
In Chapter 5
Hypotheses 5.1: Temperature has asymmetric effects on systemic risk.
Hypothesis 5.2: Temperature anomaly has asymmetric effects on systemic risk.
Hypothesis 5.3: Hot and Cold temperature shocks increase systemic risk.
There is an ongoing discussion about the temperature effects on the financial
markets. At the same time, financial stability is connected with the systemic risk
and it is questioned how financial stability could be agitated. We hypothesise
that temperature can play this role. Hypothesis 1 tests how raw temperature
might influence the financial markets. Hypothesis 2 adopts a superior measure to
test the relationship between temperature and financial markets, namely temper-
ature anomaly. Hypothesis 2 inspects that the asymmetric relationship between
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temperature and systemic risk can be explained by disaggregating temperature
data into hot and cold shocks, in turn, we examine the effect of these shocks on
the systemic risk (Hypothesis 3).
1.6 Linkage among the Empirical Chapters
Large corporations have been accused that are the root of global warming since
they are responsible for the gradual increase in the anthropogenic emissions, and
consequently this causes the gradual increase of the average global temperatures.
Amid climate change, firms should be informed and equipped with adequate tools
in order to be prepared to deal with one main threats of humanity. This thesis
explores potential relationships between climate change and firm’s performance
and gives recommendations about strategies that firms should adopt.
Particularly, the thesis brings together three major issues. The first issue,
which is described in the first empirical chapter (Chapter 3), is if all type of
firms can sustain a competitive advantage under climate change. This chapter
ascertains that investing in environmental performance can both lead to superior
financial performance, irrespective of the financial condition of the firms, and ease
regulatory and social concerns about climate change. In close relation to that,
Chapter 4 asks if disclosing environmental performance can decrease the infor-
mation asymmetries and lead to lower risk in the financial markets. Therefore,
the first two empirical chapters investigate the pro-activeness of the firms and if
it is worth investing and communicating their environmental actions. Although,
Chapters 3 and 4 offer a different view in topics that have already been tested
in the literature, Chapter 5 provides an unique dimension of the relationship be-
tween climate change and FP. This is that climate change can harm the financial
stability. The damage from climate change is, to a certain extent, irreversible and
11
this damage can, in fact, destabilise the financial system. Even though, the dam-
age from climate change is still minor, Chapter 5 shows that firms are suffering
the climate change consequences and as global warming becomes more intense
these consequences become more unbearable.
Another link among the empirical chapters is that they pertain evidence to
establish a strong connection between climate change and financial performance
in a particular area, the EU. EU has become increasingly committed to promote
climate change mitigation (e.g. Kyoto Protocol, Paris Agreement, EU emissions
trading scheme, etc.) and specifically the European Parliament has underlined
the importance of corporate environmental actions, in an attempt to monitor
the rising temperatures. For this reason, climate change effects have shaped the
perception of various stakeholders such as investors, managers and employees in
the EU area. Thus, in order to understand if all these talks about climate change
are eventually considered by stakeholders, all three empirical chapters are based
on a sample of European firms.
1.7 Structure of Thesis
The remainder of the thesis is structured as shown in Table 1.1. In Chapter 2, the
literature review is described, which includes a conceptual and theoretical frame-
work along with a systematic literature review. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 are the three
empirical investigations. All three of them follow the same structure, adhering
to a standard empirical paper. Particularly, each empirical chapter has its own
introduction, specific literature review with its hypotheses, then methodology is
described, results are presented and finally some important remarks. The final
part of the thesis, Chapter 6, concludes with the overall findings, implications of
the results and limitations of the study.
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Table 1.1: Structure of Thesis
Chapter # Title Contents
Chapter 1 Introduction
Background of the topic, motivation,
aims and contribution
Chapter 2 Literature Review
Conceptualising climate change effects,
systematic literature review,
presenting economic theories and
suggestions for future research
Chapter 3
Environmental
& Financial
Performance
The three empirical chapters of the
thesis have similar structure with
subsections:
(i) Introduction
(ii) Literature Review
(iii) Research Design
(iv) Results
(v) Conclusion
Chapter 4
Environmental
Disclosure &
Idiosyncratic
Risk
Chapter 5
Temperature
& Systemic
Risk
Chapter 6 Conclusion
Presenting the main findings, policy
implications, limitations
and future directions
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2 Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
The US and EU account for 11% of the world population and they are responsible
for 25% of world’s carbon emissions. China follows a similar pessimistic trend,
which accounts for 30% of the total Carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. This statis-
tic underlines that few countries pollute; however the social cost is attributed to
all of us. Researchers in this field focus mainly on CO2 because once in the at-
mosphere its effect can last for thousands of years compared to other Greenhouse
Gases (GHG). Bebbington and Larrinaga-González (2008) suggest that the CO2
in the pre industrial era was approximately 280 ppm1, vis-à-vis 409 ppm today,
and at this rate the average global temperature is expected to increase by more
than 2◦C by the end of the century. In close relation to this, Stern (2007) argues
that an increase in temperature of 2◦C would cause extreme weather events such
as storms and floods and that would reduce global GDP by either 0.5% or 1%; a
negative impact that that would become even worse with the rise of temperature.
The effects from global warming typically break down into two categories. On
one hand, there are direct damages which relate to the falling food production,
increasing sea levels and increasing risk of large scale climate changes (see among
others, Stern, 2007; Schlenker and Roberts, 2009; Dell et al., 2014). On the other
hand, the indirect impact of the climate change can be observed in the financial
markets in the form of pollution prevention regulations, as policy-makers make
an effort to stabilise the carbon concentration by regulating the emissions of
companies (Ambec and Lanoie, 2008; Chapple et al., 2013; Oestreich and Tsiakas,
2015). Apparently, global warming seems to have an effect not only on the non-
1ppm is parts per million e.g. 408ppm CO2 is 0.0408% CO2 in the atmosphere
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financial sphere, but also, on financial performance (Bebbington and Larrinaga-
González, 2008).
Financial performance is the ability of the firm to use its assets in a way that
generates profit. Corporate environmental responsibility (CER) is the relation-
ship between the firm and the natural environmental. In this very chapter, the
term CER reflects all the different actions that firms do regarding the environ-
ment, such as GHG reduction, disclosing environmental information, waste re-
duction, adopting environmental management system, buying carbon allowances
etc. This should not be confused with the EP variable of the next Chapter; EP,
in Chapter 3, will be just related to the carbon performance (GHG reduction)
(Busch and Lewandowski, 2017). A growing number of firms have considered
practises to enhance their environmental responsibility in order to minimise their
ecological footprint and consequently to increase its revenues. For this reason,
there is a strong link between CER and FP. However, the existing literature has
not concluded if it pays to be green. On top of that, neither economic theories
clearly show whether it is profitable to operate green. For instance, while legiti-
macy theory proposes a greener performance, neoclassical theory discourages this
adaptation (Li et al., 2018a).
This chapter provides a critical review of the existing literature on the rela-
tionship between FP and CER. We identified different empirical studies that not
only present ambiguous results about the sign and the significance of the said
relationship but also, refer to different economic theories that provide different
explanations. In this regard, we fill the void stemming from the fact that the
theoretical framework bringing together CER and FP has rather been neglected
by existing literature. The study also attempts to provide newcomers in the
field, managers and policy-makers with an overview of all the possible climate
change channels that affect FP. More importantly, we make suggestions for fu-
15
ture research. In particular, we propose that the construction of a composite
environmental variable is imperative in order to shed light on the relationship
between CER and FP.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 presents the
conceptual background of the study. Section 2.3 analyses the economic theories
that CER and FP predicate upon. Section 2.4 sets out the variables and the
methods employed by empirical papers, followed by the most noteworthy find-
ings. Section 2.5 concludes with suggestions for future research, emphasising the
importance of coming up with a component variable that captures developments
in CER.
2.2 Conceptual Background
2.2.1 Climate Change, Output and Consumption
In this section, the indirect impact of climate change on FP through the output is
being presented. Stern (2007) argues that climate change will have a direct effect
on countries’ GDP due to the fact that they have to bear the consequences of
the extreme weather events, such as rainstorms, extreme temperatures and floods.
Dell et al. (2014) maintain that temperature shocks are inevitably connected with
the consumption, agricultural outcome, health, productivity and to some extent
with economic performance.
We begin by looking at the effect on agricultural production and health.
Schlenker and Roberts (2009) identify that temperature changes can have an
impact on agricultural products due to the fact that crop yields can thrive under
certain climate circumstances. Their findings indicate that different temperature-
change scenarios can decrease the average crop supply between 30% and 82% by
the end of the century. Moreover, Deschenes (2014) underscores that the direct
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recipients of climate change are people and the main threat is whether people
are able to adapt to the new environment or not. According to World Health
Organization2 the direct cost to health will be 2-4 billion USD annually by 2030
due to the increasing number of deaths caused by climate change. Dafermos et al.
(2017) underline that extreme weather events and health problems would make
households to save more for precautionary reasons and consequently consume less.
Therefore, global warming affects directly the components of aggregate demand
and supply.
We then turn our attention to the impact on oil production and investment.
The scarcity of fossil fuels along with the continuous increase in the taxes im-
posed by governments on the goods made from fossil fuels lead to higher prices
of these goods (Busch and Hoffmann, 2007). In order to overcome this issue and
reduce the long term cost, companies might need to consider research and devel-
opment (R&D) innovations that are not reliant on fossil fuels. However, Batten
et al. (2016); Semmler et al. (2016) argue that R&D innovations will generate a
transition risk which eventually destabilises the economy.
On the top of that, productivity shocks are inevitably connected with the
climate change. Donadelli et al. (2016) support that temperature shifts have a
long run negative effect on labour productivity. Further, Hsiang (2010) finds that
an increase in temperature by 1◦C can have a negative effect of 2.4% on labour
productivity. Similar finding is supported by Graff Zivin and Neidell (2014) who
identify that a temperature rise reduces the hours worded in industries. Thus
far, less consumption, higher prices of goods and R&D innovations might cause
a productivity shock for firms (Kumar, 2006). In turn, productivity shocks can
explain a high variation of the cross section stock returns (Garlappi and Song,
2016) which accordingly affect the FP of the firms.
2Retrieved from http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs266/en/
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2.2.2 Climate Change and Financial Markets
Having discussed about the consequences of climate change on output and con-
sumption, we now proceed to examine if the temperature related risk is depicted
in financial markets.
From a firm-level perspective, Dobler et al. (2014) place emphasis on the
components of the environmental risk of the firms. This risk arises through
the regulations, operations and natural environment. Particularly, temperature
has often been reported to influence the profitability of climate-sensitive sectors3
such as agriculture, energy, tourism and manufacturing (Perez-Gonzalez and Yun,
2013). Firms in these sectors should hedge their risk management by purchasing
weather derivatives. Weather derivative is the instrument that protects firms
from the temperature related risk changes. Considering for example the study of
Perez-Gonzalez and Yun (2013), who identify that 70% of the US energy firms
hold weather derivatives. Their findings indicate that companies which hold
weather derivatives lead to higher equity valuations.
From a shareholder point of view, temperature is a risk factor (Bansal and
Ochoa, 2011) that might affect the portfolio returns. However, there is not suf-
ficient evidence that temperature variations can describe the volatility of stock
returns (e.g. Cao and Wei, 2005; Bansal and Ochoa, 2011; Balvers et al., 2017).
Futures and options market is better at reflecting all available information (Chris-
tensen and Prabhala, 1998). Therefore, a possible outcome is that temperature
changes are absorbed by the derivatives market. This interconnection has not
been examined by the literature and therefore we cannot conclude about the
effect of climate change on the derivatives market.
3Climate sensitive sectors are defined as the sectors which are affected directly by the cli-
mate change. See more on http://unfccc.int/cooperation_support/response_measures/
items/5003.php
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Overall, the direct effect of climate change on the financial markets needs
further examination. The negative externality of temperature can be hedged with
weather derivatives at company-level. However, the question that still remains is
how to hedge the temperature risk from a stock portfolio.
2.2.3 Environmental Regulations
We now turn to consider the regulatory regime against climate change. Stabil-
ising the carbon emissions is a complicated and ineffective task. According to
Stern (2007) tackling climate change considers four main actions; a) regulating
the emissions, b) incentivise the green investments, c) minimising asymmetric
information and transaction costs and d) building informative network to the
society. Different climate change policies are listed below.
The first policy is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC4)
which was set up in 1988 and is an international body for assessing climate
change. The IPCC presents scientific, technical and socio-economic information
in order to understand the future risk arising from the human-induced climate
change. Its main contribution is to inform about potential impacts and provides
with options for adaptation and mitigation. Furthermore, the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC5) is a treaty which was
signed in 1992 and having as a main target to stabilise the GHG in a harmless
level to the environment. UNFCCC is probably the most serious attempt made
against climate change and it is a treaty supporting posterior actions such as the
Kyoto protocol, Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Paris Agreement.
Regarding the Kyoto Protocol6, it is an agreement made by UNFCCC with its
main objective being to regulate a permissible limit of GHG. The Protocol had
4http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/tor/TOR_Bureau.pdf
5http://newsroom.unfccc.int/about/
6http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php
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been negotiated since 1997 and was set in action in 2008. It requires ratification
and signed members ought to decrease their emissions at a level of 5% below that
in 1990. Similar to the Kyoto Protocol, Asia Pacific Partnership (APP7) has
attempted to meet goals for national air pollution reduction and climate change
in a way that will not harm the growth and the sustainability of countries and
firms. APP partners are Australia, Canada, China, India, Japan, Korea, and the
United States. Additionally, the CDM8 is a mechanism that promotes the low
emission technologies in developing countries. Moreover, it motivates sustainable
development emission reductions by giving developed countries some flexibility in
how they meet their emission reduction limitation target under the Kyoto Pro-
tocol. Meeting the demands of CDM will cause an earning on certified emission
reduction credit (CER) each equivalent to a tone of CO2. Accordingly, CDM
supports the green investment and gives incentives for emission reductions. The
most recent and prominent attempt against climate change took place in Paris
on December of 2015. Paris agreement9 is being ratified by 148 out of 197 coun-
tries and was taken into force on November 2016. The agreement incorporates
three main targets, a) holding the world temperature increase below 2◦C (after
the industrial revolution the temperature has increased by almost 1◦C), b) facili-
tating the adaptation of low GHG technologies in respect to the food production
and c) making finance flows consistent and continuous to low climate-resilient
development.
However, the Paris agreement cannot be evaluated yet for its contribution.
Other actions have been taken all over the world but do not offer a substantial
solution. Keohane and Victor (2011) argue that complicated climate regime is
ineffective and this can be justified by the fact that world CO2 emissions keep
7http://www.asiapacificpartnership.org/english/default.aspx
8http://cdm.unfccc.int/about/index.html
9http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9444.php
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increasing (figure 2.1). In addition to this, stringent environmental regulations
not only have neutral effect on the carbon emissions, but also a negative impact
on the labour productivity of firms (Ambec and Lanoie, 2008).
Figure 2.1: CO2 Emissions.
Note: The vertical axes correspond to the kiloton (kt) of CO2 emissions. On the left is the world
carbon emissions, while on the right is the European carbon emissions. The horizontal axis is
the year. IPCC, UNFCCC, EU ETS, CDM, Kyoto Protocol and APP are referred to different
climate change policies under the years of their implementation. CO2 data were reviewed from
World Bank Indicators.
2.2.4 Climate Change and the Carbon Market
Carbon trading is tool for reducing GHG cost-effectively. In some regions such
as California, New Zealand, Korea, Australia and in EU10, CO2 has been fi-
nancialised as a commodity and is exchanged in a cap and trade system. Cap
and trade system indicates that the quantity of emissions has to be capped. Pol-
luters have allocated allowances, either free or by auctions (Schultz and Swieringa,
2014). Every year companies must surrender enough allowances to cover all of
their emissions, otherwise they are penalised according to the state-law. If com-
10https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/
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panies achieve the emission target, they can keep the additional allowances either
for their future needs or trading purposes. Therefore, CO2 is not just limited
to be regulated under the governments but also carbon market has an equal
responsibility for stabilising the climate change.
It is notable that after the implementation of the EU emissions trading system
(EU ETS), the primary objective of decreasing the CO2 emissions in the EU re-
gion has been attained (figure 2.1). However, a question that has to be addressed
is whether the stringent regulation, especially in the EU area, has made compa-
nies to outsource capital. More specifically, in the past decade, an ever increasing
number of US and western EU firms are moving their operations to Asia, partic-
ularly to India and China (Massini and Miozzo, 2012), where the environmental
regulations have not been ratified yet and the marginal cost of manufacturing is
much lower (Belcourt, 2006).
2.2.5 Political Intervention
We now turn to consider the potential effect of environmental announcements,
made by politicians, on a firm’s value. Consider, for example, the following
headline: “Coal resurgent, renewables in retreat after Trump’s win. [. . . ] If you
want a snapshot of what the global energy map will look like, look no farther
than the stock market”.11 Apparently, the newly elected president of the US has
publicly announced he does not believe in climate change. In a recent study by
Ramiah et al. (2015) the authors identify that green announcements made by
the former eco-friendly US president increse stock market volatility. Obama’s
priority was to mitigate the global warming while Trump’s agenda schedules to
“alt control delete”12 the policy of his predecessor. Similarly, Ramiah et al.
11Coal resurgent, renewables in retreat energy after trump’s win. Retrieved from: https:
//www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
12See more on:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-38746608
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(2016) assess the effect of green announcements on the stock returns of British
companies and they detect a short and long run surge of systematic risk of the
companies. Typically, political announcements occur in order to introduce or
alternate a political regime (Pastor and Veronesi, 2013). For instance, changes in
environmental policies indicate a political shock which is reflected on the stock
market, because investors are driven by uncertainty of a potential modification
of the existing legislation and they have to reassess whether the new situation is
aligned with their objectives. Therefore, the new political regime in the US has
caused uncertainty to the investors which is reflected on the volatility of stock
returns. Pastor and Veronesi (2013) notice that uncertainty instigates a higher
risk premium and it varies according to the magnitude of firms’ association with
the new policy. Even though, anecdotal evidence suggests that energy stock
prices surge while clean power stocks sink under “anti-green” announcements,
methodological framework has to thoroughly examine this observation.
2.2.6 Financial Performance and Climate Change
In this regard, temperature dynamics, regulations, carbon market and political
interventions bring us to the focal point of this report which is to evaluate the
effect of climate change on FP. The particular channels that confirm this con-
nection are represented in figure 2.2. The aggregated environmental performance
of firms generates an amount of CO2; the higher the carbon concentration in
the air, the warmer the planet gets. The effects of the temperature changes on
the environment can be defined as the climate change which subsequently has an
indirect effect on FP.
This indirect effect occurs through five channels: The first one is the environ-
mental regulation (Ambec and Lanoie, 2008) due to the fact that companies have
to operate in a new environment to which they need to adapt so they change
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their productivity levels. Second, the carbon market (Schultz and Swieringa,
2014) where firms cap their emissions via carbon allowances that are traded in
the market. The third channel is the economic output, because an increase in
the temperature decreases labour productivity (Hsiang, 2010) along with the real
GDP growth (Dell et al., 2012). The fourth channel involves the political ini-
tiatives, such as environmental announcements which have been proven to cause
volatility in the financial market (Ramiah et al., 2015). The last channel has to
do with the weather derivatives which are issued to hedge the temperature risk
(Perez-Gonzalez and Yun, 2013).
Figure 2.2: Conceptualising Climate Change Effects.
Note: Rectangles show potential effects stem from climate change and ovals represent the mit-
igation policies against climate change. Dotted lines underscore the indirect channels between
climate change and financial performance. Solid arrows represent some additional interconnec-
tions.
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On top of the established channels that link climate change to FP, our analysis
puts forward the argument that we should also investigate the following. First,
high CER admittedly seems to have a positive and significant effect on the FP
(Orlitzky et al., 2003; Albertini, 2013), with a need to further investigate their
bidirectional relationship. Second, one of the functions of derivatives market is
to hedge against unexpected events. Similarly, the weather derivatives hedge
against extreme temperatures and therefore possibly the temperature risk can be
hedged by other securities such as futures or options. Third, reassessing whether
regulations have created barrier to operate in some regions and have companies
outsourced in a less regulated environment. Overall, firms should certainly re-
consider their environmental actions and therefore the next section attempts to
clarify and evaluate the benefits and the drawbacks of high CER in regard with
the economic theories.
2.3 Economic Theories
The papers that have been reviewed for this section utilise a wide range of eco-
nomic theories. We classify these theories based on how they answer the following
prompt: “How is FP affected if we invest in CER?” There exists three distinct
cluster of theories. First, the economic theories that support the positive impact
of CER on FP because firms eventually gain sustainable competitive advantage.
Second, theories of negative impact claim that investing in CER will deteriorate
the FP. Third, neutral theories have to weigh many different aspects in order to
conclude about the direction of FP.
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2.3.1 Theories of Positive Impact
The following part of this section moves on to describe in greater detail the eco-
nomic theories that support the positive impact of CER on FP. These theories are
the: (i) natural based view of the firm, (ii) legitimacy theory, (iii) instrumental
stakeholder theory, (iv) slack resource argument, and two of the environmental
strategies, (v) accommodative and (vi) proactive approach. The positive im-
pact of CER on FP stands on the notion that firms, engaging in environmental
practises, would decrease the long-term operational cost, improve the future prof-
itability and create barriers to entry for new competitors; attributes that lead to
a competitive advantage.
Among others Judge and Douglas (1998); Gil et al. (2001); De Burgos Jimenez
and Cespedes Lorente (2001); King and Lenox (2001); Molina-Azorin et al. (2009);
Delmas et al. (2015) examine the relationship between FP and CER under the
natural resource based view of the firm. Hart (1995) claims that firms should: a)
prevent the pollution by minimising their emissions, b) increase the life of goods
by developing new technologies and c) sustain the development in order to manage
their resources efficiently. Companies have not understood the environmental
opportunities yet. Eco-friendly firms abate the risk and the cost as they become
technological advanced. Subsequently, corporate governance aims to enhance the
CER by minimising emissions and life cycle cost of products as a result the future
position of the corporation can be ameliorated (Hart and Ahuja, 1996). Also, the
future prosperity stands on the notion that green customers will be attracted by
firms’ ethical behaviour to the environment (Elkington, 1994).
Moreover, the ethical approach of the relationship is best described with the
legitimacy theory by suggesting that firms are more likely to report environmental
factors such as economic, political and social information in order to legitimise
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corporate actions (Guthrie and Parker, 1989). The notion of this theory is that
firms operate in a society where they have to contribute and inform the public
about their environmental actions. Therefore, firms would voluntarily agree to
disclose social information in order to meet the demands of the public. For
instance, disclosing firm’s ecological performance will have a result to alleviate
the external pressure for climate change. Also, transparent information regarding
the CER means that they have to operate eco-friendly in order to make visible
their environmental sensitivity and so they expect to have FP boosted (Ben-Amar
and McIlkenny, 2015). On the other hand, large emitting firms will be punished
by the society and such firms will avoid to disclose that kind of information (Lee
et al., 2015). For that reason, the companies that they disclose environmental
information are expected to have positive relationship with the FP under the
legitimacy theory.
An application of legitimacy theory combining with the agency theory (de-
scribed at 2.3.2) results the instrumental stakeholder theory which focuses on the
contracts between the agents and principals and claims that trust and coopera-
tion within company help solve problems (Jones, 1995). The theory is based on
an integration of the agency theory combining with a behavioural science and
ethics underling that under those criteria a firm can create a competitive advan-
tage. Hence, a framework relied on the instrumental stakeholder theory is more
likely to present a positive relation between CER and FP.
In addition, many studies (Karagozoglu and Lindell, 2000; Gil et al., 2001)
built their research under the environmental strategies. According to Buysse
and Verbeke (2003) the environmental CSR (corporate social responsibility) ap-
proaches are the accommodative, proactive, defensive and reactive. Accommoda-
tive and proactive approaches appear to influence the company positively. The
former posits that firms have incentives to inform stakeholders about their envi-
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ronmental management. Dawkins and Fraas (2011) also hypothesise that visible13
firms are more likely to disclosure environmental reports in order to diminish the
asymmetric information due to the fact that their actions are seriously taken
into account by the society and consequently stakeholders are attracted by high
visible firms (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), argument which is also supported by
the legitimacy theory. Thus, firms create a brand reputation with transparent
information which not only gives a cost advantage but also a source of differen-
tiation (Porter, 1991). Aragon-Correa and Sharma (2003) state that competitive
advantage can be created if only firms adopt long term proactive environmental
objectives while competitive advantage is highly unlikely to occur in a limited
period of time. Likewise, the latter approach focuses on the level of the environ-
mental engagement of the firm, suggesting that high proactive companies have
cost savings due to technological improvements and avoid regulation (Reinhardt
and Stavins, 2010), argument which is also supported by the nature resource
based view of the firm. The rest two environmental approaches are described in
the negative theory content (section 2.3.2).
Furthermore, investigating the time effect of the CER, Horvathova (2012)
examines the relationship by dividing the environmental engagement into two
sub periods. The author hypothesises that the competitive advantage has a time
varying effect. Therefore, in a short term, firms will not be able to offset the cost
of the investment but in the long run the CER and FP will be positively related; in
other words, Porter Hypothesis starts having an effect after a substantial period
of time. The time varying Porter Hypothesis can be also observed in the slack
resource view. Very few publications (Daniel et al., 2004; Endrikat et al., 2014)
can be found in the literature that discussing the relationship under the slack
resource view. The theory is referred to the resource endowments in social and
13The visibility refers to the attention paid to a firm by the media
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human capital and source constraints that can influence the performance of a firm
in a competitive market. CER is inevitably connected with the source constrains
(Busch and Hoffmann, 2007). George (2005) claims that the resources are not
only correlated with the size of the firm but also with the industry in which it
operates. The slack resource considers the bidirectional effect of the relationship
suggesting that high FP will cause good environmental behaviour and vice versa.
Overall, six economic theories are found to promote the CER as a means of
outweighing the negative climate change effect on the FP. Particularly, the pos-
itive spectrum of theories supports that investing in resources will not pay-off
immediately but it facilitates the diffusion of the technology and firms will be
capable of controlling the negative externalities such as environmental legislation
and social pressure (Bansal, 2005). Firms will be able to be imitable and decrease
the long run operational cost, representing the attributes of the competitive ad-
vantage.
2.3.2 Theories of Negative Impact
In contrast to the previous subsection, we now consider theories that claim that
investing in CER will deteriorate the FP. Theories that are included in this group
are: (i) the neoclassical theory,the rest two environmental strategies, (ii) defensive
and (iii) reactive approach and (iv) the agency theory. The negative relationship
between CER and FP can be justified due to the higher cost that firms have to
endure.
Wagner et al. (2002) investigate the association under the scope of competitive
advantage of the firm and postulate the neoclassical theory. Neoclassical theory
suggests that some industries need high environmental compliance costs to op-
erate under green management and therefore face a competitive disadvantage.
So, the cost of decreasing their emissions are relatively high and it is predicted
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to increase productivity cost as a result increasing marginal costs. Neoclassical
theory simply assumes that there is a direct trade-off between the cost and the
benefit, indicating that investing in CER deducts profits and therefore decreases
the firm’s value.
Nollet et al. (2016) rely their research on the agency theory. Managers have
incentives to invest in CER in order to increase their reputation, while share-
holders are neutral (Barnea and Rubin, 2010). However, an over-investment will
cause a deduction of profits and therefore lower shareholder value. Jensen (2001)
underlines that the social responsibility as an investment strategy could create a
higher shareholder value if the managerial discretion works under the objective
of shareholder value maximisation, but this would better mirror the instrumental
stakeholder theory, which was previously discussed (see section 2.3.1). Hence-
forth, under the agency theory, if managers choose to invest in CER, this will
directly deduct profits from the firm.
Continuing with the two last environmental strategies and more particularly
the defensive and reactive approach. The former is centred on a negative rela-
tionship between FP and voluntary environmental disclosure (Brown and Deegan,
1998) due to the fact that firms are exposed to unnecessary criticism, in a sense
that can be characterised as a counter-legitimacy theory. Last environmental
approach is the reactive, which disregards the environmental engagement merely
because the opportunity cost is high and investing in other assets can generate
greater returns (Buysse and Verbeke, 2003), argument which is in alignment with
the neoclassical theory. Another reason to avoid CER is that if the majority of
companies tend to adopt a clean operation, then companies that have not be
differentiated, will eventually gain competitive advantage. Thus, the relationship
between CER and FP varies according to the environmental strategy.
In general, four economic theories discourage the adaptation of high CER due
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to the extra cost imposed to the firms and at the same time the opportunity cost
to invest in other assets will generate greater returns.
2.3.3 Theories of Neutrality
The last category of theories concentrates on how CER can enhance specific firm
characteristics and whether these would be able to increase or decrease the value
of the firm. Theories that fall in this category are: (ii) cost-benefit approach and
(ii) finance theory.
Arora and Cason (1995) pay attention to the heterogeneity of the sample
by measuring the net benefit of reducing GHG emissions among different firms.
Similarly, Hatakeda et al. (2012) assess the difference between the cost of reducing
GHG (CER) and the profitability (FP) as the net benefit of their relationship.
They concentrate on a simple cost-benefit approach. Practically, as long as the
net benefit is positive, firms will participate to activities to reduce GHG emissions
and so that they can achieve high profitability. However, when the net benefit
is negative, firms do not engage in environmental activities, which results to low
green investments and hence cost saving, along with large GHG emissions.
Moreover, Chen and Wang (2012); Bansal et al. (2016); Balvers et al. (2017)
rely their hypothesis on the finance theory. The value of the firm is connected
with the riskiness of its underlined assets (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). De Jong
et al. (2008) evidence that macroeconomic factors affect the capital structure of
the firms. Since some climate sensitive industries have their assets exposed to
temperature risk (Balvers et al., 2017) and temperature negatively affects macroe-
conomic variables (Dell et al., 2012). Then, it can be extracted that temperature
is a factor that has a negative effect on equity evaluations. Along with the tem-
perature effects, regulations, CO2 reductions and carbon market increase the
unsystematic risk for the companies (Chen and Wang, 2012). Normally, the un-
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systematic risk can be hedge through derivatives. For instance, holding weather
derivatives, companies would be able to adjust a proportion of temperature risk
that has an impact on FP. Finance theory recognises that the negative externality
of the climate change cannot be evaded and therefore managers should take into
consideration means of hedging.
Two economic theories cannot define the outcome of FP because they have
to weigh many different factors in order to reach a decision. Particularly, neutral
theories acknowledge that investing in CER will generate a transition risk along
with some initial cost. However, the outcome of the investment might be deferred
in a long run horizon.
2.3.4 Classifying the theories
This sub-section assembles all the economic theories that previous researches
based on explaining the relationship between CER and FP (see table 2.2).
A total number of 12 theories are found with most of them supporting the
positive impact of CER on FP, few neglecting the CER engagement, while some
others just waver to provide with a clear resolution. The main difference amongst
these theories is the time horizon. For instance, positive theories conceive that
long-term environmental objectives establish a consistent strategy that reduces
the asymmetric information and uncertainty of environmental issues, develop-
ing dynamic capabilities which are attractive by shareholders. On the other
hand, negative theories maintain a trade-off view, indicating that CER deducts
short-term profits that could generate long-term higher returns. Neutral theories
support that likewise every investment, CER contains some risk which generates
either gains or losses. Besides, the main objective is to test the Porter Hypothe-
sis. FP is certainly depleted by the effects of climate change, amid that, positive
economic theories argue that this might be an opportunity to gain competitive
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Table 2.2: Economic Theory of CER and FP
Theory Expected FP outcome Objective
Legitimacy Theory +
Sustaining
Competitive
Advantage
Instrumental Stakeholder +
Slack Resource +
Natural Resource Based +
Environmental strategies:
(i) Accommodative +
(ii) Proactive +
(iii) Defensive - Increasing
Total
Cost
(iv) Reactive -
Neo-classical Theory -
Agency Theory -
Finance Theory ±
Combination
Cost-Benefit Analysis ±
Note: The link between environmental and financial performance is observed in the afore-
mentioned theories. The second column illustrates the expected sign of FP according to the
underlined theory. The third column corresponds to the objective of its theory.
advantage. However, negative theories present this opportunity as a cost-trap
disadvantage.
2.4 Systematic Literature Review
Having discussed about the economic theories about environmental CSR and
firm performance, this section of the thesis aims to provide an up-to-dated lit-
erature review regarding the empirical investigations around the environmental
CSR and financial performance. The significance of environmental responsibility
in financial performance cannot be unobserved by scholars, managers and regu-
lators. Over the past two decades, the former have attempted to understand the
opportunities of investing in CER. We refer to CER as a specific term for the
environmental CSR of the firms. Meanwhile, policy-makers attempt to stabilise
the carbon emissions of the companies. Stabilising the emissions demands firms
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to comply with the environmental regulations. In turn, Reinhardt and Stavins
(2010) indicate that high CER would make firms to avoid regulation. Also em-
bracing the CER, firms would be technological advanced and decrease the long
term operational costs (Hart, 1997). Therefore, this engagement can be described
as a “win-win” situation (e.g. Elkington, 1994; Ambec and Lanoie, 2008).
However, the examination of the effect of CER on FP have brought ambiguous
results with a tenancy of supporting the positive and significant relationship. For
instance, meta-analytic papers (Busch and Lewandowski, 2017; Endrikat et al.,
2014; Albertini, 2013; Horvathova, 2010) indicate that on average 60% of the em-
pirical studies support the positive, 20% the negative and 20% the non-significant
relationship between CER and FP. The studies jointly specify that the ambigu-
ousness amongst studies is attributed to the different methodological artefacts.
The geographical areas, the methods used, the length of the investigation, as well
as, the variables to approximate CER and FP seem to moderate the relationship.
This section provides a systematic review of the existing literature on the re-
lationship between FP and CER . We identified 49 empirical studies that present
inconsistent results about the sign and the significance of the said relationship
under different methodological specifications. In this regard, we fill the void
stemming by providing more insights about the methodological trends of the
investigation. More importantly, we make suggestions for future research. In
particular, we propose that the construction of a composite environmental vari-
able is imperative in order to shed light on the relationship between CER and
FP.
2.4.1 Retrospect of Theoretical Studies: CER Definition
At this point, it is imperative to underline that CER in this chapter indicates all
different environmental CSR activities and it is significantly different from what
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we define EP in the first empirical chapter (Chapter 3).
Analysing the relationship between FP-CER has reached 25 years with em-
pirical (Hamilton, 1995) and conceptual (Hart, 1995) contributions. The first
meta-analytic paper is dated in 2003 (Orlitzky et al., 2003), when CER is under-
lined as one of the most important components of CSR. The authors underline
that CER can be used as a proxy for social performance. Even though, the results
are not significant to establish a connection between CER and FP, the study was
a virtue step to the upcoming analysis. Later, Ambec and Lanoie (2008) with
a systematic review paper provide more insights regarding the aforementioned
relationship. The study analyses a content associated with the competitive ad-
vantage by arguing that CER is the relationship of the firm to its natural re-
sources. Boosting CER would result to indirect benefits by offsetting the cost of
stringent regulation. Similarly, Horvathova (2010) postulates that the net benefit
of CER is the difference between pollution abatement cost and cost of environ-
mental policies. The author underlines the importance of the time length of the
examination. Molina-Azorin et al. (2009) emphasise that green management pro-
motes the values and ethics of firms. Their findings highlight that the direction
of the relationship is depended upon the industry, country and method of the
examination.
Recently, meta-analyses have dominated in the theoretical examination. Dixon-
Fowler et al. (2013); Albertini (2013); Endrikat et al. (2014); Busch and Lewandowski
(2017) define CER as the environmental practises of firms to reduce their ecolog-
ical footprint. The studies catholically imply that the methodology moderates
the relationship. More specifically, the variables to approximate CER and FP,
the estimation method, the geographical area and time of the investigation are
the most noteworthy findings.
Addressing the problem of homogeneity the study aims to investigate in depth
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the methodological artefacts. We take into account the econometric technique, a
wide range of environmental variables, industry, country, the way of the exami-
nation (CER dependent or independent) and lastly we observe the results upon
this specifications.
2.4.2 Methodology
Figure 2.3: Systematic Literature Review Process
Having discussed about the theory and definition of CER, we now proceed
to systematically evaluate different empirical studies between CER and FP. The
systematic review has conducted into two steps (figure 2.3). Firstly, we searched
into Scopus database for published articles between 1995 and 2017, with terms
in title, abstract and keywords: “environmental performance” or “environmental
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management” or “environmental disclosure” and “financial performance” or “eco-
nomic performance”. The analysis is centred on four aspects: (1) the data and
proxies of FP and CER; (2) geographic area and industry covered (3) economet-
ric technique; and (4) results obtained. In the second step we applied exclusion
criteria. Even though, the initial sample was extensively large [539 (see figure
2.4)] we focused on peer reviewed articles that are published in high quality jour-
nals in ABS list. The total number of papers, that are both quantitative and
theoretical from the ABS list and available online, are 81. These 81 paper are
listed in Table 2.3. The Table 2.3 indicatively shows that climate-economy and
managerial literature are ample, while climate - finance literature is still limited.
Figure 2.4: Number of Publications per Year
Note: studies included if use the following words: “environmental performance” or “environ-
mental management” or “environmental disclosure” and “financial performance” or “economic
performance”.
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Additionally, we only focused on quantitative studies with business, manage-
rial, economic and finance content. Some papers, which were not appeared in
the search, are added due to the fact that are found to be highly cited in this
examination. Hence, we finally detect 49 empirical articles in 31 peer reviewed
journals that examine the connection between CER and FP. Similar methodology
for systematic review has been conducted by Molina-Azorin et al. (2009).
38
Table 2.3: Distribution of Papers by Discipline
Discipline Journal Title
Number
of Papers
Management
& Social
Responsibility
Academy of management review, Journal of
Business Ethics, Journal of Management,
Academy of management journal,Business &
Society, Journal of Business Research,
California Management Review, Management
Decision, European Management Journal,
Harvard business review, Journal of Management
Studies,
19
Economics
Journal of Environmental Economics &
management, Ecological Economics,
Journal of Economic Literature, Energy
Economics, Environmental & Resource Economics,
Review of Economics & Statistics,Economic
Modelling, Applied Economics, Oxford Review of
Economic Policy, Journal of Labor Economics,
American Economic Review
15
Finance
Journal of Banking & Finance, Journal
of Finance, Applied Financial Economics,
Journal of Financial Economics
14
Business &
Environment
Business Strategy & the Environment,
Journal of Industrial Ecology,
Corporate Social Responsibility
& Environmental Management
8
Accounting
European Accounting Review,
Accounting & Business research,
Pacific Accounting Review,
Managerial Auditing Journal, Abacus
6
Strategy Strategic Management Journal 5
Operation
Research
Omega, Management Science 5
Human
Resources
Human Resource Management,
Human Resource Management Review
4
Operations &
Technology
Management
Journal of Operations & Production Management,
IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management,
Journal of Operation Management
3
Organisation
Studies
Organization & Environment, Organization Studies 3
Innovation Structural Change & economic dynamics 1
Note: Left column describes the area, the middle column lists the name of the journal and
the right column counts the number of papers. ABS and ABDC lists were used to divide the
journals according to their discipline.
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2.4.3 Results
Data and Variables
This section identifies a number of methodological trends that are observed in
the geographical area, industry covered and examined variables.
Initially, the majority of the studies (see for example, Judge and Douglas,
1998; Karagozoglu and Lindell, 2000; King and Lenox, 2001; Konar and Cohen,
2001; Stanny, 2013; Matsumura et al., 2014; Delmas et al., 2015) use a sample of
U.S firms. More particularly, 22 studies focus purely on the U.S indicating that
almost 50% of the examination corresponds to this area. Few others (Gil et al.,
2001; Wagner et al., 2002; Horvathova, 2012; Broadstock et al., 2018) choose EU
firms (n=9). While some other studies (Gilley et al., 2000; Busch and Hoffmann,
2011; Sariannidis et al., 2013; Gallego-Alvarez et al., 2014) investigate the re-
lationship focusing on international sample (n=11). The three aforementioned
areas predominate upon this examination by covering the 85% of our sample.
The remaining percentage covers areas such as Japan (e.g. Nakao et al., 2007;
Iwata and Okada, 2011; Hatakeda et al., 2012), Canada, Australia, Isreal and
Egypt. Another important aspect is the examined industry. 33 studies conduct
their research by dispersing on any industry, while the remaining researches focus
on “dirty” firms.
Regarding the FP variables, profitability ratios are used as a proxy to capture
FP and particularly accounting variables such as return on assets (ROA), return
on sales (Sales), return on equity (ROE), stock returns and Tobin’s Q (Q). Even
though most of the researchers employed more than one financial performance
variables, a dominant role in the analysis plays ROA (n=18) and stock returns
(n=18), following by ROE (n=13), Q (n=12) and Sales (n=8). FP variables are
obtained universally from Compustat, S&P Index, Bloomberg and Datastream.
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All studies use annual frequency on their analysis apart from the event studies
which use daily data.
More importantly, environmental variables are more complicated to be at-
tributed (see table 2.4). There are three main categories of environmental vari-
ables (Albertini, 2013). First, variables that measure the environmental footprint
of the corporations such as toxic release inventory (TRI), waste reduction, green-
house gases and aggregated environmental performance (EP rating); this category
of variables cover approximately 60% of the investigation. The second type of
variables correspond to the environmental management variables, which reaches
20% of the examination. For instance, whether firms adopt an environmental
management system, promote cleaner mechanisms and encourage waste reduc-
tion initiatives. The remaining 20% is attributed to the last category which is
the environmental disclosure of firms. Those variables can be either reported
by firms or media. Interesting is the fact that older chronologically studies use
TRI as environmental variable while more recent studies incorporate disclosure
into their analysis. The variables are commonly retrieved from KLD, Bloomberg,
Trucost, S&P ESG Index and CDP.
Environmental disclosure variables interact stronger and more positively with
FP variables regardless the geographical area and industry. Conversely, using
environmental performance variables (e.g. TRI, GHG, EP rating, etc.), the re-
sults appear to have mixed association with FP variables, aligned with Albertini
(2013); Endrikat et al. (2014). In the case of TRI the results are mixed. For in-
stance, TRI influences FP in significant positive and negative direction in different
studies (Hart and Ahuja, 1996; Cordeiro and Sarkis, 1997; Stanwick and Stan-
wick, 1998). Also, TRI and GHG have a significant negative and non significant
effect respectively on Tobin’s Q (Konar and Cohen, 2001; Delmas et al., 2015).
50% of studies (5/10) that incorporate GHG, indicate the negative effect of GHG
41
and FP, the rest studies find no association and none supports the positive rela-
tion between GHG and FP. When EP rating is employed the majority of studies
support the positive outcome (7/11). Therefore, there is a strong evidence that
the selection bias is apparent in this relationship. Thus, the relationship heavily
relies on the moderation effects and endogeneity has to be controlled. Although,
the analysis differs according to industry level and country effects (Berman et al.,
1999) the part which has to be prudentially faced is the variables of the exami-
nation. Detailed results from the systematic review output can be found in the
table 2.4.
Methods and outcome
This subsection describes different econometric methods employed to test the
said relationship, along with some noteworthy findings. The methods reported
include the ordinary least square (OLS) regression, event study and other panel
data methodologies.
Initially, we should point out that environmental performance variable (e.g.
TRI, GHG, EP rating, etc.) dominates as independent variable in the analysis
(n=37) while it is only examined as dependent variable in 9 studies. Few studies
decide to test the relationship by having environmental performance as both
dependent and independent variable (Judge and Douglas, 1998; Wagner et al.,
2002; Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Matsumura et al., 2014). Another finding is that
3 studies based their results solely on correlations (Turban and Greening, 1997;
Montabon et al., 2007; Aragon-Correa and A. Rubio-Lopez, 2007).
The majority of the studies, employ OLS regressions (n=18) (Karagozoglu
and Lindell, 2000; Konar and Cohen, 2001; Dawkins and Fraas, 2011; Hatakeda
et al., 2012). The overall results from the OLS regressions vary with a tendency of
supporting the positive (14/19) relation between CER and FP. More importantly,
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studies that based their research on mainly US firm sample have also positive
results (Judge and Douglas, 1998; Karagozoglu and Lindell, 2000; Konar and
Cohen, 2001).
Dominant role in CER-FP relationship plays the panel data methodologies.
Panel data takes into account the time by including cross section firm observa-
tions. 9 of the empirical studies employ fixed and random effect estimations to
capture the average effect of CER on FP (King and Lenox, 2001; Elsayed and Pa-
ton, 2005; Iwata and Okada, 2011; Horvathova, 2012; Gallego-Alvarez et al., 2014;
Delmas et al., 2015; Nollet et al., 2016). Model-specifications may differ across
studies. For instance, some studies examine the non-linear relationship by adding
as an explanatory variable squared values of CER. Wagner et al. (2002); Dawkins
and Fraas (2011); Hatakeda et al. (2012); Misani and Pogutz (2015); Nollet et al.
(2016); Broadstock et al. (2018); Trumpp and Guenther (2017) support the evi-
dence of non-linear relationship between CER and FP. The non-linear effects have
been analysed by 8 mostly contemporaneous papers. The reason behind that is
to test whether there is a direct association between CER and FP.
Also, Horvathova (2012) investigates the time variations by adding more than
one period lagged values of CER, the time varying effect provides a clarification on
whether the Porter hypothesis holds after a substantial period of time. Another
important finding is the existence of time varying effect, particularly, Horvathova
(2012); Delmas et al. (2015) identify that a high CER has a negative effect on the
first year, while in the long run the effect becomes positive. This finding comes
to an agreement with the trade off view because firms initially will not be able
to bear the cost of an investment, but in the future, firms will have created a
competitive advantage, argument which is supported by the legitimacy theory.
Moreover, Sariannidis et al. (2013) investigate the relationship between FP
and environmental behaviour with time series approach. Taking monthly stock
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returns from world largest CSR companies and their GHG emissions in order to
identify causality. Garch model is employed with expectation to measure if CO2
“moving together” with the stock returns. Also, if the conditional variance found
statistical significant means that there is a hidden information in the GHG which
results in the asymmetric volatility of the stock returns. Garch model accounts
mostly for the causality between CER and FP and whether CO2 reductions boost
the environmental pro-activity of the firm. Their findings indicate that carbon
emissions affect negatively the stock price. This finding is more intense in a carbon
oriented industries and firms with high CSR management. Likewise, Yamaguchi
(2008) observe that environmental disclosure influences stock returns in a positive
manner. Therefore, socially responsible investors are more likely to divert from
a company with low CER communicator, as legitimacy theory proposes, and
consequently CSR companies are exposed to a higher risk under a negative carbon
information.
Event studies provide similar results. Among others (Fisher-Vanden and
Thorburn, 2011; Hsu and Wang, 2013; Luo and Tang, 2014; Lee et al., 2015) use
event study methodology (n=10). They examined the effect of environmental
voluntary carbon disclosure or the green political announcements on the cumu-
lative abnormal returns of the firms. Announcements are inevitably connected
with the legitimacy theory of the firm. Therefore, upon a good environmental
announcement, shareholders should reward the companies that legitimise their
environmental behaviour. The majority of authors (8/10) conclude that environ-
mental corporate disclosure increase the value of the firm.
Likewise, from a political point of view, Ramiah et al. (2015) investigate the
announcements concerning climate change that have been made by the former US
president Obama who is known for his environmental sensitivity. Ramiah et al.
(2015, 2016) provide results which are twofold. First, upon an announcement
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high volatility have been observed in both the US and global financial markets;
finding which is consistent with Pastor and Veronesi (2013) who claim that po-
litical announcement is a source of systematic risk. Also, there is no evidence
that green companies experience some positive returns, indicating that “good”
news have less effect than “bad” news. Second, large polluters do not seem to be
affected directly from green announcement, finding which is supported by Gilley
et al. (2000) as well. According to the legitimacy theory, large polluters should
be penalised upon a “bad” news however this is not the case. The latter finding
triggers some further questions, such as how large corporations can offset the risk
of a political shock. The exegesis which is given by Ramiah et al. (2016) is that
those companies are able to pass the extra cost to the consumers. Another exe-
gesis can be supported by the defensive environmental strategy, which indicates
that firms prefer to maintain a neutral position against climate change in order
to keep low visibility (Lee et al., 2015).
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Table 2.4: Systematic Review Output
Author(s) Variable Method Results Industry Country IV DV FP term
Hamilton, 1995
Toxic Release
Inventory
Event study −*
Cross-
section
U.S Stock return
Hart & Ahuja,
1996
TRI OLS regression −*
Manufa-
cturing
U.S ROA, ROE
Klassen et al.,
1996
Environmental
awards
Event study +*
Cross-
section
U.S Stock return
Cordeiro &
Sakris, 1997
TRI OLS regression +*
Manufa-
cturing
U.S EPS
Russo & Fouts,
1997
EP rating OLS regression +*
Cross-
section
U.S ROA
Turban &
Greening, 1997
EP rating correlation ±
Cross-
section
Global ROA
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Judge & Douglas,
1998
EP rating
Structural equa-
tion model
+
Cross-
section
U.S ROI, Sales
Stanwick &
Stanwick, 1998
TRI
OLS regression
and correlation
−
Manufa-
cturing
U.S Net profits
Gilley et al., 2000
Waste reduc-
tion
Event study null
Cross-
section
Stock return
King & Lexon,
2001
GHG OLS regression −
Manufa-
cturing
U.S Q
Konar & Cohen,
2001
TRI OLS regression −*
Manufa-
cturing
U.S Q
Wagner et al.,
2002
EP index(2)
Simultaneous
equations
- Paper E.U
ROA, Sales,
ROC
47
Al-Tuwaijri et al.,
2004
Disclosure,
waste reduc-
tion
Simultaneous
equation
+*
cross-
section
U.S Stock return
Wagner &
Schaltegger, 2004
Waste reduc-
tion
OLS regression +
Manufa-
cturing
EU
Composite
index
Elsayed & Paton,
2005
EP rating
Fixed, random
effect, GMM
regressions
±
Cross-
section
U.K
ROA, Q ,
Sales
Wagner, 2005 EP rating(2)
Fixed, random
effects and
pooled OLS
regressions
(U shape)* Paper EU ROE, Sales
Link & Naveh,
2006
EMS OLS regression null
Cross-
section
Israel Net profit
48
Aragon-Correa &
Rubio-Lopez,
2007
Organic emis-
sions
Correlation null Food
UK,
France
ROE
Montabon et al.,
2007
EMS
Canonical corre-
lation
+
Cross-
section
U.S,
Global
ROA, ROI
Nakao et al., 2007 EP rating
OLS, Granger
Causality
+*
Manufa-
cturing
Japan
ROA, ROE,
Q, EPS
Wahba, 2008 EMS OLS regression +*
Cross-
section
Egypt Q
Yamaguchi, 2008 EP rating
EGARCH, OLS,
Event study
+
Cross-
section
Japan Stock return
Berrone &
Gomez-Mejia,
2009
TRI
Fixed, random
effect regressions
±
Cross-
section
U.S ROE
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Iwata & Okada,
2011
Waste reduc-
tion, GHG
Fixed effect re-
gression
null, −*
Manufa-
cturing
Japan
ROA, ROE,
Q
Busch &
Hoffmann, 2011
GHG, EMS OLS regression −*, −* Energy Global
ROE, ROA,
Q
Dawkins & Fraas,
2011
Disclosure OLS regression ±
Cross-
section
U.S ROA, ROE
Fisher-Vanden &
Thorburn 2011
Waste re-
duction
initiatives
Event study −*
Cross-
section
Global Stock return
Clark &
Crawford, 2012
EP rating probit regression +*
Cross-
section
U.S
Financial in-
centives
Chen & Wang,
2012
Kyoto proto-
col ratifica-
tion
OLS regression +
Cross-
section
Global Leverage
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Hatakeda et al.,
2012
GHG(2)
Switching regres-
sion
±*
Manufa-
cturing
Japan ROA
Horvathova, 2012
EP index,
EMS
OLS regressions +*
Cross-
section
Czech Re-
public
Sales, ROE,
ROA
Sariannidis et al.,
2013
GHG EGARCH −*
Cross-
section
Global Stock return
Hsu & Wang,
2013
Media en-
vironmental
news
Event study +
Cross-
section
U.S Stock return
Chakrabarty &
Wang, 2013
TRI
Fixed effect re-
gression
null
Manufa-
cturing
U.S ROE
Delmas et al.,
2013
EP rating
Random effect
regression
±
Cross-
section
U.S Q
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Stanny 2013 Disclosure Logit regression null
cross-
section
U.S Stock return
Luo & Tang, 2014 carbon tax Event study −*
Cross-
section
Australia Stock return
Matsumura et al.,
2014
Disclosure
OLS, logit re-
gression
+*
Cross-
section
U.S MKT
Misani et al., 2015 GHG(2) OLS regression (U shape)*
Manufa-
cturing
Global
ROA, ROE,
Q, Sales
Delmas et al.,
2015
GHG
Fixed effect re-
gression
±*
Cross-
section
U.S ROA, Q
Oestreich &
Tsiakas, 2015
Carbon al-
lowances
Pricing models +*
Cross-
section
U.K, Ger-
many
Stock return
Ramiah et al.,
2015
Green policy
news
Event study -
Cross-
section
U.S,
Global
stock return
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Ben-Amar &
Mcllkenny 2015
Disclosure OLS regression + Energy Canada ROA
Nollet et a., 2016 Disclosure(2)
Fixed, random
effect regressions
−
Cross-
section
U.S
ROA, ROI,
Stock return
Ramiah et al.,
2016
Green policy
news
Event study +
Cross-
section
U.K Stock return
Yadav et al., 2016 EP rating event study +*
cross-
section
U.S Stock return
Trumpp &
Guenther, 2017
GHG(2),
waste
reduction(2)
One-way clus-
tered OLS
(U shape)*
Cross-
section
Global
ROA, Stock
return
53
Broadstock, et al.,
2018
GHG, disclo-
sure
Instrumental
variable regres-
sion
(inverted U
shape)*
Cross-
section
U.K
[ROE,
Net prof-
its, Stock
return, Q](2)
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2.4.4 The Case for a Composite Environmental Indicator
This sub-section proposes an environmental composite index in order to measure
the overall environmental performance of the firms by including all the available
environmental variables (see table 2.4). A composite index might draw a better
picture between the EP and FP relationship, because the numerous different
variables give us biased estimation (Albertini, 2013; Endrikat et al., 2014). By
constructing a composite index we will overcome the problem of the selection
bias and at the same time we would have control for different dimensions of the
environmental responsibility (Albertini, 2017).
The liner combinations of the environmental variables might observe the vari-
ance of the data. Zhou et al. (2006) recommend that constructing environmental
index with aggregating methods can be proven an objective measurement. There-
fore the aim is to construct a principal composite variable14. Principal Component
Analysis (PCA) can be used as a robust method because it validates the theory
that harmonises the data (OECD, 2008). PCA is a multivariate technique that
extracts essential information from complex data and clusters the variables in
order to summarise the average effect of them. The output is factor weights for
each variable. Using those weights, not only independent environmental variables
can then be constructed for each firm but also can be ranked according to mean
values of these scores. Moreover, dynamic panel data estimation is more suitable
in cases where some unobservable factors affect both the dependent and indepen-
dent variables and some control variables are strongly related to past values of
the dependent variable (Coban and Topcu, 2013). This is likely to be the case in
regressions of CER on FP.
2.5 Discussion and Future directions
This chapter combines empirical studies and reviews: (1) the theoretical frame-
work behind the effect of CER on FP; (2) the methodological regime of FP-CER
14See more on Appendix A
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examination; (3) geographical area and (4) variables for CER and FP. To this end,
we analyse not only theoretical but also managerial and regulatory implications
of climate change on FP.
Overall, the results are in alignment with previous theoretical papers (Orl-
itzky et al., 2003; Albertini, 2013; Dixon-Fowler et al., 2013; Endrikat et al., 2014)
jointly indicate, CER and FP are positive correlated. Notably, causality involves
the positive link of CER with FP and the partially positive link of FP with CER.
The most important finding is the moderation effect of the methodology, address-
ing the problem of homogeneity. Particularly, the variables, geographical area,
the time horizon of the study and the size of the firms moderate the relationship
between CER and FP and therefore, we cannot decline the probability of biased
estimations. Hence, the question that still remains is whether the indirect profits
of CER can outweigh the direct cost of CER.
2.5.1 Implications
This study attempts to enhance our understanding of the effects of climate change
on the FP. Researchers in the field can use this study as a handbook in order
to familiarise themselves with the main issues and ideas in connection with this
interdisciplinary topic. To this end, we analyse not only theoretical but also
managerial and regulatory implications of climate change on FP.
From a managerial point of view, environmental management should decrease
the asymmetric information as proposed by instrumental stakeholder theory.
Shareholders should distinguish between their long and short term objectives.
For instance, if they target to their long term satisfaction, firms should recon-
sider the green investment as a form of proactive environmental strategy. Thus,
managers should evaluate investments oriented towards environmental technolo-
gies and pollution prevention in order to create a competitive advantage. The
board of directors should carefully assess the climate change channels that have
an effect on their company and seek for means of hedging. Also, industries differ
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substantially with regard to public visibility, social pressure and financial risk.
Therefore, the opportunity cost to gain financial benefits from CER is likely to
be depending upon several industry-specific factors.
Regarding the policy implications, regulators should carefully examine all the
economic theories and especially the theories that do not embrace “high” CER.
Having identified these theories and the reasons why they do not encourage firms
to invest in CER, an effective practice would be to impose regulations that would
give them disincentives to pollute. For instance, imposing a carbon tax should
be considered as a way of tackling the climate change because it would increase
the operational cost of “dirty” firms.
Shareholders should distinguish between their long and short term objectives.
For instance, if they target to their long term satisfaction, firms should recon-
sider the green investment as a form of proactive environmental strategy. Thus,
managers should evaluate investments oriented towards environmental technolo-
gies and pollution prevention in order to create a competitive advantage. The
board of directors should carefully assess the climate change channels that have
an effect on their company and seek for means of hedging. Also, industries differ
substantially with regard to public visibility, social pressure and financial risk.
Therefore, the opportunity cost to gain financial benefits from CER is likely to
be depending upon several industry-specific factors.
2.5.2 Future Research
Potential avenues for future research should include (i) the effect of anti-green
announcements, (ii) the decision making of companies regarding the stringent
environmental regulation, (iii) the role of derivatives market, (iv) the causality of
FP and CER, as well as, (v) the case of a composite environmental variable.
Ramiah et al. (2015) examine the connection between green announcements
regarding Obama’s initiates and stock return; they call this phenomenon Obama
effect. It would be very interesting to investigate the stock returns under the
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Trump effect. What is the reaction of the markets upon an anti-environmental
announcement? Some firms, which are included in the carbon-sensitive industries,
had a positive stock returns upon his election. Therefore, event study might be
able to capture the alterations in the regime of the environmental policy in the US.
Also, environmental regulations have brought transition risk and thus a future
research could focus on the strategic decision of the firms. For instance, they
might outsource capital in order to avoid regulations.
Another issue that has been neglected by the literature is the role of options
and futures. Temperature is a risk factor that can be partially observed in the
equity evaluations (Bansal and Ochoa, 2011; Balvers et al., 2017). On the other
hand, weather derivatives are able to hedge a proportion of temperature risk.
Also, option market reflects the expectations of the stock market and hence it
might have better predictive power (Christensen and Prabhala, 1998). Therefore
future research should be focused on the examination between climate change
and the role of options.
Lastly, researchers should investigate the relationship between FP and CER
afresh because there is a strong evidence of endogeneity among studies and more
particularly the problem of simultaneity bias has to be underlined. The causality
of the relationship has to be examined as slack resource view propose. There is
also a significant evidence of non-linearity, suggesting that linear regression mod-
els might provide biased estimations. We call for the use of more sophisticated
econometrics methods, a good example is the contemporaneous paper of Broad-
stock et al. (2018), whose study is one of the few that investigates the effect of FP
on CER (literature commonly investigates the opposite; CER on FP). Further
research should be undertaken to explore the ambiguity among environmental
variables. Variables should posit in a way not to moderate the results. Hence, we
propose the construction of a composite environmental index. The dimensional-
ity of the CER analysis is a major issue (Albertini, 2017) and has to be examined
with multivariate techniques such as PCA. Ranking of the environmental index
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could be a useful tool in order to extract information about the CER of the
companies by using different weighted environmental indicators.
Hence, we propose an environmental composite index in order to measure the
CER of the firms by including all the available environmental variables. A com-
posite index might draw a better picture between the CER and FP relationship,
because the numerous different variables give us biased estimation (Albertini,
2013; Endrikat et al., 2014). By constructing a composite index we will overcome
the problem of the selection bias and at the same time we would have control
for different dimensions of the CER(Albertini, 2017). The dimensionality of the
CER analysis is a major issue and has to be examined with multivariate tech-
niques such as Principal Component Analysis. Ranking of the environmental
index could be a useful tool in order to extract information about the CER of
the companies by using different weighted environmental indicators. Moreover,
dynamic panel data estimation is more suitable in cases where some unobserved
factors affect both the dependent and independent variables and some control
variables are strongly related to past values of the dependent variable.
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3 First Empirical Chapter: Environmental and Financial Per-
formance, Evidence from Quantile Regressions
3.1 Introduction
In the effort to mitigate climate change by preventing greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions, one of the most important policy areas that has attracted attention
is the manufacturing sector (IPCC, 2014). Even though European manufactur-
ing firms have 29.9 million employees (21.8% of employment) and generate more
than e1,900 billion (15% of GDP), their industrial process together with fossil
fuel combustion were responsible for around 88% of the total carbon dioxide emit-
ted in the European Union (EU) in 2015 (Eurostat, 2019; World Bank, 2019).
Large emitting companies in the EU have been monitored and regulated in or-
der to decrease their emissions. Particularly, the EU has become increasingly
committed to promoting climate change mitigation (e.g. Kyoto Protocol, Paris
Agreement) with a key target being to decrease 21% in firms’ GHG emissions
by 2020 compared with their emissions in 2005 (European Commission, 2019).
For this reason, environmental issues are of paramount importance to regulators,
investors, employees, customers and managers (de Villiers and van Staden, 2010;
Griffin and Sun, 2013; Qiu et al., 2016). For instance, low-carbon investments by
EU firms grew from e57 billion in 2011 to a staggering amount of e243 billion in
2015 (Eurosif, 2016)15. Firms benefit from this kind of investment in two ways.
First, they comply with the existing regulation (Reinhardt and Stavins, 2010).
Second, they manage to reduce long-term operational costs (Hart, 1997).
Growing environmental awareness within the EU highlights the importance
of investigating the effects of environmental performance (EP) on financial per-
formance (FP) (Wagner, 2010). EP is typically defined as the firm’s carbon
15There has been a growing number of environmental strategies being adopted by firms within
the EU. Strategies such as the “sustainability themed” and “impact investment” accounted for
e145 billion and e98 billion respectively in 2015, see more on Eurosif (2016).
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footprint (i.e. GHG), whilst FP is approximated with accounting profitability
ratios (i.e. ROA and ROE) (Dixon-Fowler et al., 2013; Albertini, 2013; Endrikat
et al., 2014). To shed light on the EP-FP relationship, prior literature has ad-
dressed the main question “Does it pay to be green?” (Dixon-Fowler et al., 2013;
Busch and Lewandowski, 2017). The majority of the literature (around 60%)
supports a positive EP-FP relationship; however, 20% shows that greater EP is
costly, while 20% reports an insignificant relationship (Horvathova, 2010; Busch
and Lewandowski, 2017). These ambiguous research findings have encouraged
researchers to delve deeper into this relationship. Accordingly, among others,
Horvathova (2012) shows that EP has a time-varying effect on FP; in the short
term the direction of the effect is negative due to the additional costs, while in the
long term firms gain a competitive advantage (known in the literature as “When
does it pay to be green?”). Barnett and Salomon (2012); Misani and Pogutz
(2015) explore the possibility that the relationship might be curvilinear, depend-
ing upon the magnitude of EP engagement. At the same time, authors such as
Hatakeda et al. (2012) underline that EP and FP are endogenously related. On
general principles, a consensus has yet to be reached about the direction of EP
effects on FP, the role of endogeneity and the type of non-linearity (Busch and
Lewandowski, 2017; Baboukardos, 2018).
Furthermore, the lack of consensus regarding the EP-FP interaction is also
evident in relevant theoretical studies. Economic theory suggests that the EP-
FP relationship is complex (Brooks and Oikonomou, 2018). For instance, while
the instrumental stakeholder theory proposes that a greener performance would
result in higher profits, neoclassical theory opposes this suggestion. A different
picture is implied by the natural resource-based view, which suggests that firms
might initially experience high costs, but then might benefit from higher profits
(e.g. Lewandowski, 2017; Trumpp and Guenther, 2017; Broadstock et al., 2018).
Another example that further stresses the complex nature of the relationship is
the one supported by the financial slack argument, indicating that the financial
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state of the firm can influence the efficacy of EP on FP.
Screening the relationship for EU firms (data explained in section 3.3), fig-
ure 3.5 represents the difference in FP probability density function between green
performers and non-green performers, by incorporating kernel density estimation.
The FP distribution for green performers is shifted to the right, indicating that
green performers tend to be indeed more profitable than their non-green coun-
terparts. However, as King and Lenox (2001); Qiu et al. (2016); Li et al. (2018b)
indicate more profitable firms are more likely to invest more and to engage in en-
vironmental actions. Thus, the question that arises is if the positive relationship
depicted in figure 3.5 is due to the reverse causality between EP and FP.
Figure 3.5: Kernel FP Density for Green and Non-green Performers
Notes: Green performers are firms distributed in the 4rd quarter of the EP variable [EP =
(−1)∗Log(GHG/Total assets)], while non-green performers are observations in the 1st quarter
of the EP variable. Green performers > No-green performers (one side test for ROE, mean
difference = 0.631, χ2 = 9.6041 with p-value=0; for ROA, mean difference = 0.471, χ2 = 14.85
with p-value = 0). Data are explained in section 3.3.1.
Existing literature has focused only on the conditional mean of the FP dis-
tribution neglecting the highly skewed distribution of the financial data (e.g.,
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Misani and Pogutz, 2015; Nollet et al., 2016; Lewandowski, 2017). Understand-
ing the effects of EP at different parts of the FP distribution might not only give
a more complete picture about the managerial actions towards EP but also offer
a potential avenue to reconcile ambiguous research findings. For instance, EP
might have positive effects on the higher tail of the FP distribution while at the
lower tail the EP effects might become negative. In this regard, we allow for a
heterogeneous EP-FP relation and we evaluate the EP effects on FP for different
profitability levels. Hence, our study engages in the EP-FP debate and takes one
step further in order to answer “How does green affect the different points of the
profitability distribution?”
Our research provides new evidence on this conflict that is evident in both
empirical studies and economic theory, by utilising both quantile and two stage
quantile regressions. Our approach attempts to to simultaneously address both
major limitations inherent in previous studies. First, there are constraints stem-
ming from the non-linearity of the relationship (see among others, Barnett and
Salomon, 2012; Misani and Pogutz, 2015; Nollet et al., 2016; Trumpp and Guen-
ther, 2017). While previous studies adopt quadratic values of EP in linear models
in order to deal with the non-linearity (Barnett and Salomon, 2012; Misani and
Pogutz, 2015), we maintain that the relationship is complex and therefore quan-
tile regressions could lead to more insightful results. The second limitation relates
to the implication that the EP-FP relationship is more likely to be endogenous.
Studies have attempted to deal with this issue by adopting different econometric
techniques in parametric models (see, inter alia, Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Elsayed
and Paton, 2005; Barnett and Salomon, 2012; Hatakeda et al., 2012; Delmas et al.,
2015; Lewandowski, 2017). Our two stage quantile regression approach can con-
trol for endogeneity which arises through simultaneity or omitted variable bias in
the EP-FP relationship (Horvathova, 2010; Hatakeda et al., 2012).
Our study goes beyond the standard literature by allowing the EP estimates
to vary with the conditional quantiles of the FP, relaxing the distributional as-
63
sumptions which were traditionally assumed (e.g., Misani and Pogutz, 2015;
Lewandowski, 2017). To the best of our knowledge, this is a first attempt to eval-
uate the EP-FP relationship by means of non-parametric and semi-parametric
models. Specifically, we provide novel evidence of this relationship on the tails of
the FP distribution. Additionally, our approach effectively controls for firm het-
erogeneity which is regarded in the literature as one of the main factors that gen-
erates contradicting results in this field of study (see, for example, Horvathova,
2010; Albertini, 2013; Endrikat et al., 2014; Nollet et al., 2016; Baboukardos,
2018).
Using quantile instrumental variable regressions, we also estimate an EP
model. EP estimations reveal some noteworthy implications for both economic
research and European climate change policy. For example, we show how mitiga-
tion policies for climate change and other institutional characteristics can affect
“dirty” (lower tail of EP distribution) and “clean” firms (higher tail).
Research findings from EU manufacturing firms for the period 1995-1997 ap-
pear to support a negative relationship between EP and FP (Wagner et al., 2002;
Wagner, 2005). By contrast, using a sample of 288 EU manufacturing firms for
the period 2005-2016, which was marked by stricter environmental regulations,
shows that (i) EP has a positive effect on FP; (ii) the EP-FP relationship varies
significantly across different quantiles; (iii) EP and FP are endogenously related
for high profitability firms, while there is no evidence of endogeneity for low prof-
itability firms. Our findings also imply that both a partially endogenous and
positive view is more suitable to theoretically frame the relationship between
EP-FP than the neoclassical theory suggested by previous studies in the EU area
(Wagner et al., 2002). Further results show that the size of the firm and the
period of investigation moderate the relationship. Particularly, large firms are
unaffected by the EP effects, and EP had a minimum role before the financial
crisis. The fact that large sized firms are unaffected by EP can be explained such
as that they might need more time and higher investment in order to diffuse their
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EP practices, while for small and medium sized firms, EP has easier and more
efficient implementation Hoogendoorn et al. (2015); Yadav et al. (2016).
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 3.2, we present
the theoretical framework and discuss the relevant hypothesis. In Section 3.3, we
describe the data and present the methods of the study. The empirical results
are reported in Section 3.4. Finally, in Section 3.5, we discuss the main results
of the study and reach a conclusion.
3.2 Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis Development
EP plays an essential role in promoting stakeholders’ interests and influencing
profitability of firms. The connection between EP and FP is based on a plethora
of theoretical predictions which have been summarised in Figure 3.6; their main
objective is to answer the following prompt: “How is FP affected if we invest in
EP?” The purpose of this section is to provide a broad overview of the existing
framework and move to scrutinise: “Under what circumstances do EP affect FP?”
Figure 3.6: Theory behind EP-FP
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3.2.1 A Brief Theoretical Background
The first theoretical prediction is the negative link between EP and FP, and it
is supported by the trade-off view, indicating that investments in EP will merely
reduce profits from firms. The negative relationship between EP and FP can be
justified due to the higher cost that firms have to endure. The neoclassical theory
suggests that some industries experience high environmental compliance costs to
operate under green management and therefore face a competitive disadvantage
(Wagner et al., 2002). This is the case for manufacturing firms since the cost
of decreasing their emissions is relatively high and results in an increase of the
marginal cost of production. In a similar vein, the agency theory argues that
EP is in conflict with the main objective of the firm (e.g. maximise shareholder
value) and thus EP would only decrease shareholders’ satisfaction (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976).
The second theoretical perspective argues that EP will increase the value of
the firm. The positive link between EP and FP, as proposed by instrumental
stakeholder theory, supposes that long-term environmental objectives establish
a consistent strategy that reduces the uncertainty of environmental issues and
develops dynamic capabilities that in turn attract shareholders. The theory is a
combination of the legitimacy16 and agency theories, and it focuses on the con-
tracts between managers and stakeholders and claims that trust and cooperation
within a company help create a competitive advantage (Jones, 1995). For ex-
ample, by satisfying stakeholder demands concerning climate change, firms may
acquire a better reputation, improve customers’ loyalty and, overall, respond ef-
fectively to external demands (Endrikat et al., 2014).
There is a third strand of literature suggesting that EP might have a non-linear
impact on FP. Empirical literature supports the U-shaped relationship (Nollet
et al., 2016; Trumpp and Guenther, 2017; Lewandowski, 2017). An increase in
EP would decrease profits, as the trade-off view suggests, while a continuous
16Legitimacy theory suggests that firms will be adhere to social demands in order to legitimise
their corporate actions (Guthrie and Parker, 1989).
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increase beyond a certain level would cause additional benefits that offset the
costs, and thus U-shaped is depicted. The U-shaped relationship can be implied
by the natural resource-based view of the firm. Hart (1995) opines that firms
should develop new technologies in order to manage their resources efficiently.
Consequently, corporate governance aims to invest in EP with the expectation
that the future position of the corporation will be ameliorated (Hart and Ahuja,
1996). Furthermore, Barnett and Salomon (2012) demonstrate that it is the least
polluting firms that experience the highest financial returns (i.e., in consonance
with the “doing well by doing good” hypothesis). Apparently, firms that engage
in EP, gradually improve their stakeholders’ satisfaction. In turn, gradually in-
creasing stakeholders’ satisfaction results in benefits outweighing the costs (i.e.,
the turning point in the EP-FP relationship). The threshold at which this turning
point occurs varies considerably, depending mainly on firm-specific characteristics
(Eichholtz et al., 2010; Eisenbeiss et al., 2015; Broadstock et al., 2019a,b).
3.2.2 Towards Unravelling the EP effects on FP: A Financial Slack Approach
Given that the relationship between EP and FP lies in a number of competing
theoretical frameworks, it is essential to investigate the conditions under which
the EP benefits outweigh the potential costs. Even though the majority of the
empirical results tend towards a positive outcome between EP and FP (see the
meta-analysis by Busch and Lewandowski, 2017), it is universally accepted that
measurement characteristics, such as EP measures, FP measures, industry, period
and area under investigation, are dominant factors responsible for the variability
of the results. In fact, previous studies acknowledge the importance of the afore-
mentioned factors (among others, Iwata and Okada, 2011; Hatakeda et al., 2012;
Barnett and Salomon, 2012; Misani and Pogutz, 2015; Trumpp and Guenther,
2017); however, they all focus on the mean of the FP distribution and neglect to
examine the EP effects for low or high profitability firms. For this reason, both
theoretical and empirical gaps should be addressed in order to provide a detailed
67
picture of the impact of changes in EP on different parts of the FP distribution.
A promising extension is to delve more into the moderating role of FP. Im-
portantly, literature argues that FP itself is a contingency that might influence
the efficacy of EP (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Hatakeda et al., 2012; Cai et al.,
2016; Broadstock et al., 2018). Reasonably, low profitability firms have limited
resources and, at the same time, pressure from stakeholders for profit maximisa-
tion is higher compared to their high performing counterparts. Low performance
poses a threat for firms and thus managers ought to take actions in order to im-
prove their profitability. Those actions may be towards investing in R&D projects,
such as improving the environmental performance. On one hand, low profitability
firms convey the impression that management is inefficient. Likewise investments
in EP might purely deduct profits from firms (Wagner, 2005), as considered by
the absorbed slack resource theory (Symeou et al., 2019). Absorbed slack refers
to resources that cannot be re-deployed for other organisational purposes. On
the other hand, EP might be a sustainable strategy for low profitability firms
to build bonds with stakeholders and signal their green technology advances to
society (Porter, 1991; Hart and Ahuja, 1996).
It is worth noting that low profitability firms are constrained by financial
resources, which can limit their investment in EP. By contrast, firms with supe-
rior financial performance may utilise their after tax income in order to invest in
eco-friendly technologies (Li et al., 2018b). At the same time, high profitability
firms, are more likely to accomplish effective EP investments (i.e. unabsorbed
slack)17 (Symeou et al., 2019). However, there is less internal pressure for high
profitability firms to adopt new strategies. According to the agency theory, if a
firm is highly profitable, managers should prefer distributing profits to sharehold-
ers to investing in environmental projects. Even if managers invest in EP, we can
conclude either that EP indeed improves FP, or that firms had extra reserves to
invest in EP, so the relationship might be influenced primarily by high FP. An-
17Unabsorbed slack refers to resources that can be re-deployed for other organisational pur-
poses.
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other crucial point for highly performing firms is that managers might choose to
invest in EP just for symbolic purposes, or because they aim to improve their rep-
utation as environmentally sensitive managers, indicating that such investments
are more likely to be costly and ineffective (Barnea and Rubin, 2010; Trumpp
and Guenther, 2017).
In this regard, an important distinction should be made between high and
low profitability firms. This can be well explained by the slack resource argu-
ment, which implies that FP causes EP and vice versa. The theory explains why
firms with different resources have different levels of environmental engagement
(George, 2005). Even though the theory is multifaceted (Shahzad et al., 2016),
our study focuses on financial slack resources of the firms. For example, firms
with financial slack are reflected on the upper tail of the profitability distribution
(high profitability firms), while low profitability firms – which lack financial slack
– are on the lower tail of the distribution. Informed by the above, we test for the
relation between EP and FP, with a particular emphasis on the financial slack
resource argument. To the best of our knowledge, no prior empirical research has
examined the behaviour of EP on FP distribution, and given the competing the-
oretical perspectives as well as the underwhelming number of studies that discuss
the relationship under the slack resource argument (Daniel et al., 2004; Endrikat
et al., 2014; Symeou et al., 2019), our main expectation is that the strength of
the relation between EP and FP will vary across the conditional distribution of
FP, and thus we formulate a broader hypothesis:
Hypothesis: Under the financial slack argument, the effect of environmental
performance on financial performance varies across different levels of financial
performance.
3.2.3 Identification of causal effects
The main focus of the analysis is to examine the effect of EP on FP at different
profitability levels. However, reverse causality between EP and FP and omitted
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variables bias are unquestionably the most topical issues that can distort the
reliability of the results (Cai et al., 2016; Broadstock et al., 2018). A possible so-
lution to this endogeneity problem is to identify factors that directly influence EP
and indirectly FP. Almost every study defines EP as is a sequence of managerial
actions in order to deal with the economic, institutional and regulatory pressure
in respect to the natural environment (among others, Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004;
Matsumura et al., 2014; Hassan and Romilly, 2017). Particularly, an increasing
number of environmental regulations push firms to remove their obsolete coal
technologies and deploy a greener energy generation. Thus, a great proportion of
the EP variation is explained by environmental law, which, in turn, is the only
exogenous factor that can influence the EP (Brunel and Levinson, 2016).
Adhering to the regulations, firms try to legitimate their actions. For exam-
ple, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris agreement are some of the most serious
attempts made, with their main objective being to regulate a permissible limit
of firms’ carbon emissions. Particularly, in the EU, polluting firms are supposed
to participate in the EU emissions trading system (ETS). Carbon emissions have
been financialised as commodities and they are exchanged in a cap and trade
system18. A cap and trade system indicates that the volume of emissions has
to be capped, or the offender is obliged to pay a fine. Participation in the EU
emissions trading scheme will thus significantly affect the level of EP (Ellerman
and Buchner, 2008; Luo et al., 2012). Similarly, pressure about climate change
is usually reflected in the decision making when adopting environmental strategy
such as ISO 14001. ISO 14001 standards are provided by a non-profit organisa-
tion to firms that want to comply with the regulatory limits; guidance is offered
in order to minimise and manage firms’ carbon footprints (Quazi et al., 2001).
In order to have firms qualified for ISO certification, they should fulfil some re-
quirements. For example, they should (i) establish environmental management
department, (ii) identify their environmental compliance requirements (regula-
18More information about the European emission scheme can be found on the European
commission website: https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/.
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tions), (iii) clarify how firm interacts with the environment (e.g. GHG emissions)
and (iv) monitor, review and measure their environmental performance (ISO,
2015). Hence, EP is the channel through which ETS and ISO affect the FP of
firms. We methodically address the role of environmental regulations and we
examine the extent to which the above hypothesis holds.
3.3 Data and Methods
3.3.1 Data
The sample consists of 288 European firms of the manufacturing sector that
are included in the STOXX Europe 600 Index, covering large, mid and small
capitalisation companies across 17 countries of the European region, for a 12 year
period 2005-2016. Thus far, several studies have investigated the effects of EP
on FP, focusing on US (Hart, 1995; Clark and Crawford, 2012; Chakrabarty and
Wang, 2013; Delmas et al., 2013; Nollet et al., 2016), UK (Elsayed and Paton,
2005; Aragon-Correa and A. Rubio-Lopez, 2007; Broadstock et al., 2018) and
Japanese firms (Nakao et al., 2007; Yamaguchi, 2008; Iwata and Okada, 2011;
Hatakeda et al., 2012), while the literature concerning the wider EU economy is
rather scarce and outdated (Wagner et al., 2002; Wagner, 2005). In addition, EU
manufacturing firms have been chosen because they are inevitably connected with
climate change, since they emit large amounts of carbon dioxide. For this reason,
EU environmental regulations have enforced firms to be transparent about their
environmental actions (variables). We choose 2005 as the initial year, a period
when not only were talks against climate change escalated, but also when the
first phase of the EU emissions trading scheme was activated. Table 3.5 classifies
the sample into industry and country, with most of the firms (30.5%) being in
the industrial sector and approximately 25% coming from the United Kingdom.
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Table 3.5: Industry and Country Composition
Panel A: Industry Composition
Industry Frequency Percent
Technology 11 3.82
Telecommunications 12 4.17
Consumer Discretionary 56 19.44
Consumer Staples 40 13.89
Industrials 88 30.56
Basic Material 40 13.89
Energy 17 5.9
Utilities 24 8.33
Panel B: Country Composition
Country Frequency Percent
Germany 36 12.5
United Kingdom 71 24.65
France 47 16.32
Italy 14 4.86
Spain 14 4.86
Netherlands 15 5.21
Switzerland 18 6.25
Sweden 24 8.33
Norway 8 2.78
Austria 4 1.39
Belgium 6 2.08
Denmark 5 1.74
Finland 14 4.86
Ireland 7 2.43
Czech Republic 1 0.35
Portugal 3 1.04
Luxembourg 1 0.35
Total 288 100
Note: Firms are allocated to industries according to the Industry Classification Benchmark
(ICB).
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3.3.2 The Regression variables
Dependent variables
Table 3.6 displays the source and concept of each variable employed. Four FP
variables are used as dependent variables. Financial profitability is linked to ac-
counting profitability ratios. Return on assets (ROA) measures the ability of
the firm to generate profits from its assets and is used as a proxy for financial
profitability. Similarly, return on equity (ROE) measures the shareholder’s sat-
isfaction. We also use industry-adjusted ROA and ROE as dependent variables
in order to control for the variability of the results between industries; this is
because some industries might be more efficient than others (Aggarwal and Dow,
2012). Adjusted ROA is calculated as the ratio of firm’s ROA to average in-
dustry ROA (Adj.ROAi,t =
ROAi,t
ROAj,t
, where i is the firm, t is the year and j is
the industry where firm i is classified). Similarly, we compute adjusted ROE
(Adj.ROEi,t =
ROEi,t
ROEj,t
). A great number of studies use ROA and ROE as de-
pendent variables in their regressions (see, for example, Busch and Hoffmann,
2011; Qiu et al., 2016; Lewandowski, 2017). The indicators reflect the managerial
efficiency and shareholders’ satisfaction rather than market responses to organi-
sational actions (Albertini, 2013).
Explanatory Variables
We employ three alternative measures for EP as an explanatory variable. Follow-
ing Aragan-Correa (1998); King and Lenox (2001); Wagner (2005); Aggarwal and
Dow (2012); Cormier and Magnan (2015); Misani and Pogutz (2015), we define
(i) EP (ta) as the reverse logarithmic ratio of the carbon emissions reported by
the firm (scope 1 and scope 2) to the total assets [EP (ta)i,t = (−1) ∗ LogGHGi,tTAi,t ],
(ii) EP (mv) the reverse logarithmic ratio of the carbon emissions reported by the
firm to the market value [EP (mv)i,t = (−1) ∗LogGHGi,tMVi,t ] and (iii) adj.EP the re-
verse logarithmic ratio of the carbon emissions reported by the firm to the average
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Figure 3.7: Scatter Graph of EP-FP
Notes: The figure illustrates two scatter diagrams. The dots correspond to ROA (ROE) obser-
vations plotted by EP [EP = (−1) ∗ Log(GHG/Total assets)].
industry carbon emissions [adj.EPi,t = (−1) ∗LogGHGi,tGHGj,t ], where i is the firm, t is
the year and j is the industry where firm i is classified. Higher values correspond
to better performance, and our variables avoid high skewness; they control for
both book and market size of the firms, as well as capturing industry-relative EP
performance.
In order to capture and explain EP, it is instrumented with two exogenous
variables: (i) EU emissions trading scheme (ETS) and (ii) ISO 14001 standards
(ISO). ETS and ISO have been retrieved by Datastream and both have been
reported in various studies as EP determinants (Quazi et al., 2001; Ellerman and
Buchner, 2008; Luo et al., 2012; Horvathova, 2012; Bye and Klemetsen, 2018).19
19see more at section 3.3.4
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Other Control Variables
What is more, we employ a set of different variables that affect FP. Firstly, the
probability of default measured by Altman’s (1968) Z-score (Z), higher Z-score
corresponds to lower probability of default and thus it is expected to have positive
sign to the FP (Psillaki et al., 2010). Also, leverage (LEV ) is used as a proxy of
financial risk and it represents the level of debt to equity. It can be measured by
summing the short and long term liabilities divided by the market value. Risk
proxies are imperative to be included in the analysis (Busch and Hoffmann, 2011;
Hatakeda et al., 2012; Matsumura et al., 2014).
Furthermore, larger firms have been found to perform poorer (King and Lenox,
2001). We use a size proxy as the logarithm of total assets (LOGTA), firm size
is the most common variable in the examination (Hatakeda et al., 2012; Delmas
et al., 2013). Another size proxy, that is employed, is the logarithm of the number
of employees (EMP )(Broadstock et al., 2018). This variable can capture a part
of stakeholders that exercise pressure to the firm regarding social activities (Luo
and Bhattacharya, 2009).
Annual growth rate of total sales (GRO) displays the firm’s cash flows and
hence is expected to increase the profitability (King and Lenox, 2001; Konar and
Cohen, 2001; Delmas et al., 2013; Matsumura et al., 2014).
Future prosperity can be represented by intangible assets (INTA). They
cannot be easily collateralised but they add value to the firm (Psillaki et al., 2010),
intangible assets have also attributes of research and development (R&D) of the
firm (Elsayed and Paton, 2005). For instance, an investment in EP might either
generate future profits or losses. Also, tangible assets (TANG) can be a proxy
for the collateral of the firm. Ambiguous relation between FP and tangibility is
expected because creditors can liquidate assets easily and thus they face less risk
(Konar and Cohen, 2001), however, funds lying idle tend to increase the marginal
costs.
Lastly, real GDP growth (GDP ) captures different economic conditions among
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firms that operate in different counties (Chen and Wang, 2012). GDP might be
able to explain a part of the variation of the firm’s profitability.
Apart from GDP , the rest of the control variables are firm-specific ones.
Because, we additionally test for industry adjusted results, the firm-specific con-
trol variables have been transformed into industry adjusted control variables as
adj.V ariablei,t =
V ariablei,t
V ariablej,t
, where i is the firm, t is the year and j is the industry
where firm i is classified.
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Table 3.6: Variable Description and Source of Data
Variables Concept Source
ROA Return on assets (Net income/TA)a Bloomberg
ROE Return on equity (Net income/MV)a Bloomberg
adj.ROA ROA/average industry ROA Bloomberg
adj.ROE ROE/average industry ROE Bloomberg
EP(ta)
(-1)*[Log(total GHG/TA)], high values cor-
respond to good EP
Datastream,
Bloomberg
EP(mv)
(-1)*[Log(total GHG/MV)], high values
correspond to good EP
Datastream,
Bloomberg
adj.EP
(-1)*[Log(total GHG/average industry
GHG)], high values correspond to good EP
Datastream,
Bloomberg
ETS
Participation in EU emissions trading
scheme : 1 when participate, 0 otherwise
Datastream
Continued on next page
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Table 3.6: continued from previous page
ISO
ISO 14001, it takes values: 0 for non-
adaptation, 1 when adopting ISO standards
Datastream
Z
(Financial distress) Altman’s Z =
1.2* (WC/TA)+1.4* (RE/TA)+3.3*
(EBIT/TA) +(Sales/TA)+0.6* (MV/TL).
High values correspond to low probability
of default
Datastream,
Bloomberg
LEV
(Financial leverage) Leverage = total
debta/total equitya
Datastream
EMP Log of number of employees Datastream
LOGTA Log of total assets Datastream
GDP Country’s real GDP growtha
World bank
Indicators
TANG Tanglible assets/TAa Bloomberg
INTA Intangible assets/TAa Bloomberg
Continued on next page
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Table 3.6: continued from previous page
GRO Annual growth rate of total salesa Bloomberg
[MV, WA,
TA, Sales,
EBIT, RE,
TL]a
Variables for calculations, MV= market
value, WA= working capital, TA= total as-
sets, EBIT= earnings before interest and
taxes, RE= retained earnings TL= total li-
abilities
Datastream,
Bloomberg
a All money-based indicators for all countries, for each given year, are adjusted into
current Euro.
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3.3.3 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
We continue this section by presenting some descriptive statistics and correlations
of the variables employed in the regressions. Firstly, our final sample numerates
3465 firm-year observations. The three measures for EP [EP(ta), EP(mv) and
adj.EP] have the most missing values compared to the rest of the data-set with
around 2180 valid observations. The first three years of our examination (2005-
2007) coincide with the first pilot phase20 of EU emissions trading scheme, when
disclosing environmental data was not mandatory. In 2008, EU regulations began
monitoring more and more sites. This is why our sample suffers from many
missing values at the beginning of the examination and gets improved at the
latest years.
Regarding the rest of the variables (see, table 3.7), for instance, the firm size
in our sample is quite heterogenous with a mean of current e8.6 bn (LOGTA ≈
9.06), minimum of e30 m and maximum of e400 bn. ROA has a mean (median)
of 6.0641 (5.2056) with the highest value being 28.28 and standard deviation of
5.341. ROE has a value of 8.7269 at the first quartile, 15.1781 at the median
and 22.5526 at the third quartile. ROA (ROE) has skewness 0.9383 (1.13718)
and kurtosis 4.9285 (8.2505); our dependent variables do not follow normal dis-
tribution and thus the use of quantile regressions is further motivated. In terms
of the distribution of the explanatory variables EP, ISO, ETS, EMP and INTA
are very close to satisfy the normality conditions (Skewness= 0 and Kurtosis=
3). Howerver, the aforementioned variables seem to follow a slightly platykurtic
distrubution. Other variables such as Z, LEV, GRO and TANG have a leptokur-
tic distribution and they also have fat upper tails apart from LEV with a thick
lower tail.
Additionally, table 3.8 reports the correlations. Spearman matrix, is a non-
parametric correlation measurement robust to outliers, gives some insights into
the association of the variables. Note that most of the examined variables have
20See more about Phase 1 on https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/pre2013_en.
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a negative and low correlation with FP variables. The relation between EP and
FP is shown in figure 3.7. From a first glance, EP slightly increases the FP.
Testing only the mean distribution of EP and not all conditional distribution
might lead to distorted results. Finally, we plot ROA and EP by country in order
to detect any country specific differences (Figure 3.8). Most of the countries
report positive EP-ROA relationship apart from Italy, Luxembourg and Austria.
In order to provide a clearer picture of the relationship, we proceed to examine
our hypothesis non-parametrically.
Figure 3.8: Plot ROA and EP by country
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Table 3.7: Descriptive Statistics
mean max min std 1st quartile median 3rd quartile skew kurt Obs
ROA 6.064 28.280 -9.028 5.342 2.831 5.206 8.427 0.938 4.928 3341
ROE 16.512 110.710 -31.177 14.209 8.727 15.178 22.553 1.137 8.250 3291
adj.ROA 1.000 96.323 -67.445 3.256 0.492 0.891 1.385 9.195 509.095 3341
adj.ROE 1.000 21.293 -16.197 1.128 0.553 0.913 1.375 0.776 75.344 3291
EP(ta) -4.251 1.014 -8.503 1.630 -5.594 -4.061 -2.987 -0.156 2.348 2184
EP(mv) -4.568 0.130 -9.979 1.941 -6.060 -4.340 -3.129 -0.208 2.329 2175
adj.EP 1.690 7.901 -3.333 2.039 0.028 1.687 3.196 0.086 2.376 2190
ETS 0.353 1 0 0.478 0 0 1 0.617 1.380 3159
ISO 0.796 1 0 0.403 1 1 1 -1.465 3.147 3159
Z 4.858 328.075 -0.519 9.973 2.315 3.456 4.986 19.831 524.369 3232
LEV 90.246 10020.930 -22583.330 601.481 34.980 64.570 114.720 -20.691 872.524 3437
EMP 9.992 13.348 2.890 1.497 9.023 10.038 11.141 -0.513 3.780 3412
LOGTA 9.063 12.899 3.407 1.462 8.041 8.997 10.147 0.041 2.624 3437
GDP 1.323 26.276 -8.269 2.525 0.576 1.699 2.556 1.038 22.883 3456
TANG 0.804 2.721 0.002 0.225 0.677 0.848 0.960 -0.079 8.825 3350
INTA 0.223 1.164 0.000 0.188 0.062 0.176 0.345 0.916 3.289 3282
GRO 9.029 2290.132 -91.056 66.807 -1.251 5.087 12.562 27.657 868.328 3390
Note: Description of the variables can be found on table 3.6.
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Table 3.8: Spearman Correlation Matrix
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17)
(1) ROA 1
(2) ROE 0.83* 1
(3) adj.ROA 0.91* 0.80* 1
(4) adj.ROE 0.74* 0.90* 0.81* 1
(5) EP(ta) 0.15* 0.16* 0.10* 0.09* 1
(6) EP(mv) 0.40* 0.34* 0.34* 0.26* 0.91* 1
(7) adj.EP 0.25* 0.22* 0.30* 0.22* 0.55* 0.62* 1
(8) ETS -0.18* -0.14* -0.13* -0.08* -0.40* -0.45* -0.34* 1
(9) ISO -0.17* -0.09* -0.10* -0.05* -0.08* -0.14* -0.08* 0.14* 1
(10) Z 0.69* 0.41* 0.63* 0.39* 0.09* 0.41* 0.34* -0.18* -0.22* 1
(11) LEV -0.42* -0.04* -0.32* -0.02 -0.06* -0.25* -0.18* 0.17* 0.16* -0.52* 1
(12) EMP -0.19* -0.10* -0.28* -0.16* -0.04* -0.17* -0.66* 0.13* 0.11* -0.39* 0.12* 1
(13) LOGTA -0.33* -0.18* -0.32* -0.17* -0.09* -0.28* -0.72* 0.33* 0.20* -0.50* 0.33* 0.73* 1
(14) GDP 0.19* 0.15* 0.08* 0.03 0.01 0.10* 0.03 -0.11* -0.09* 0.20* -0.11* -0.01 -0.06* 1
(15) TANG -0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.28* -0.27* -0.01 0.09* -0.09* 0.06* -0.11* -0.17* -0.09* 0.03 1
(16) INTA 0.07* 0.09* 0.02 0.07* 0.25* 0.27* 0.00 -0.08* 0.10* -0.01 0.09* 0.17* 0.05* 0.01 -0.81* 1
(17) GRO 0.28* 0.28* 0.18* 0.15* 0.05* 0.11* 0.08* -0.06* -0.04 0.13* -0.08* -0.05* -0.08* 0.22* -0.02 0.04* 1
Notes: *, Significant at 5% level. Description of the variables can be found on table 3.6.
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3.3.4 Econometric Method
Quantile Regression Methodology
To test our hypothesis, we employ Quantile regression which was introduced by
Koenker and Bassett (1978) with a purpose to estimate an equation expressing at
a quantile of the conditional distribution. In this paper, we investigate parameters
that describe the 5%, 50% and 95% of the conditional distribution. In order to
linearly represent our regressions, we consider the following equation:
FP = π(τ) + θ(τ)EP + Y′ϑ(τ) + ε, τ ∈ (0, 1) (3.1)
Where, FP is the dependent variable, π is the intercept, Y is a vector that
contains all explanatory variables, θ(τ) and ϑ(τ) are the parameters, ε signifies
the error term and τ is the quantile of FP. We assume that the error is equal to
zero at the conditional τ th quantile [Qε|EP,Y(τ |ep,y) = 0]. Also, the parameter θ
for any given quantile (τ) for a sample of N observations can be calculated with
linear programming as follows:
θ̂(τ) = arg min
θ
1
N
N∑
i=1
ρτ [FP − π(τ)− θ(τ)EP −Y′ϑ(τ)] (3.2)
where the check function ρτ (.) is defined as:
ρτ (ε) =

τε, if ε ≥ 0;
(τ − 1)ε, if ε < 0
In order to investigate our main hypothesis, which predicts heterogeneous EP
effects on FP distribution, θ(τ) coefficients should be significantly different across
the quantiles, thus H0 : θ(0.05) = θ(0.50) = θ(0.95) should be rejected.
We use bootstrap estimates of θ̂(τ) in order to calculate the covariance ma-
trix. We compute standard errors with 1000 bootstrap replications and thus
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we obtain asymptotically normally distributed estimators which are valid under
heteroskedasticity and misspecification. We use the Wald test to test whether
EP coefficients are statistically different across quantiles. Statistically significant
values denote that EP parameters heterogeneously affect FP.
At this stage of the examination, we let equation 3.1 be affected by the poten-
tial endogeneity, then this problem is treated with two stage quantile regressions.
Two stage Quantile Regression Methodology
We employ a semi-parametric technique to deal with the endogeneity. More
particularly, we account for the endogeneity in our estimations by considering a
control function approach. Therefore, we exploit the linear nature of the setting
in an non-parametric environment. There are several ways to treat endogeneity
in quantile estimations, however these are mainly for binary variables. Due to the
fact that we have continuous endogenous variables, we follow the methodology
proposed by Lee (2007).
FP = β(τ)EP + X′1γ(τ) + U (3.3)
EP = m(α) + X′δ(α) + V (3.4)
QU |EP,X(τ |ep,x) = QU |V,X(τ |v,x) = QU |V (τ |v) ≡ λτ (v) (3.5)
QV |X(a|x) = 0 (3.6)
Where FP is the dependent variable of financial performance and EP is the en-
dogenous term of environmental performance. X ≡ (X1,X2)′ is a vector of ex-
planatory variables, where X1 a vector of FP covariates and X a vector of EP
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covatiates which includes both X1 and at least one or more instruments (X2)
for identification. U and V are the error terms of equations 3.3 and 3.4 respec-
tively. Also, m(α) is an unknown constant, γ(τ) and δ(α) vectors of unknown
parameters and β(τ) the parameter of interest, τ and α denote the quantile
area where τ, a ∈ (0, 1). Term λτ (v) is a real-valued unknown function of V
and QU |EP,X(τ |ep,x) is the τ th quantile of U conditional on EP=ep and X=x,
whereby ep and x are projections of EP and X on the τ th quantile respectively.
In equation 3.5 [QU |V (τ |v)] U is independent of X but conditional on V, where
v = ep −m(a) − x′δ(a). Our semi-parametric approach allows us to estimate V
(eq. 3.4) by the residuals of a linear (ath) quantile regression and then V̂ (α) can
be included as explanatory variable in the quantile regressions of FP.
QFP |EP,X(τ |ep,x) = epβ(τ) + x′1γ(τ) + λτ (v) (3.7)
QEP |X(a|x) = m(a) + x′δ(a) (3.8)
Henceforth, the probability density functions of FP and EP are given by equations
3.7 and 3.8 respectively. Under those assumptions, we are able to estimate the
effect of EP on FP in a two step procedure as linearly represented in equation
3.9:
FP = β(τ)EP + X′1γ(τ) + ψ(τ)V̂(α) + U (3.9)
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Endogeneity
We thus re-examine our hypothesis, accounting for endogeneity by employing a
two-stage regression approach. A great number of studies (Al-Tuwaijri et al.,
2004; Cai et al., 2016; Broadstock et al., 2018) have reported the problem of
endogeneity in the examination between EP and FP. In order to deal with the
endogeneity, first we need to identify characteristics (instruments) that are both
conceptually and methodologically correct and that are correlated with the first
stage dependent variable (i.e. EP) but not with the residuals of the second
stage regression. As has been explained in section 3.2.3, regulatory pressure can
be really exogenous to EP (Brunel and Levinson, 2016) and thus we include
two instruments (X2). The first instrument is the participation of firms in the
European emissions trading scheme (ETS) (Bye and Klemetsen, 2018) and the
second is the adoption of ISO 14001 standards (ISO) (Quazi et al., 2001). It is
worth noting that across firms both instruments vary over time (within variation)
and thus they can potentially explain abrupt EP changes. For this reason, various
empirical studies have used ETS and ISO as determinants to explain the variation
of EP (see, for example, Quazi et al., 2001; Melnyk et al., 2003; Ellerman and
Buchner, 2008; Albino et al., 2009; Engels, 2009; Hatakeda et al., 2012; Conrad
et al., 2012; Cormier and Magnan, 2015).
Regarding the first stage results, an EP model is estimated as shown in equa-
tion 3.4. The expectation is that firms participating in ETS and ISO should have
on average worse EP than non-participants. This is because carbon allowances
are allocated according to firms’ needs and therefore carbon-intensive firms would
have more certified emissions to trade; similarly, ISO is adopted when firms need
assistance with their environmental behaviour. The second stage estimates a FP
model (equation 3.9). The residuals estimated from the first stage are now in-
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cluded non-parametrically as an additional explanatory variable along with the
other control variables (Lee, 2007). The two-stage quantile regression as a semi-
parametric approach would detect if there is a problem of endogeneity, confirming
or rejecting the previous estimates. Hence, we focus on the V̂ (α) coefficients; if
V̂ (α) appears to be statistically significant then our previous estimations are
problematic (Wooldridge, 2015). We are now able to proceed with the results.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Quantile Regression Results
This session reports the results from the quantile regressions based on equation
3.1. Columns 1-6, as shown in tables 3.9, 3.10 and 3.11, display the coefficients
of EP(ta), EP(mv) and adj.EP respectively along with their standard errors.
Columns 1-3 report the results for ROA at the 5%, 50% and 95% of the conditional
distribution, likewise columns 4-6 report ROE results for the lower, median and
upper part of the distribution. Table 3.11 reports the adjusted industry results.
We begin by analysing the control variables of our estimations, all 3 tables
report similar coefficients and so we focus on table 3.9. Z-score appears to have
significant and positive relation for all different quantiles with all FP variables,
signifying that lower probability of default increases the profits (Psillaki et al.,
2010). Leverage has a positive and significant effect on ROE, but does not seem
to influence ROA. Intangible assets, that have characteristics of R&D, positively
influence FP, especially at the lower tail of the distribution. Consistent with our
expectations, size (LOGTA) is negative and significant for the whole probability
distribution (Konar and Cohen, 2001; Hatakeda et al., 2012). Number of em-
ployees (EMP) has on average a positive effect on FP. GDP growth (GDP) and
sales growth (GRO) do not seem to affect ROA and ROE. Overall, irrespective
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of the geographical area, the effects of our control variables on FP are in line
with previous literature (see, for example, Elsayed and Paton, 2005; Clarkson
et al., 2011; Nollet et al., 2016). Another interesting finding is that Pseudo R-
squared21 (R2) explains a larger part of the variation at the upper tail rather than
the lower tail of the conditional distribution; for example R2 for ROA (ROE) at
τ = 0.95 is 49.25% (26.10%), while at τ = 0.05 is 19.45% (20.17%). Comparing
the benchmark specification for ROA with models including EP(ta) (Table 3.9)
and EP(mv) (Table 3.10), we witness an increase in the goodness of fit across
the whole conditional distribution which is approximately 1 percentage point,
indicating the important role of EP in the examination.
21Pseudo-R2 has the same concept with the OLS R2 but it refers to any given (τ) quantile
(Koenker and Machado, 1999).
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Table 3.9: Quantile regressions with independent variable: EP(ta)
τ 05 50 95 05 50 95 05 50 95
Benchmark model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA ROE ROE ROE
EP(ta) 0.450*** 0.152** 0.600*** 1.982*** 1.101*** 1.312**
(0.139) (0.057) (0.134) (0.392) (0.197) (0.602)
Z 0.113 1.019*** 1.560*** 0.113** 1.015*** 1.540*** 0.387*** 1.215*** 1.857***
(0.155) (0.091) (0.149) (0.053) (0.074) (0.107) (0.084) (0.188) (0.391)
LEV -0.0026 -0.0006 0.0006 -0.0032 -0.0009 -0.0001 -0.0247*** 0.0240*** 0.0853***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.004) (0.014)
EMP 0.459 0.181 0.390* 0.558* 0.232** 0.645*** 0.734 1.258*** 3.373**
(0.324) (0.117) (0.216) (0.321) (0.103) (0.283) (0.536) (0.367) (1.641)
LOGTA -1.109*** -0.303** -0.456** -1.132*** -0.306*** -0.535** -1.367*** -1.157*** -3.754***
(0.381) (0.146) (0.189) (0.290) (0.104) (0.253) (0.527) (0.431) (1.219)
GDP 0.101 0.0927** 0.00401 0.142 0.0913 -0.00223 0.116 0.185 -0.0445
(0.122) (0.046) (0.054) (0.115) (0.057) (0.058) (0.344) (0.171) (0.416)
TANG -0.149 -0.408 0.334 -0.0330 -0.320 0.435 0.814 -0.446 10.02
(1.401) (0.680) (1.031) (1.151) (0.444) (1.564) (4.228) (1.058) (8.104)
INTA 3.614** 0.901 -3.412** 2.458** 0.608 -2.954* 7.612 2.922*** -4.138
(1.678) (0.687) (1.348) (1.133) (0.609) (1.689) (5.100) (1.034) (10.083)
GRO 0.00105 0.00820 0.0274* 0.000656 0.00820 0.0220 0.0210 0.0200 0.121**
(0.004) (0.007) (0.014) (0.008) (0.009) (0.022) (0.029) (0.030) (0.056)
cons 3.562 3.152** 6.534 4.602 3.216*** 6.566 9.226 8.473** 14.01
(3.900) (1.573) (4.715) (3.110) (1.334) (4.583) (9.549) (4.145) (17.116)
Year YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Obs 2017 2017 2017 2017 2017 2017 1989 1989 1989
R2 0.1867 0.2860 0.4842 0.1945 0.2875 0.4925 0.2017 0.1546 0.2610
Wald 22.76*** 2.46*
Notes: Description of the variables can be found on table 3.6. This table reports the results of the quantile regressions based on equation 3.1.
Term τ shows the quantile of FP distribution under investigation. Significance based on bootstrap standard errors (1000 replications): ***,**,*
significance level at 1%, 5%, 10%. Wald-test is for EP slopes [θ(0.05) = θ(0.50) = θ(0.95)].
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Table 3.10: Quantile Regressions with Independent Variable: EP(mv)
τ 05 50 95 05 50 95
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ROA ROA ROA ROE ROE ROE
EP(mv) 0.910*** 0.426*** 0.649*** 2.712*** 1.829*** 2.353***
(0.167) (0.076) (0.116) (0.399) (0.231) (0.448)
Z 0.117*** 0.906*** 1.353*** 0.291** 0.908*** 1.694***
(0.043) (0.117) (0.232) (0.130) (0.165) (0.485)
LEV -0.00275 -0.000844 0.000215 -0.0146 0.0243*** 0.0824***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.010) (0.004) (0.014)
EMP 0.507** 0.423*** 0.605*** 1.374** 1.912*** 4.234**
(0.249) (0.113) (0.198) (0.649) (0.519) (1.737)
LOGTA -0.888*** -0.389*** -0.286 -1.275 -1.339*** -3.100**
(0.300) (0.147) (0.177) (0.776) (0.500) (1.567)
GDP 0.0906 0.0627 -0.00378 -0.0381 0.129 -0.0529
(0.134) (0.043) (0.098) (0.346) (0.120) (0.301)
TANG 0.741 -0.0374 -0.0289 -4.667 0.996 7.214
(1.239) (0.413) (1.447) (4.175) (1.220) (7.726)
INTA 1.457 0.560 -3.947** 1.399 1.848 -9.558
(1.586) (0.478) (1.597) (4.683) (1.847) (9.068)
GRO -0.000335 0.00833 0.0174 0.0152 0.0205 0.101
(0.009) (0.010) (0.017) (0.036) (0.039) (0.066)
cons 3.109 3.020** 5.801 6.169 7.011** 4.205
(3.068) (1.374) (5.302) (12.511) (3.575) (15.053)
Year YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 2017 2017 2017 1989 1989 1989
R2 0.2279 0.2992 0.4996 0.2335 0.1772 0.2712
Wald 5.80*** 2.34*
Notes: Description of the variables can be found on table 3.6. This table reports the results of the quantile regressions based on equation 3.1.
Term τ shows the quantile of FP distribution under investigation. Significance based on bootstrap standard errors (1000 replications): ***,**,*
significance level at 1%, 5%, 10%. Wald-test is for EP slopes [θ(0.05) = θ(0.50) = θ(0.95)].
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Table 3.11: Quantile Regressions: Industry Adjusted Results
τ 05 50 95 05 50 95
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
adj.ROA adj.ROA adj.ROA adj.ROE adj.ROE adj.ROE
adj.EP 0.143*** 0.0510*** 0.118*** 0.139*** 0.0856*** 0.127***
(0.032) (0.010) (0.033) (0.033) (0.017) (0.045)
adj.Z 0.195** 0.758*** 1.213*** 0.256*** 0.348*** 0.414***
(0.093) (0.067) (0.170) (0.047) (0.046) (0.154)
adj.LEV -0.0252 -0.00774 0.0136 0.0116 0.0504** 0.232***
(0.018) (0.014) (0.009) (0.043) (0.024) (0.058)
adj.EMP 1.263** 0.346 0.847* 1.045* 0.696** 2.070***
(0.516) (0.216) (0.468) (0.620) (0.276) (0.645)
adj.LOGTA -0.974** 0.0701 0.103 0.384 0.373* -1.268*
(0.489) (0.159) (0.468) (0.447) (0.218) (0.675)
GDP 0.0336 0.00498 -0.00124 0.0204 -0.00188 -0.0277
(0.039) (0.010) (0.015) (0.028) (0.014) (0.027)
adj.TANG 0.284* -0.0274 -0.116 0.344 0.00582 0.487**
(0.159) (0.059) (0.309) (0.239) (0.054) (0.196)
adj.INTA 0.153*** 0.0262 -0.224** 0.203*** 0.0398** -0.140**
(0.045) (0.024) (0.096) (0.065) (0.018) (0.063)
adj.GRO 0.00452 0.000563 0.00316 0.00379 0.000508 0.00295
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
cons -1.346 -0.102 0.343 -5.194*** -0.486 1.160
(1.104) (0.225) (1.010) (1.985) (0.370) (0.849)
Year YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country YES YES YES YES YES YES
Obs 2017 2017 2017 1989 1989 1989
R2 0.1584 0.1813 0.2162 0.187 0.1016 0.2246
Wald 6.07*** 2.75*
Notes: Description of the variables can be found on table 3.6. This table reports the results of the quantile regressions based on equation 3.1.
Term τ shows the quantile of FP distribution under investigation. Significance based on bootstrap standard errors (1000 replications): ***,**,*
significance level at 1%, 5%, 10%. Wald-test is for EP slopes [θ(0.05) = θ(0.50) = θ(0.95)].
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Figure 3.9: EP Effects on FP Distribution
Notes: The figure illustrates the non-linear effects of EP on FP, based on equation 3.1. The grey area corresponds to confidence intervals calculated
with 1,000 bootstrap replications. The dash lines represent the OLS estimations with their confidence intervals (dot lines). The control variables
are not reported for brevity but are available upon request.
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Regarding the hypothesis, EP seems to increase FP significantly across the
FP distribution at the 0.01 level. For example, in Table 3.9, an increase in EP(ta)
of 1% will cause an increase in ROA (ROE) by 0.45% (1.982%), 0.152% (1.101%)
and 0.6% (1.312%) at the low, median and high part of the distribution respec-
tively. Having a closer look at the graphical representation at Figure 3.9, we
detect that (i) EP always has positive effects on FP and (ii) the lower and upper
parts of the distribution witness greater EP coefficients compared to the middle
of the distribution. We should also underline that this Figure indicates that the
linear regressions are insufficient to describe the data. Dash lines illustrate that
ordinary least squares can only provide a broad idea of the relationship by ig-
noring the different conditional distributions that plays an important role in the
investigation. Additionally, the heterogeneous EP effects on FP are supported
for both ROA and ROE. Wald statistics, for testing equality, reports whether EP
slopes have statistical differences across the distribution. EP seems to change
dramatically over the FP distribution. Particularly, EP coefficients have statisti-
cal differences for both ROA (Wald-test statistics = 22.76, p-value < 0.01) and
ROE (Wald-test statistics = 2.46, p-value < 0.10), indicating that the coefficients
are not constant across the distribution. So far, this finding implies that EP-FP
relationship exhibits a positive and heterogeneous association, as financial slack
argument predicts, and we do have adequate evidence to support our hypothesis.
3.4.2 Robustness Checks
To corroborate our results, we split our sample in three different ways. First,
due to the fact that we examine small, mid and large firms, we now run quantile
regressions separately for each category. A crucial limitation of previous studies
is that they examined mainly large firms and that their results were generalised
for the whole population (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004). An advantage of the EU
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sample is that the firm size is quite heterogenous. Therefore, our results would
provide evidence about whether firms with different book-size and profitability
are affected by EP. Second, UK firms have dominated our sample (25%) and
results might be driven by this country; previous studies show that UK firms pay
attention to environmental practises (Salama et al., 2011), thus we exclude the
UK as a post-Brexit scenario and we run the regressions again. Third, results
might be highly dependent upon the timing. For instance, in the period during
the recent financial crisis, firms had low profitability and they did not focus on
their EP. Accordingly, we split the sample into before crisis (2005-2008) and after
crisis (2010-2016) and we observe the sensitivity of the results.
Table 3.12 shows that our results are strong for small and medium size cor-
porations, while very large firms are unaffected by EP. This is particularly in-
teresting and indicates that not only profitability but also the size of the firms
have a dominant role in the examination. In line with Hoogendoorn et al. (2015);
Yadav et al. (2016), we find that smaller firms can better reap benefits from EP,
while larger firms may require larger investments to make EP efficient. Also, in
columns 10-12 of the same table, it is evident that a non-UK sample does not
moderate the EP-FP relationship, and UK firms have the same characteristics as
all the EU firms.
We continue with Table 3.13, showing that the period of the investigation can
offer sightly alternate results. Particularly, the results are quite robust during
the post-crisis period, while before crisis, only profitable firms seem to benefit
from EP. So far, the results support the main hypothesis, that profitability is
primarily responsible for the efficacy of EP. However, we would like to dig more
into the EP-FP relationship by assessing whether these results are driven by the
endogenous relationship between EP and FP (Endrikat et al., 2014).
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Table 3.12: Robustness Checks 1: EP(mv) on ROA
τ 05 50 95 05 50 95 05 50 95 05 50 95
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
sample small small small medium medium medium large large large Non-UK Non-UK Non-UK
EP(mv) 1.655*** 1.992*** 1.302** 1.227*** 0.508*** 0.586*** -0.148 0.0764 0.0433 0.696*** 0.370*** 0.579***
(0.618) (0.384) (0.506) (0.334) (0.128) (0.211) (0.282) (0.100) (0.203) (0.197) (0.070) (0.137)
Z -0.0248 0.226 0.764*** 0.148 0.798*** 1.236*** 1.917*** 1.687*** 2.435*** 0.796*** 1.097*** 1.434***
(0.093) (0.175) (0.284) (0.276) (0.122) (0.146) (0.174) (0.188) (0.304) (0.080) (0.062) (0.117)
LEV -0.00240 -0.000163 0.000310 0.00342 -0.00519* -0.00242 -0.00215 0.000128 -0.000375 -0.00449 -0.00177 -0.000173
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001)
EMP 0.553 2.489*** 3.255*** 0.927** 0.482** 0.00932 0.697 0.597*** 0.221 1.356*** 0.509*** 0.754***
(0.537) (0.640) (0.872) (0.396) (0.189) (0.314) (0.430) (0.226) (0.240) (0.318) (0.147) (0.246)
LOGTA -3.663*** -5.669*** -2.774** -1.017** -0.544** 0.666 0.881* -0.112 0.123 -1.047*** -0.445*** -0.524**
(1.256) (0.968) (1.319) (0.510) (0.228) (0.542) (0.469) (0.325) (0.439) (0.298) (0.151) (0.257)
GDP 0.280 0.178 0.546 -0.0898 -0.0299 0.00638 -0.0295 0.0474 -0.119 0.140 0.0940** 0.0199
(0.334) (0.123) (0.509) (0.190) (0.079) (0.059) (0.215) (0.083) (0.171) (0.177) (0.046) (0.095)
TANG -1.806 3.539 -4.000 -1.958 0.201 1.643 -1.529 -1.697** 0.398 -2.580*** -0.460 -1.405
(3.146) (3.687) (7.776) (2.239) (0.742) (3.587) (1.352) (0.670) (1.325) (0.814) (0.438) (1.308)
INTA -0.0836 -6.506 -15.99* -3.302 1.387* -0.319 4.343** 0.185 -2.079 0.672 -0.160 -3.906**
(7.531) (4.434) (8.410) (2.251) (0.733) (3.526) (1.787) (1.084) (2.441) (1.204) (0.544) (1.790)
GRO 0.000706 0.00650 0.0101 0.00737 0.00832 0.00696 0.000900 -0.00322 -0.00263 0.00158 0.00889 0.0155
(0.040) (0.023) (0.055) (0.029) (0.012) (0.015) (0.011) (0.017) (0.025) (0.006) (0.009) (0.017)
cons 27.34** 25.32*** 12.70 3.621 4.663* 1.736 -21.75*** -3.514 4.208 -5.063 1.846 5.745*
(12.493) (9.270) (12.253) (6.520) (2.622) (7.360) (5.972) (3.499) (9.226) (3.579) (1.462) (3.178)
Year YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Obs 286 286 286 1050 1050 1050 681 681 681 1506 1506 1506
R2 0.3196 .4090 0.5399 0.2732 0.3035 0.4913 0.4402 0.4045 0.5523 0.3206 0.3752 0.5738
Wald 0.96 5.30*** 0.48 3.91**
Notes: Small refers to firms falling in the lower quartile of total assets variable, similarly medium is firms in the middle quartile and large in the
upper quartile. Description of the variables can be found on table 3.6. This table reports the results of the quantile regressions based on equation
3.1. Term τ shows the quantile of FP distribution under investigation. Significance based on bootstrap standard errors (1000 replications): ***,**,*
significance level at 1%, 5%, 10%. Wald-test is for EP slopes [θ(0.05) = θ(0.50) = θ(0.95)].
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Table 3.13: Robustness Checks 2: EP(mv) on ROA and adj.EP on adj.ROA
τ 05 50 95 05 50 95 05 50 95 05 50 95
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
sample post post post pre pre pre post post post pre pre pre
ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA adj.ROA adj.ROA adj.ROA adj.ROA adj.ROA adj.ROA
EP 0.912*** 0.469*** 0.721*** 0.355 0.191 0.542* 0.141*** 0.0531*** 0.120*** 0.0931 0.0293 0.0585**
(0.144) (0.092) (0.098) (0.345) (0.218) (0.277) (0.030) (0.013) (0.023) (0.064) (0.019) (0.027)
(adj.)Z 0.0786 0.762*** 1.318*** 1.326*** 1.595*** 1.607*** 0.150** 0.708*** 1.046*** 0.828*** 0.861*** 1.034***
(0.060) (0.124) (0.184) (0.302) (0.206) (0.389) (0.075) (0.072) (0.162) (0.142) (0.068) (0.240)
(adj.)LEV 0.0014 -0.0015 -0.0001 -0.00274 -0.00117 0.00113 -0.0226 -0.00541 0.00916 -0.0256 -0.0808*** -0.0385
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.022) (0.013) (0.011) (0.049) (0.030) (0.091)
(adj.)EMP 0.583** 0.407** 1.070*** 0.507 0.167 0.396 1.253** 0.306 1.664*** 1.177 0.343 1.163
(0.250) (0.182) (0.256) (0.486) (0.197) (0.265) (0.552) (0.282) (0.305) (0.928) (0.352) (0.876)
(adj.)LOGTA -1.147*** -0.579*** -0.768*** 0.770 0.422 0.120 -1.191*** -0.113 -0.653 1.254 0.422 0.0651
(0.301) (0.168) (0.272) (0.489) (0.268) (0.621) (0.434) (0.255) (0.446) (1.059) (0.295) (0.609)
GDP 0.221 0.0401 -0.0107 0.155 -0.0588 1.046 0.0413 0.00705 -0.00188 0.0301 -0.000526 0.148
(0.141) (0.038) (0.092) (0.373) (0.231) (0.818) (0.032) (0.009) (0.014) (0.046) (0.030) (0.120)
(adj.)TANG -0.941 -0.632* 1.141 0.984 -0.170 0.0111 0.168 -0.0806 -0.119 0.473* -0.211* -0.252
(0.864) (0.358) (2.324) (1.828) (1.490) (2.836) (0.148) (0.083) (0.247) (0.267) (0.122) (0.479)
(adj.)INTA -0.544 0.149 -1.917 -0.227 1.664 -2.486 0.0837* 0.00728 -0.160* 0.0517 -0.0272 -0.130
(1.281) (0.664) (2.564) (2.477) (1.164) (3.790) (0.048) (0.028) (0.090) (0.071) (0.039) (0.133)
(adj.)GRO -0.006 0.008 0.0191* 0.0005 -0.002 -0.0059 0.0067 0.005* 0.005*** -0.008 0.00005 0.0437
(0.009) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.025) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.020) (0.012) (0.064)
cons 6.644* 5.175** 2.064 -23.42*** -3.696* 0.708 -1.045 0.117 -0.350 -4.658*** -0.453 -0.525
(3.401) (2.007) (4.218) (8.061) (1.969) (7.917) (0.764) (0.354) (0.657) (1.768) (0.458) (1.058)
Year YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Obs 1465 1465 1465 375 375 375 1465 1465 1465 375 375 375
R2 0.2463 0.311 0.523 0.4345 0.4129 0.5637 0.2488 0.1716 0.2273 0.4053 0.3313 0.4671
Wald 6.63*** 1.15 9.55** 0.42
Notes: Columns 1-6 are referred to non industry-adjusted results with main independent variable the EP(mv), columns 7-12 are referred to industry
adjusted variables with main independent variable the adj.EP. Pre-crisis is from 2005-2008, post-crisis from 2010-2016. Description of the variables
can be found on table 3.6. This table reports the results of the quantile regressions based on equation 3.1. Term τ shows the quantile of FP
distribution under investigation. Significance based on bootstrap standard errors (1000 replications): ***,**,* significance level at 1%, 5%, 10%.
Wald-test is for EP slopes [θ(0.05) = θ(0.50) = θ(0.95)].
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3.4.3 Detecting Endogeneity
To address the problem of the potential endogeneity between EP and the error
term, we stress our results in a two-stage quantile regression approach. Rea-
sonably, high profitability firms could allocate more resources to finance green
projects. Accordingly, at the first stage, we estimate an EP model enriched with
two instruments (ETS and ISO), and then the residuals from the first stage are
used as an explanatory variable at the second stage FP regressions controlling for
endogeneity.
As shown in table 3.14, columns 1,2 and 3 report the first stage for EP at 5,
50 and 95% of the conditional distribution respectively. Regarding the first stage
results, it is important to underline the validity of the two instruments as they
appear statistically significant below the 0.01 level. It should not be surprising
that ETS values coincide with “bad” EP because participating companies emit
more carbon dioxide. Also, firms might purchase carbon allowances in order to
legitimate their pollutants. Due to the very low carbon price, firms do not have
motives to reduce carbon emissions (Zhang and Wei, 2010). Specifically, by the
end of Phase 1, one ton of carbon emission priced at e0.02 (Engels, 2009). In
regard to the negative coefficient of ISO, this can be attributed to either ineffective
environmental management to reduce carbon footprint or to the adoption of ISO
by firms in order to ease stakeholder and regulatory pressure (Melnyk et al.,
2003). Another explanation of the negative coefficients is that polluting firms
receive pressure to adopt environmental proactive approaches and abide by the
regulatory standards (Dixon-Fowler et al., 2013; Lee et al., 2015).
Turning to the second stage results, we are now able to provide more in-
sights into our hypothesis (EP-FP relationship under endogeneity). All control
variables, estimated by the two-stage quantile regressions report very similar co-
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efficients to the previous estimates of the standard quantile regression (see section
3.4.1). Specifically, Z-score is positive, LOGTA is negative, LEV is negative and
insignificant for ROE and ROA respectively, EMP is positive and insignificant
for ROA and ROE respectively, while we do observe some variation of INTA co-
efficients across distribution for both ROE and ROA. As shown in Tables 3.15
and 3.16, EP coefficients are strongly significant and positive at the upper tail
of the distribution, while at the median and upper tail, EP is insignificant. Par-
ticularly, column 1 for ROA (ROE) represents a firm at the lower part of the
conditional distribution with α = τ = 0.05, and at this part EP is not significant.
On the other hand, in column 9, a counterpart firm, at the upper tail of the dis-
tribution with α = τ = 0.95, reports a significant coefficient for ROA (ROE) of
1.111% (5.172%). Overall, firms with heightened environmental performance are
more likely to experience financial benefits, compared to firms with high pollution
propensity. At the same time, this finding shows that firms with higher FP get
more benefits from EP engagement, while low profitability firms are unaffected
by their EP.
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Table 3.14: First-stage Quantile Regressions on EP(ta)
α 05 50 95
(1) (2) (3)
ETS -0.895*** -1.334*** -1.000***
(0.157) (0.118) (0.101)
ISO -0.198 -0.478*** -0.497***
(0.292) (0.100) (0.176)
Z 0.00528 -0.00373 -0.0367**
(0.007) (0.011) (0.015)
LEV 0.000203 0.000171 -0.000145
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EMP 0.312*** -0.113** -0.418***
(0.084) (0.048) (0.062)
LOGTA -0.224*** 0.117** 0.391***
(0.084) (0.047) (0.067)
GDP 0.0242 -0.00284 -0.0661**
(0.023) (0.022) (0.027)
TANG -1.086*** -1.394*** 0.258
(0.282) (0.222) (0.790)
INTA 0.508 1.779*** 1.828**
(0.526) (0.297) (0.907)
GRO 0.000640 -0.000163 0.00172
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
cons -6.964*** -2.357*** -0.982
(0.872) (0.568) (0.954)
Year YES YES YES
Industry YES YES YES
Country YES YES YES
Obs 2033 2033 2033
R2 0.1617 0.2056 0.2124
Notes: Description of the variables can be found on table 3.6. This table reports the results
of the first-stage quantile regression (equation 3.4). Term a shows the quantile of EP distribu-
tion under investigation. Significance based on bootstrap standard errors (1000 replications):
***,**,* significance level at 1%, 5%, 10%.
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Table 3.15: Two-stage Quantile Regressions on ROA
α 05 50 95
τ 05 50 95 05 50 95 05 50 95
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
EP(ta) 0.0727 0.0131 1.011** 0.159 0.0627 0.891*** 0.0471 0.0222 1.111**
(0.461) (0.197) (0.436) (0.400) (0.147) (0.266) (0.385) (0.176) (0.509)
V̂ (α) 0.391 0.158 -0.527 0.285 0.108 -0.426* 0.400 0.147 -0.641*
(0.429) (0.173) (0.477) (0.302) (0.149) (0.240) (0.358) (0.189) (0.344)
Z 0.119*** 1.025*** 1.562*** 0.114 1.023*** 1.559*** 0.0981*** 1.017*** 1.562***
(0.041) (0.071) (0.122) (0.135) (0.096) (0.128) (0.031) (0.049) (0.099)
LEV -0.00304 -0.000935 -0.000292 -0.00309 -0.000954 -0.000312 -0.00317* -0.000991 -0.000265
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
EMP 0.714*** 0.334*** 0.377 0.550** 0.277*** 0.566** 0.391 0.231** 0.757***
(0.251) (0.128) (0.272) (0.251) (0.101) (0.238) (0.372) (0.093) (0.293)
LOGTA -1.250*** -0.388** -0.221 -1.125*** -0.347*** -0.359 -0.978*** -0.308*** -0.521***
(0.295) (0.175) (0.242) (0.334) (0.121) (0.226) (0.326) (0.088) (0.182)
GDP 0.105 0.0764 -0.0127 0.0882 0.0715 0.00380 0.0520 0.0651 0.0468
(0.127) (0.047) (0.066) (0.155) (0.047) (0.059) (0.123) (0.054) (0.163)
TANG -0.805 -0.873* 0.884 -0.795 -0.863 0.974 -0.293 -0.666 0.395
(1.448) (0.499) (1.445) (1.270) (0.582) (1.525) (1.232) (0.587) (1.488)
INTA 2.576* 0.620 -3.406** 2.826*** 0.750 -3.834* 2.962** 0.850 -4.139**
(1.316) (0.509) (1.649) (1.094) (0.665) (2.103) (1.402) (0.750) (1.732)
GRO 0.000706 0.00838 0.0152 0.000463 0.00826 0.0143 0.00119 0.00853 0.0130
(0.005) (0.007) (0.015) (0.004) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.018)
cons 2.567 2.297* 9.146 4.408 3.085** 6.481 4.876* 3.185*** 6.189
(4.354) (1.257) (5.934) (3.671) (1.319) (4.453) (2.676) (1.090) (4.369)
Year YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Obs 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992
R2 0.2018 0.2878 0.4917 0.202 0.2878 0.4921 0.2022 0.2878 0.4926
Wald 3.16** 3.98** 3.58**
Notes: Description of the variables can be found on table 3.6. This table reports the results of the two-stage quantile regressions (equation 3.9), with τ showing
different quantiles of ROA distribution. Term V̂ (α) corresponds to any α given based on the first stage estimates (equation 3.4). Significance based on bootstrap
standard errors (1000 replications): ***,**,* significance level at 1%, 5%, 10%. Wald-test is for EP slopes for any α given [β(0.05) = β(0.50) = β(0.95)].
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Table 3.16: Two stage Quantile Regression on ROE
α 05 50 95
τ 05 50 95 05 50 95 05 50 95
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
EP(ta) -0.0877 0.249 5.486** 0.688 0.647 4.126*** 0.171 0.496 5.172**
(2.209) (0.794) (2.538) (1.218) (0.435) (1.092) (1.453) (0.632) (2.131)
V̂ (α) 2.361 1.032 -4.724** 1.531 0.647 -3.344** 2.026 0.808 -4.306*
(2.161) (0.820) (2.18) (1.329) (0.421) (1.313) (1.627) (0.617) (2.380)
Z 0.439*** 1.188*** 1.623*** 0.418*** 1.181*** 1.641** 0.354*** 1.158*** 1.738***
(0.134) (0.199) (0.588) (0.125) (0.207) (0.679) (0.108) (0.157) (0.409)
LEV -0.0255*** 0.0229*** 0.0814*** -0.0250** 0.0228*** 0.0809*** -0.0251*** 0.0230*** 0.0810***
(0.008) (0.005) (0.019) (0.011) (0.004) (0.021) (0.008) (0.005) (0.015)
EMP 2.003* 2.018*** 1.358 1.094 1.610*** 3.255 0.432 1.348*** 4.768***
(1.035) (0.655) (1.948) (0.932) (0.489) (2.076) (1.192) (0.511) (1.626)
LOGTA -2.263** -1.933*** -2.130 -1.501* -1.608*** -3.367 -0.788 -1.378*** -4.692***
(1.061) (0.698) (2.070) (0.859) (0.494) (2.063) (0.969) (0.444) (1.478)
GDP 0.0832 0.214 -0.0909 0.0352 0.185 0.0258 -0.106 0.132 0.239
(0.398) (0.167) (0.419) (0.349) (0.149) (0.309) (0.434) (0.130) (0.324)
TANG -3.575 -1.912 12.94** -3.396 -1.661 12.07* -0.892 -0.487 5.817
(4.270) (1.272) (5.259) (4.267) (1.258) (6.815) (4.713) (1.243) (9.561)
INTA 8.733 3.951*** -7.036 10.20** 4.398** -10.27 11.00 4.708** -12.00
(5.384) (1.486) (5.676) (4.236) (1.763) (10.739) (6.886) (1.844) (11.719)
GRO 0.0233 0.0207 0.0878 0.0215 0.0199 0.0910 0.0252 0.0214 0.0824
(0.019) (0.049) (0.066) (0.047) (0.054) (0.058) (0.040) (0.040) (0.056)
cons -6.539 1.967 53.29** 5.606 7.697** 27.37* 5.473 8.331** 24.76
(19.090) (7.140) (21.408) (14.577) (3.891) (15.488) (12.914) (3.431) (18.413)
Year YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Obs 1963 1963 1963 1963 1963 1963 1963 1963 1963
R2 0.2114 0.1542 0.2583 0.2114 0.1541 0.2587 0.2113 0.1541 0.259
Wald 5.38*** 3.48** 3.74**
Notes: Description of the variables can be found on table 3.6. This table reports the results of the two-stage quantile regressions (equation 3.9), with τ showing
different quantiles of ROE distribution. Term V̂ (α) corresponds to any α given based on the first stage estimates (equation 3.4). Significance based on bootstrap
standard errors (1000 replications): ***,**,* significance level at 1%, 5%, 10%. Wald-test is for EP slopes for any α given [β(0.05) = β(0.50) = β(0.95)].
102
Figure 3.10: Two-stage Non-linear EP Effects on FP
Notes: The figure illustrates the two stage non-linear effects of EP on FP, based on equation 3.9. Panels a, b and c are calculated with a two step process
at α = 0.05, α = 0.50 and α = 0.95 respectively. For example (a) ROA shows how β estimator changes across the ROA quantiles (τ) when V̂ (α = 0.05)
is given. The grey area corresponds to confidence intervals calculated with 1,000 bootstrap replications. The dash lines represent the OLS estimations with
their confidence intervals (dot lines). The control variables are not reported for brevity but are available upon request.
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Interestingly, the factor V̂ (α), controlling for endogeneity, is statistically sig-
nificant only for high profitability firms, indicating that we can rely on the pre-
vious estimates (standard quantile regressions) regarding low and median prof-
itability firms (Wooldridge, 2010), but the situation is much more complex for
high profitability firms. The evidence of endogeneity is apparent at the upper
part of the distribution (α = 0.95), where firms with financial resources are pro-
jected. In fact, as predicted by the financial slack argument, these firms have the
financial capacity to increase their EP even more. Similarly, V̂ (α) term in table
3.16 suggests that EP and ROE are endogenous only for high profitability firms.
In other words, EP causes FP, while the reverse causality is valid only if firms
have high financial resources. This result is consistent with previous studies; as
meta analyses (Orlitzky et al., 2003; Albertini, 2013; Dixon-Fowler et al., 2013;
Endrikat et al., 2014) jointly indicate, EP and FP are positive correlated. No-
tably, causality involves the positive link of EP with FP and the partially positive
link of FP with EP.
The main results are graphically represented in Figure 3.10, depicting that
superior EP results in better FP. The graph extracted from the second stage re-
sults represents a monotonically increasing sequence. In order to understand the
asymmetries of the relationship, Wald statistics for testing equality indicate that
EP coefficients have, on average, significant differences across quantiles. There-
fore the non-linear, endogenous and positive relationship seems to be the most
relevant framework for the EP-FP examination of the EU manufacturing sector.
Therefore, instrumental stakeholder theory, under the prism of the financial slack
argument, is the best way to describe our findings. Overall, EP seems to be an
effective strategy for firms in order to sustain a competitive advantage, validating
the Porter Hypothesis (Porter, 1991).
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3.5 Conclusion
Our paper examined the effect of EP on FP using data from a sample of 288 EU
manufacturing firms for the period 2005-2016. We used an innovative approach
combining the standard quantile methodology (Koenker and Bassett, 1978) with
instrumental variables for EP (Lee, 2007). This gave an opportunity to account
for potential non-linearity and endogeneity between EP and FP.
The main results that emerge from this paper are that (i) EP has a positive
effect on FP, (ii) the relationship between EP and FP is heterogenous across
the conditional distribution, and (iii) FP and EP are endogenously related for
high profitability firms. Taken together, these results suggest that a positive
theoretical framework (i.e. instrumental stakeholder theory) under the financial
slack argument mirror the relationship between EP and FP.
In particular, our evidence shows a statistically significant relationship depict-
ing a U-shaped curve between the EP coefficients and the associated quantiles of
FP. The schematic representation follows a steady process at the median quantiles
and it increases at the beginning and the end of the distribution. For all regres-
sions, the result suggests that lower emissions significantly increase ROA, ROE,
industry-adjusted-ROA and industry-adjusted-ROE for firms across the whole
distribution. Our findings are in line with studies that use a contemporary, large
data-set for an international sample (Lewandowski, 2017; Trumpp and Guenther,
2017). On the contrary, previous studies conducted with EU samples have rather
negative results (Wagner et al., 2002; Wagner, 2005). A possible explanation,
apart from the small sample of the previous studies, is that during the examined
period (1995-1997), companies were not subject to European regulations (i.e. EU
ETS).
Another important aspect of the examination is that we have adequate evi-
dence to support the endogeneity between EP and FP for high profitability firms.
Thus, endogeneity is conditional on the profitability levels. A research implica-
tion of this is that empirical studies should avoid generalising results and they
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should distinguish between low and high profitability firm samples. We also show
that estimations with low profitability firm samples are more likely to be unbi-
ased, while it is risky to assume no endogeneity for high profitability samples;
this problematic situation can be solved with an instrumental variable approach.
Additionally, we consider some regulatory and managerial implications. EP
has a multidimensional nature and hence many interconnections can arise (Busch
and Lewandowski, 2017). For instance, the finding that participation in the EU
emissions trading scheme increases the carbon emissions of large polluting firms
should generate regulatory concerns. Also, the role of ISO as a managerial strat-
egy to loosen regulatory pressure is still unclear. Misani and Pogutz (2015) note
that environmental management is done merely for symbolic purposes without
improving the carbon footprint. More importantly, policymakers should develop
cheap access to finance green investments particularly for low profitability firms;
otherwise, such firms do not have clear benefits from EP. Despite the increas-
ing volume of environmental regulations, mitigation policies to address climate
change provide insufficient motives for adaptation.
Concluding this paper, we would like to offer some potential avenues for future
research. First, it could be useful to examine the net benefit from the EP to the
FP in the EU area for a greater number of industries (see Hatakeda et al.,
2012). Second, a similar semi-parametric examination for the US market could
reveal interesting results. Parametric studies have reported that EP positively
affects FP in the US (Ben-Amar and McIlkenny, 2015; Dawkins and Fraas, 2011;
Matsumura et al., 2014). It would be intriguing to investigate how EP behaves in
different quantiles. Third, more information on the EU emissions trading scheme
[the carbon price, the free carbon allowances and whether firms buy or sell those
allowances (Clarkson et al., 2015)] would help us to establish greater accuracy in
our results, along with a better understanding of EP. Fourth, a similar analysis
could have used cash-flows instead of ROE or ROA in order to conceptualise the
slack resource argument. Finally, more research should be devoted to dynamically
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and non-parametrically modelling of the relationship.
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4 Second Empirical Chapter: The Nexus between Environ-
mental Disclosure and Idiosyncratic Risk
4.1 Introduction
For the past several years, great consideration has been given to the economic im-
plications of the environmental responsibility of firms, not only by company stake-
holders including investors, managers, suppliers, employees and governments, but
also by researchers and scholars (Zhang, 2017). More particularly, the disclosure
of environmental information is rather crucial for shaping future actions of both
investors and policy-makers (Qiu et al., 2016). At the same time, in an attempt to
monitor rising temperatures, the European Parliament has underlined the impor-
tance of corporate environmental disclosure for identifying sustainability risks and
for helping increase both investor and consumer trust (EU Commission., 2014).
Reporting transparent environmental information not only mitigates information
asymmetries, but also helps towards shaping an informative network within soci-
ety which is rather crucial for dealing with climate change (Stern, 2007; Aggarwal
and Dow, 2012; IPCC, 2014). In this paper, we add to the discussion about cli-
mate change by examining whether the disclosure of environmental-performance
information by European manufacturing firms is conducive to less uncertainty in
the relevant market.
Environmental disclosure22 is the information that is publicly disclosed by
firms and relates to climate change activities (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Luo et al.,
2012; Matsumura et al., 2014). Transparent environmental information has the
potential to appease market expectations because firms signal their smooth tran-
sition to the new climate era (Benlemlih et al., 2016). In turn, this signalling
could have implications for the financial state of the firms. For instance, a rea-
22One example of transparent environmental disclosure is when firms report greenhouse gases,
energy consumption, renewable energy consumption and total waste.
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sonable question is whether disclosing such information reduces firm risk. To be
more explicit, total risk of financial investment can be decomposed into system-
atic and idiosyncratic components. In this study, we concentrate on the latter
because it is shaped by firm-specific characteristics; implying that, making the
right decisions should diminish said risk. In retrospect, given the importance of
idiosyncratic risk for investment decision making (e.g., Merton, 1987; Ang et al.,
2006; Lin et al., 2014), in this study we investigate how environmental disclosure
affects idiosyncratic risk.
The effects of environmental disclosure on the risk of financial investment
build on a complex theoretical framework (Brooks and Oikonomou, 2018). On
the one hand environmental disclosure promotes the values and ethics of firms,
and thus firms are more likely to experience lower levels of risk (Jiang et al.,
2009; Molina-Azorin et al., 2009), as it is predicted by both the legitimacy and
the stakeholder theory. On the other hand, environmental disclosure can be detri-
mental (Friedman, 1970; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) because it exposes firms to
unnecessary criticism and high pollution-abatement cost (Wagner et al., 2002;
Lee et al., 2015), as managerial opportunism advocates. The theoretical contro-
versy is further stressed by the slack resource argument, according to which, the
financial state of firms affects their level of environmental engagement. In this
regard, we investigate whether different levels of idiosyncratic risk affect both the
strength and the sign of this relationship across firms.
Empirical studies conducted over the years have substantially improved our
knowledge about the effects of environmental disclosure on firm performance.
These studies imply that disclosure in general decreases the information asymme-
tries between firms and investors and thus it is negatively related to risk (Ferreira
and Laux, 2007; Benlemlih et al., 2016; Qiu et al., 2016). However, due to the
sensitive nature of environmental information, investors are advised to exercise
caution when making future investment decisions (Cormier and Magnan, 2015).
This is apparent from the body of research that examines the relation between
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environmental and financial performance, and reports inconclusive results. Meta-
analytic papers (Horvathova, 2010; Dixon-Fowler et al., 2013; Albertini, 2013;
Endrikat et al., 2014) suggest that the controversy of the results is attributed to
intense endogeneity. To put it differently, empirical findings regarding the rela-
tionship between financial and environmental performance might vary depending
on the measures employed to approximate these variables (Orlitzky and Ben-
jamin, 2001; Delmas et al., 2015; Misani and Pogutz, 2015; Nollet et al., 2016;
Trumpp and Guenther, 2017; Brooks and Oikonomou, 2018). It should also be
noted that the majority of the studies utilise accounting profitability ratios (e.g.,
ROA, ROE, Sales) as measures of financial performance, but they typically ne-
glect to examine how risk responds to environmental disclosure.
The main objective of this study is to examine how disclosing environmental
information affects firm risk. We mainly focus on the idiosyncratic risk of financial
investments. We further outline the controversial predictions of economic theory
and evaluate the relevance of specific theories for examining the risk-disclosure
nexus. Another important aim of our study is to investigate if the level of id-
iosyncratic risk moderates the magnitude of the environmental disclosure effect.
Thus far, studies focus only on the average picture by neglecting to investigate
how firms that operate in the tails of the distribution are affected. Finally, we
evaluate the effect of voluntary environmental disclosure on a sample of manu-
facturing firms that are subject to stricter environmental regulation (Mallin and
Ow-Yong, 2012).
Our study offers four important contributions. First, although prior studies
have examined the effects of environmental disclosure on idiosyncratic risk (Lee
and Faff, 2009; Salama et al., 2011; Oikonomou et al., 2012; Cai et al., 2016;
Diemont et al., 2016; Utz, 2017; Linciano et al., 2018), we test the said relationship
under the contradicting theoretical framework and we provide evidence about the
relevance of these theories. Second, in contrast to previous literature that uses the
traditional capital asset pricing model and at some occasions the four factor model
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(Mishra and Modi, 2013; Bouslah et al., 2013; Benlemlih et al., 2016), we utilise
both the four- and five-factor model to estimate idiosyncratic risk. Third, our
study demonstrates that the financial slack of firms moderates the examination
and thus the overall environmental disclosure of a portfolio has a heterogeneous
effect on investments with different risk levels, an important yet under-researched
area of the empirical finance literature (Ang et al., 2006). Fourth, this study offers
new evidence from the highly regulated EU manufacturing sector.
By utilising a framework of multiple regressions in a strongly balanced data
set of 288 manufacturing firms covering the period from 2005 to 2016 in 17 Euro-
pean countries, we find significant evidence that environmental disclosure reduces
the idiosyncratic risk. This finding provides additional support to both the stake-
holder and legitimacy theory, emphasising the importance of transparent environ-
mental disclosure as a management practice for risk-reduction. After controlling
for endogeneity within a dynamic panel data model, results remain robust. Addi-
tionally, consistent with the slack resource argument, quantile regressions reveal
that there is asymmetric relationship; that is, disclosure is more likely to affect
investments with high rather low idiosyncratic risk. Particularly, our results show
that investors significantly value the environmental transparent practices of the
EU firms,in line with the study of (Ziegler et al., 2011). While, as expected, a
perfectly diversified portfolio does not seem to price in environmental actions,
similarly to (Ang et al., 2006). Finally, in line with Benlemlih et al. (2016), the
alternative model specifications help us determine that environmental disclosure
has stronger link with idiosyncratic risk rather than other risk types.
This research has profound implications for CEOs, portfolio managers and in-
vestors. First, the negative environmental disclosure - idiosyncratic risk nexus can
be perceived by CEOs as a signal to pledge to more transparent environmental
policies, which will be rewarded by the stock market in terms of lower idiosyn-
cratic risk of investment. Second, because idiosyncratic risk can be diversified
away, the negative effect of environmental disclosure on idiosyncratic risk helps
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portfolio managers and investors identify stocks of companies that offer greater
diversification benefits. Indeed, our results imply that portfolio investment in po-
tentially fewer stocks of environmentally transparent than opaque companies can
help portfolio managers and investors diversify the risk of portfolio investment.
Third, if the volume of financial transactions is proportional to transaction costs,
then a portfolio made up of fewer stocks may be associated with lower transaction
costs.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 4.2, we present
the main hypotheses. Section 4.3 describes the data and the methodology. In
Section 4.4, we report the empirical results. We then conclude with Section 4.5.
4.2 Hypotheses Development
The aim of this section is to define the hypotheses that are based on the theo-
retical framework between environmental disclosure and idiosyncratic risk. From
the lens of signalling theory (Connelly et al., 2011), information asymmetries be-
tween stakeholders and firm can be attenuated when firms provide transparent
information about their practises. More specifically, environmental disclosure can
strengthen the bonds with investors, customers, suppliers and regulators (legiti-
macy theory) and thus firms can be less vulnerable to external and internal shocks.
A good firm-stakeholder relationship (stakeholder theory) acts as a protection-
scheme and a firm can eventually sustain a competitive advantage which in turn
will assist to attain its financial objectives. However, transparent environmental
information does not necessarily suggest “good” environmental performance (Al-
Tuwaijri et al., 2004) and it might be done for symbolic purposes as managerial
opportunism implies. Overall, three main theoretical categories can be withdrawn
according to how environmental disclosure contributes to the risk (see Table 4.17).
First, transparent environmental information can increase the idiosyncratic risk
due to the fact that firms are exposed to criticism. Second, complete environ-
mental information reduces the risk because firms have stakeholders informed and
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thus can hold fully-diversified portfolios. Finally, the relationship is more com-
plex and might be moderated by the financial slack of the firms (slack resource
argument).
Table 4.17: Theory between Environmental disclosure and Risk
Theory Expected Risk outcome Concept
Managerial opportunism + Managerial discretion
Slack resource
argument
-
Effective resource
allocation
Stakeholder theory - Integrating management
Legitimacy theory - Transparent information
Natural resource
based view
Initially + then -
(∩ shape)1 Competitive advantage
Finance theory Initially ± then ± Investment uncertainty
Note: The link between environmental disclosure and idiosyncratic risk is observed in the
aforementioned theories. The second column illustrates the expected sign of the risk according
to the underlined theory. The third column corresponds to the concept of its theory. 1 Inverted
U shape association.
4.2.1 Positive Association between Disclosure and Risk
We begin by considering the positive relationship between environmental disclo-
sure and risk. The positive theoretical framework can be justified due to the
higher cost that firms have to endure while at the same time, firms are exposed
to unnecessary criticism (Brown and Deegan, 1998). Another justification of the
positive association between social performance and risk is suggested by the man-
agerial opportunism theory (Bouslah et al., 2013). The theory is referring to the
principal-agent problem with the latter acting according to their own preferences
and disregarding the principals’ objectives (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Partic-
ularly, managers might over-disclose environmental actions for symbolic purposes
because they would like to be considered as environmental-sensitive managers.
Such disclosure will increase the investors’ concerns and as a result the uncer-
tainty arises. Disclosure should be accompanied with “good” environmental per-
formance, otherwise firms will not agree to provide this kind of information (Lee
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et al., 2015). Manufacturing firms would need to bear high environmental cost
in order to operate “green” (Wagner, 2005). Therefore, there is a direct trade-off
between the cost and the benefit, entailing that manufacturing firms will eventu-
ally face competitive disadvantage.
Few studies are found in the literature to document positive association be-
tween idiosyncratic risk and general transparency (Lin et al., 2014; Wu et al.,
2016). While the majority of the studies that correlate corporate social actions
with the idiosyncratic risk, obtain results in favor of the negative outcome (Fer-
reira and Laux, 2007; Mishra and Modi, 2013; Cai et al., 2016; Utz, 2017).
4.2.2 Negative Association between Disclosure and Risk
Regarding the negative theoretical justification, environmental disclosure may
reduce the asymmetric information and signal an environmental sensitive to the
investors firm (Bouslah et al., 2013). At the same time, such actions minimise
the risk to damage the reputation of the firm and governments set less regulatory
environmental pressure (Reinhardt and Stavins, 2010). For instance, a negative
framework between disclosure and risk can be found in the stakeholder theory.
The theory advocates that a green firm improves the efficiency, the visibility, re-
duces the operational cost and tightens bonds with ethical-investors, employees,
consumers and government (Jones, 1995). In a stakeholder framework, Salama
et al. (2011); Oikonomou et al. (2012) identify that social actions significantly de-
crease the systematic risk and wonder about the potential impact on idiosyncratic
risk.
In addition, the notion of the negative association is that firms operate in a
society where they have to contribute and inform the public about their environ-
mental actions. The ethical approach of the relationship is best described by the
legitimacy theory. Reporting environmental information would potentially lead to
legitimise their corporate actions and abate the demands of the society (Guthrie
114
and Parker, 1989). For instance, disclosing firm’s ecological performance will have
a result to alleviate the external pressure for climate change. Also, transparent
information regarding the environmental performance means that they have to
operate eco-friendly in order to make visible their environmental sensitivity and
so they expect to have profitability boosted (Ben-Amar and McIlkenny, 2015).
For this reason, according to the legitimacy theory, a firm which informs the in-
vestors and society will be awarded because (1) it legitimises its actions and (2)
diminishes the asymmetric information.
There are numerous studies (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Dawkins and Fraas,
2011; Matsumura et al., 2014; Nollet et al., 2016) that examine the impact of en-
vironmental disclosure on the stock performance. The studies imply that higher
disclosure improves the financial condition of the firms. Previous studies (Salama
et al., 2011; Bouslah et al., 2013; Mishra and Modi, 2013; Cai et al., 2016; Diemont
et al., 2016) examine whether corporate social strengths and concerns are linked to
the idiosyncratic risk. The studies underline the effect of environmental initiatives
and how the decisions from the board of directors can influence the investment
climate. Environmental strengths are generally linked to the risk-reduction as-
sumption. Benlemlih et al. (2016) is closely related to our paper. They examine
the effect of corporate and environmental disclosures on idiosyncratic, systematic
and total risk for a sample of British companies and they support that disclosure
significantly decreases idiosyncratic but not systematic risk. However, we cannot
reject that environmental disclosure affects idiosyncratic risk abnormally. So far,
researchers pay major attention to the profitability of the firms, by neglecting the
risk associated with this performance. The majority of the empirical literature
is consistent with the negative association between corporate actions and risk.
Therefore, we extract the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Following the legitimacy and stakeholder theory, high envi-
ronmental disclosure has a negative impact on idiosyncratic risk.
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4.2.3 Financial Slack and Disclosure
Slack resource argument is referred to the social and human capital resources that
can influence the firm’s performance (George, 2005). Empirically, Knight et al.
(2019) show that firm resources can influence the adoption of environmentally
sustainable strategies. In a similar vein, riskier firms normally undertake more
environmental projects and therefore risk and disclosure are “co-determined”
(Orlitzky and Benjamin, 2001). Therefore, financial state can influence the en-
vironmental disclosure of firms. This is because it involves a commitment to
financially support environmental actions. Previous studies pinpoint that the
level of environmental engagement can affect the financial performance of the
firm by solely focusing on the mean of the financial performance distribution
(e.g, Misani and Pogutz, 2015; Qiu et al., 2016; Trumpp and Guenther, 2017;
Lewandowski, 2017). Herein, we argue that disclosure might behave differently
across investment-portfolios with high and low risk.
Hypothesis 2: Under the slack resource argument, environmental disclosure
can heterogeneously affect the idiosyncratic risk at different levels of idiosyncratic
risk.
4.3 Research Design
4.3.1 Sample and Data
The sample consists of 288 European firms of the manufacturing sector that are
included in the STOXX Europe 600 Index across 17 countries of the European
region, covering a 12 year period from 2005 to 2016 (see table 4.18). Those firms
are chosen because the unavailability of data creates constrains for investigating
larger sample. In addition, manufacturing firms have been highly criticised be-
cause are connected with climate change since they emit large amount of carbon.
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For this reason, the EU environmental regulations23 have enforced firms to dis-
close essential information about their climate change actions and at the same
time firms are monitored for the reliability of the data, implying that our sample
includes firms with high visibility [controversially with Merton’s (1987) model].
2005 has been chosen as the initial year because the EU emissions trading scheme
was activated and Kyoto Protocol set into force.
4.3.2 Variables of the Study
Idiosyncratic risk
To answer the hypotheses, idiosyncratic risk needs to be constructed. Previous
studies (e.g., Ferreira and Laux, 2007; Fu, 2009) define idiosyncratic risk as the
standard deviation of the residuals of the pricing models. Capital asset pricing
model, three-factor (Fama and French, 1993) and four-factor (Carhart, 1997)
models have been used for this type of examination extensively. We compute our
risk results based on the four-factor model following Mishra and Modi (2013);
Bouslah et al. (2013); Cai et al. (2016).
Ri,t−Rf,t = βi+βi,1(Rm,t−Rf,t)+βi,2SMBt+βi,3HMLt+βi,4MOMt+ui,t (4.10)
The left part of the equation corresponds to the excess stock return, (Rmt−Rf ) is
the excess return on the market portfolio , the second factor (SMB) measures the
return of small over large stocks, (HML) the return of value over growth stocks,
the momentum factor measures the portfolio returns of winner over loser stocks
(MOM) and uit is the residuals. Rmt, Rf , SMBt, HMLt and MOMt values for the
23Commission Regulation (EU) No 601/2012 of 21 June 2012 on the monitoring and reporting
of greenhouse gas emissions. During the second compliance cycle of the greenhouse gas emissions
trading scheme, covering the years 2008 to 2012, industrial operators, aviation operators, veri-
fiers and competent authorities have gained experience with monitoring, reporting greenhouse
gases and establishing guidelines for the monitoring and reporting of greenhouse gas emissions.
The rules for the third trading period of the Union’s greenhouse gas emission allowance trading
scheme which begins on 1 January 2013 and for the following trading periods should build on
that experience. See more on: https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/monitoring_en
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European market are retrieved from Kenneth R. French website. Stock returns
(Ri,t) are downloaded from Datastream. Note that we could construct our own
systematic factors endogenously from our sample, however, we wish to benchmark
our findings across the whole European market. All the aforementioned values are
on a daily frequency for all 288 firms for the 12 year period. We next run ordinary
least squares (OLS)24 regressions to eq.(4.10) by assuming that the residuals are
normally distributed with zero mean and constant variance. In fact, Figure 4.11
shows that residuals ∼ N (0, σ2) We repeated this procedure for each year of the
sample in order to obtain 12 different variances for every firm. Then, we define
the idiosyncratic risk (Risk) as the annualised standard deviation of the residuals
(Risk = σ(ui,t)×
√
K × 100%), where k corresponds to trading days of any year
given with k = 1, 2, ..., K).
Figure 4.11: Histogram of residuals from four factor model
24Fu (2009) employed Egarch models to construct the idiosyncratic risk and found that OLS
and Garch models provide with very similar idiosyncratic risk results.
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Environmental disclosure
Answering the hypotheses, environmental disclosure score (Disc) is used. Disclo-
sure is produced by Bloomberg database and it measures the quality and mag-
nitude of the environmental information disclosed by each firm. While previous
studies use binary or low range scores to account for the disclosure (see, Fisher-
Vanden and Thorburn, 2011; Barnett and Salomon, 2012; Hsu and Wang, 2013;
Matsumura et al., 2014), our score takes values from 0 to 100 with the lowest val-
ues corresponding to lack of climate change information. This indicates that our
examination might varies substantially across different quantiles. The fact that
contemporaneous literature has a growing interest in Bloomberg’s scores strength-
ens the appropriateness of this variable as a proxy of environmental disclosure
(Nollet et al., 2016; Broadstock et al., 2018; Petitjean, 2019). As examined by Qiu
et al. (2016); Benlemlih et al. (2016), the score weights the information provided
by firms for 60 different environmental actions and it is normalised according to
the mean disclosure of the industry that firms operate, as well as disclosure score
is also normalised by year (see more about environmental disclosure in Appendix
B).
Other Control Variables
We employ a set of different variables that affect the idiosyncratic risk (table 4.19).
First, the probability of default measured by Altman’s Z-score (Z), low values
correspond to higher probability of default and should induce higher idiosyncratic
risk (Bouslah et al., 2013). Z-score sums up five weighted measures in order to
classify firms according to their financial distress and it uses both accounting and
market based indicators. Firms with high probability of default are closely tied
to idiosyncratic risk (Lopez, 2004). In contrast to default risk, leverage (Lev)
is debt to equity ratio which is measured by summing the short and long term
liabilities divided by the market value. Leverage is a proxy of financial risk and it
is expected to be positive because risky firms hold usually more debt (Ang et al.,
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2006; Psillaki et al., 2010; Mallin and Ow-Yong, 2012). High leverage implies
that stakeholders bear a high amount of cash flow risk and therefore volatility of
the stock return increases.
Furthermore, larger firms have diversified activities and hence less idiosyn-
cratic risk. We use as a size proxy the logarithm of the total assets (LogTa)
(Lee and Faff, 2009; Mishra and Modi, 2013; Cai et al., 2016). Profitability is
linked to the risk. Return on assets (ROA) measures the ability of the firm to
generate profits from its assets and it is used as a proxy for financial profitability.
High profitability might act as signal to investors about the soundness of the firm
(Mishra and Modi, 2013). Another profitability proxy is the the annual growth
rate of total sales (Growth), growth displays the firm’s cash flows and so it is
expected to decrease the risk (Ang et al., 2006).
Additionally, the future prosperity can be represented by intangible assets
(Inta). They cannot be easily collateralised but they add value to the firm (Psil-
laki et al., 2010). Intangible assets have characteristics of Research and Devel-
opment (R&D) and it might either generate future profits or losses (Elsayed and
Paton, 2005). Intangibility is generally expected to have negative association
with risk. Also, tangible assets (Tang) can be a proxy for the collateral of the
firm. Negative relation between risk and tangibility is expected because creditors
can liquidate assets easily and thus they face less risk (Konar and Cohen, 2001).
Finally, we include year (Year), industry (Industry) and country (Country)
dummies to control for the unobserved firm heterogeneity. Different industries
have been observed to have different risk and different countries affect dis-similarly
the idiosyncratic risk of their firms (Chen and Wang, 2012; Mishra and Modi,
2013; Wu et al., 2016).
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Table 4.18: Industry and Country Composition
Panel A: Industry Composition
Industry Frequency Percent
Technology 11 3.82
Telecommunications 12 4.17
Consumer Discretionary 56 19.44
Consumer Staples 40 13.89
Industrials 88 30.56
Basic Material 40 13.89
Energy 17 5.9
Utilities 24 8.33
Panel B: Country Composition
Country Frequency Percent
Germany 36 12.5
United Kingdom 71 24.65
France 47 16.32
Italy 14 4.86
Spain 14 4.86
Netherlands 15 5.21
Switzerland 18 6.25
Sweden 24 8.33
Norway 8 2.78
Austria 4 1.39
Belgium 6 2.08
Denmark 5 1.74
Finland 14 4.86
Ireland 7 2.43
Czech Republic 1 0.35
Portugal 3 1.04
Luxemburg 1 0.35
Total 288 100
Same as Chapter 3 . Firms are allocated to industries according to the Industry Classification
Benchmark (ICB).
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Table 4.19: Variable description and source of data
Variables Concept Source
Risk
(Idiosyncratic risk) Annualised standard de-
viation of 4-factor model’s residuals
Kenneth
Frencha
5.Risk
(Idiosyncratic risk) Annualised standard de-
viation of 5-factor model’s residuals
Kenneth
Frencha
T.Risk
(Total risk) Annualised standard deviation
of stock returns
Datastream
Disc Environmental disclosure score Bloomberg
Z-score
(Default risk) Altman’s Z = 1.2* (WC/
TA)+1.4* (RE/ TA)+3.3* (EBIT/ TA)
+(Sales/ TA)+0.6* (MV/ TL), higher score
denotes lower probability of default
Datastream,
Bloomberg
Lev Leverage = total debt/total equity Datastream
LogTa Log of TA Datastream
ROA Return on assets Bloomberg
Continued on next page
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Table 4.19: continued from previous page
Growth Annual growth rate of total sales Bloomberg
Tang Tanglible assets/ TA Bloomberg
Inta Intangible assets/TA Bloomberg
Q Tobin’s Q = (MV + TL + PE + MI) / TA Bloomberg
R&D Log of research and development expenses Datastream
[WC, TA,
EBIT, RE,
MV, TL,
PE, MI]b
Variables for calculations , WC= working
capital, TA= total assets, EBIT= earnings
before interest and taxes, RE= retained
earnings, MV= market value, TL= total li-
abilities, PE= preferred equity, MI= minor-
ity interest
Datastream,
Bloomberg
a The factors (SML, HML, MOM, RMW, CMA, RM and Rf ) to calculate idiosyn-
cratic risk are retrieved from Kenneth R. French Data library (http://mba.tuck.
dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html)
b All money-based indicators for all countries, for each given year, are adjusted into
current Euro.
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4.3.3 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
We continue this subsection by presenting some descriptive statistics and cor-
relations of the variables employed in the regressions. Firstly, our final sample
numerates 3,465 firm-year observations. Having a closer look at panel A in table
4.20, disclosure is the variable with the most missing values comparing to the rest
of the data-set with 2788 valid observations. In a pooled sample of 901,728 firm-
daily observations, we extract 3389 annual idiosyncratic risk values, which have a
mean (median) of 26.96 (24.11) with the highest value being 115.08 and standard
deviation of 10.62. In terms of the distribution of the variables Disc, Inta, ROA
and LogTA are very close to satisfy the normality conditions (Skewness=0 and
Kurtosis=3). While Risk, Z, Lev, Tang and Growth have a leptokurtic distribu-
tion and they also have fat upper tails apart from Lev with a thick lower tail.
Panel B reports the correlations. Pairwise correlations gives some preliminary
view of the effect of independent variables on Risk. Note that most of the exam-
ined variables have a negative and very low correlation with Risk. Particularly,
disclosure negatively correlates with Risk at a rate of 22.3%.
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Table 4.20: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for the Main Variables
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
(1) Risk (2) Disc. (3) Z-score (4) Lever. (5) Inta. (6) Tang. (7) ROA (8) LogTA (9) Growth
Obs 3389 2788 3232 3437 3282 3349 3341 3437 3390
Mean 26.96 35.68 4.86 90.25 0.22 0.80 6.06 9.06 9.03
Std 10.62 16.21 9.97 601.48 0.19 0.22 5.34 1.46 66.81
Min 10.62 2.33 -0.52 -22583.33 0.00 0.00 -9.03 3.41 -91.06
1st Q 19.75 23.96 2.32 34.98 0.06 0.68 2.83 8.04 -1.25
Med 24.11 37.21 3.46 64.57 0.18 0.85 5.21 9 5.09
3rd Q 31.30 47.29 4.99 114.72 0.35 0.96 8.43 10.15 12.56
Max 115.08 75.97 328.07 10020.93 1.16 2.72 28.28 12.9 2290.13
Skew 1.90 -0.09 19.83 -20.69 0.92 -0.08 0.94 0.04 27.66
Kurt 9.14 2.31 524.37 872.52 3.29 8.84 4.93 2.62 868.33
Panel B: Correlations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(1) 1
(2) -0.2229* 1
(3) 0.0563* -0.1365* 1
(4) -0.0153 0.0291 -0.0244 1
(5) -0.0914* -0.0895* -0.0841* 0.0203 1
(6) -0.0005 -0.0192 0.1034* -0.0091 0.0051 1
(7) -0.1165* -0.1282* 0.1882* -0.0411* -0.03 -0.0242 1
(8) -0.2501* 0.4932* -0.2642* 0.0543* -0.0054 -0.0909* -0.3482* 1
(9) 0.0599* -0.0485* 0.034 0.0149 0.0282 -0.0045 0.0721* -0.0487* 1
All variables are defined in Table 4.19. * denotes 5% level of significance. Std= standard deviation, Q= quartile, Med=median, Skew= skewness
and Kurt= kurtosis.
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Table 4.21: Risk and Return, with average t-Statistics
Risk
Very low
(q<5%)
Low
(q<25%)
Lower middle
(q<50)
Higher middle
(q>50%)
High
(q>75%)
Very high
(q>95%)
Disc 43.528* 40.613* 38.623* 32.739* 30.862* 26.849*
(-5.706) (-9.399) (-9.739) (9.739) (9.339) (7.062)
Return 10.063 10.708* 10.979* -0.314* -11.446* -26.535*
(-1.445) (-4.368) (-8.039) (8.039) (14.436) (10.874)
The table shows disclosure and return of portfolios with different idiosyncratic risk levels. T-
Statistics are reported in parenthesis, comparing the different risk portfolios with the rest of
the sample, where q denotes the quantile of Risk variable. * denotes 5% level of significance.
In addition, there is a debate whether portfolio managers and investors should
prefer firms with higher disclosure unconditionally. As expected, investing in dis-
closing assets implies lower idiosyncratic risk and thus lower risk should generate
lower returns. As shown in Table 4.21, low risk portfolios are followed by higher
disclosure and higher returns than the high risk portfolios. Therefore, in line with
Ang et al. (2006), lower idiosyncratic risk does not necessarily indicate lower re-
turns. We now proceed to econometrically test if indeed disclosing environmental
information can decrease the idiosyncratic risk of a portfolio.
4.3.4 Empirical Model
This subsection presents three different types of econometric techniques. (1)
Panel, (2) dynamic panel and (3) quantile regressions. We are trying to cap-
ture all different aspects of risk-disclosure relationship since there is no extensive
literature on this particular topic. The methodology aims to deal with the en-
dogenous and non-linear estimates and at the same time to provide insights into
the overall effect of environmental disclosure on the firm risk.
Panel Model
Having discussed about how environmental disclosure and risk are connected,
we now proceed to estimate their relationship. Following previous studies (e.g.,
Delmas et al., 2015; Nollet et al., 2016) we employ panel data methodology and
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we stress disclosure in risk regressions as shown below:
Riski,t = a0+a1Disci,t+X
′
i,tφ+
T∑
t=2
δtY eart+
M∑
m=2
δmIndustrym+
J∑
j=2
δjCountryj+ei,t
(4.11)
Where the subscripts i and t correspond to firm and year respectively, i =
1, 2, ..., n and t = 1, 2, ..., T and ei,t the error term. Risk denotes the idiosyn-
cratic volatility and X′ is a vector that contains control variables (Z, Lev, Inta,
Tang, ROA, LogTa, Growth). We also control for year, industry and country fixed
effects, so a0 intercept is refereed to the base year (2005), industry (Technology)
and country (Germany) where m = 1, 2, ...,M and j = 1, 2, ..., J . Particular
attention should be place on the variable of interest which is Disc and the co-
efficient we should observe is a1. According to the first hypothesis (H1), we
perform one-tailed test, so the null hypothesis is H10 : a1 ≥ 0 and alternative
H11 : a1 < 0.
The results are presented under the pooled OLS, fixed effect and random effect
models. For all different specifications, we use robust standard errors. Fixed effect
model is appropriate when we focus on a specific firm characteristics (ci) and
therefore ei,t= vi,t + ci with vi,t being a time-varying error component. Note that
in case of fixed effect model industry and country dummies are dropped from
the model to avoid multicollinearity. Random effect model represents random
draws from the population so that ci allows for individual effects. In contrast
with the previous models, pooled OLS estimates constant coefficients (ci = c).
Finally, we report likelihood ratio redundant fixed effects and Hausman test in
order to identify if the individual effects ci are unobserved and are correlated with
explanatory variables (Baltagi, 2008; Oikonomou et al., 2012).
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Dynamic Panel Model
The problem of endogeneity which has been reported continuously should be
carefully considered (Tamazian and Bhaskara Rao, 2010; Coban and Topcu, 2013;
Albertini, 2013; Endrikat et al., 2014; Busch and Lewandowski, 2017). A system
of generalised method of moments (Sys-GMM), which is proposed by Blundell
and Bond (1998) can control for endogeneity in our estimations. The use of this
model is motivated by the study of Orlitzky and Benjamin (2001) who underscore
that environmental actions and risk may be endogenously related and therefore
the equation 4.11 is tested with dynamic panel model:
Riski,t = a0 + a1Disci,t + β1Riski,t−1 + X
′
i,tφ+
T∑
t=3
δtY eart + ei,t (4.12)
Moreover, equation 4.12 is instrumented with lagged values of the explanatory
variables. However, lagged values are usually weak instruments and thus sys-
GMM combines the first-difference estimator with the estimator in levels in order
to efficiently deal with the endogeneity. The description of the variables is as
above and again ei,t = vi,t + ci is referred to the typical fixed effect components
of the error term, with the assumption that E(vi,t)= E(ci)= E(vi,tci) =0, for
i=1,..,n and t=2,..,T. In order to avoid the over-identified restrictions and auto-
correlation, we do not include industry and country dummies. The model is
appropriate to re-address the hypothesis 1 (H1).
In order to satisfy the orthogonality condition, we collapse instruments as pro-
posed by Roodman (2009) because large number of instruments would lead to fi-
nite sample bias and therefore we assume that E(Riski,t−1∆vi,t)= E(∆Riski,tvi,t−1)=
0. We consider two lags for both the difference and system GMM instruments.
Also, Hansen’s (1982) J-test measures the validity of instruments and at the same
time the two step estimates are based on corrected standard errors (Windmeijer,
2005).
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Non-parametric Model
In order to observe how disclosure behaves to firms with different risk levels we
employ quantile regression which was introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1978).
We investigate parameters that describe the 5%, 25%, median, 75% and 95% of
the conditional distribution. The main advantage of this method is that captures
the abrupt changes of disclosure on Risk. It can be linearly represented as:
Risk = π(τ) + γ(τ)Disc+ Y′θ(τ) + ε, τ ∈ (0, 1) (4.13)
Where, Risk is the dependent variable, π is the intercept, Y is a vector that
contains all explanatory variables, θ(τ) is the parameters, ε signifies the error
term and τ refers to the part the of Risk distribution. We assume that the
error is equal to zero at the conditional τ th quantile [Qε(τ |Y, Disc) = 0]. Also,
the parameter γ for any given quantile τ for a sample of N observations can be
calculated with linear programming as follows:
γ̂(τ) = arg min
γ
1
N
N∑
i=1
ρτ (Risk − π(τ)− γ(τ)Disc−Y′θ(τ))
where check function ρτ (.) is defined as:
ρτ (ε) =

τε, if ε ≥ 0;
(τ − 1)ε, if ε < 0
We use bootstrap estimates of γ(τ) in order to calculate the covariance ma-
trix. We compute standard errors with 1000 bootstrap replications and thus
we obtain asymptotically normally distributed estimators which are valid under
heteroskedasticity.
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In order to investigate the hypothesis 2 (H2: Disc heterogeneously affects
Risk), we consider that γ coefficients do not vary across the conditional distri-
bution. Therefore jointly equality test is performed. The null hypothesis is that
the slope of disclosure is the same across quantiles and can be written as H20 :
γ0.05 = γ0.25 = γ0.50 = γ0.75 = γ0.95, otherwise disclosure unequally influences risk.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Panel and Dynamic Panel Regression Results
Results relating to hypothesis 1 are reported in table 4.22. Columns 1, 2 and 3 re-
port the pooled-OLS, fixed effect and random effect model respectively. Concern-
ing the the control variables, Inta, Tang, ROA and LogTa reduce the idiosyncratic
risk; finding which is according to our expectations and the previous literature
(Konar and Cohen, 2001; Mishra and Modi, 2013; Cai et al., 2016), while higher
leverage unexpectedly increases the idiosyncratic risk of the firms (Ang et al.,
2006; Psillaki et al., 2010). Z and Growth do not appear to have an effect on
the idiosyncratic risk. The results from the 3 models support hypothesis 1.
Hence, transparent information about climate change significantly decreases the
idiosyncratic risk of EU manufacturing firms. This finding is in line with both the
legitimacy and stakeholder theory and it provides additional support to existing
literature which acknowledges the benefits from the social corporate actions (Lee
and Faff, 2009; Salama et al., 2011; Oikonomou et al., 2012; Mishra and Modi,
2013; Cai et al., 2016).
A noteworthy remark is that with the inclusion of the disclosure variable
our baseline specification acquires higher explanatory power, as it highlights the
importance of environmental disclosure as determinant of idiosyncratic risk. We
should underline that the goodness of fit of the models reaches 60%, indicating
that the chosen variables can explain a high proportion of the unobserved variance
of stock returns. Also, the likelihood ratio specifies that the pooled-OLS model
130
is not appropriate in this examination due to the fact that firms have different
characteristics. We cannot reject though that pooled-OLS provides with unbiased
estimations since we have control for a set of different attributes. On a final note,
the random effect model is preferable in this instance; that is, according to the
Hausman test; suggesting that our sample is representative for all manufacturing
firms in the EU.
Regarding the dynamic panel results, column 4 of table 4.22 reports the two-
step Sys-GMM based on equation 4.12. Dynamic panel regressions are appro-
priate to address the problem of endogenous variables and consequently to re-
address hypothesis 1. In this regard, we cannot reject hypothesis 1 that Disc-
Risk relationship is negative; consistent with the previous estimates. Even if
risk and disclosure are bidirectionally related (Orlitzky and Benjamin, 2001), re-
sults demonstrate that environmental disclosure is tied up with the risk-reduction
hypothesis.
It is important to underline the validity of the model. Hansen J-test reports
p-values of 38.5%, signifying the validity of the instruments. AR(1) and AR(2)
related to the first differenced equation denote that there is first order autocor-
related disturbances and no second order autocorrelation. Windmeijer (2005)
affirms that the two-step estimator with the finite sample correction for stan-
dard errors provides unbiased results. As expected the autoregressive term for
Risk is positive and highly statistically significant, underlining the memory of the
idiosyncratic risk (Ang et al., 2006).
Interestingly, the panel estimates report larger coefficients in comparison with
the Sys-GMM. An explanation is that the autoregressive term in the Sys-GMM
model absorb a large proportion of the systematic influence of the control vari-
ables. Also, we cannot reject that panel estimates are affected by endogeneity.
Nevertheless, disclosure remains negative and statistically significant at 1% level.
This finding is in line with the majority of empirical studies (Ziegler et al., 2011;
Salama et al., 2011; Oikonomou et al., 2012; Mishra and Modi, 2013; Cai et al.,
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2016; Utz, 2017) and therefore we provide evidence supporting the negative the-
oretical framework for European firms. At the same time, results do reveal that
environmental disclosure could be a rational managerial decision to reduce firm’s
specific and it is also evident that environmental disclosure can be priced in fi-
nancial markets.
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Table 4.22: Regression Results for Idiosyncratic Risk
Pooled OLS Fixed effect Random effect Sys-GMM
(1a) (1b) (2) (3) (4)
Riskt−1 0.474***
(0.0908)
Disc -0.0507*** -0.0608*** -0.0559*** -0.0328***
(0.0113) (0.0222) (0.0182) (0.0122)
Z 0.0534* 0.0520* -0.0751 -0.0274 0.0423**
(0.0317) (0.0313) (0.0729) (0.0451) (0.0167)
Lev 0.0003078* 0.000316* 0.000316** 0.000315** 0.0000782
(0.0001634) (0.000169) (0.000144) (0.000148) (0.000306)
Inta -5.294*** -5.422*** -7.115*** -6.869*** -3.140***
(0.726) (0.723) (2.491) (1.455) (0.861)
Tang -0.148*** -0.148*** -0.190 -0.127*** -0.0817***
(0.040) (0.0389) (0.414) (0.0464) (0.0162)
ROA -0.4058*** -0.388*** -0.381*** -0.374*** -0.260***
(0.0468) (0.048) (0.0664) (0.0622) (0.0568)
LogTa -1.731*** -1.424*** -2.669*** -1.666*** -0.829***
(0.1235) (0.142) (0.737) (0.261) (0.212)
Growth 0.00479** 0.00430* 0.00361 0.00336 0.00332
(0.00208) (0.00221) (0.00278) (0.00263) (0.00273)
Cons 41.73*** 39.54*** 49.47*** 41.67*** 23.73***
(1.80) (1.871) (6.661) (3.110) (4.041)
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes No Yes No
Country Yes Yes No Yes No
Likelihood ratio 7.44 [0]
Hausman χ2(d.f) 18.5(19) [0.48]
AR(1) [0]
AR(2) [0.193]
Instr 31
H-J [0.385]
R2 0.549 0.553 0.602 0.601
Observations 2580 2580 2580 2580 2528
Standard errors are in parenthesis, p-values in brackets. Standard errors are robust correcting
for heterogeneity. Idiosyncratic risk (Risk) is the dependent variable for all models. Disclosure’s
significance is based on one-tailed test. Hansen J-test (H-J) reports the instrument validity.
AR(1) and AR(2) show the first and second order auto-correlation respectively. The number
of instruments (Instr) is reported. All variables listed are defined in Table 4.19. ***,**,*
significance level at 1%,5%, 10%.
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4.4.2 Non-parametric Regression Results
The use of quantile regressions help us analyse the dependence between disclosure
and Risk. Panel and dynamic panel regressions estimate the average effect of
disclosure on Risk. In turn, quantile regressions are able to estimate the tails of
the idiosyncratic risk distribution relationship (see, e.g., Ang et al., 2006). Table
4.23 considers 5 different quantiles based on equation 4.13.
Table 4.23: Quantile Regressions for Idiosyncratic Risk
τ 0.05 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.95
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Disc -0.00960 -0.0174** -0.0255*** -0.0524*** -0.0815***
(0.0117) (0.00949) (0.0102) (0.0154) (0.0311)
Z 0.0222 0.0204 0.0513 0.0615 0.0632
(0.0607) (0.0577) (0.0385) (0.0534) (0.0676)
Lev -0.0000211 0.000226 0.000210 0.0000194 0.000693
(0.000292) (0.000263) (0.000189) (0.000293) (0.000902)
Inta -2.362*** -3.598*** -3.864*** -5.100*** -2.229
(0.750) (0.720) (0.626) (1.141) (2.682)
Tang -0.0470 -0.0249 -0.0580 -0.168*** -0.567**
(0.0669) (0.196) (0.0586) (0.0503) (0.234)
ROA -0.198*** -0.256*** -0.328*** -0.436*** -0.606***
(0.0427) (0.0350) (0.0304) (0.0454) (0.0898)
LogTA -1.014*** -1.203*** -1.211*** -1.297*** -1.961***
(0.139) (0.120) (0.142) (0.192) (0.371)
Growth 0.00616 0.00369 0.00576 0.00531 0.00757
(0.00558) (0.00327) (0.00432) (0.00593) (0.0133)
Cons 26.80*** 33.48*** 37.06*** 40.60*** 56.51***
(1.830) (1.559) (1.811) (2.309) (6.629)
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2580 2580 2580 2580 2580
Pseudo R2 0.3061 0.3425 0.3716 0.4007 0.3994
Significance based on bootstrap standard errors (1000 replications). Idiosyncratic risk (Risk)
is the dependent variable for all models. Disclosure’s significance is based on one-tailed test. τ
denotes the different quantiles. All variables listed are defined in Table 4.19. Equality test of
the environmental disclosure coefficients reports p-value = 0.042 [F(4, 2537)= 2.48]. ***,**,*
significance level at 1%,5%, 10%.
Similar to the parametric models; Int, Tang, ROA and LogTa appear to sig-
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nificantly decrease idiosyncratic risk for the largest part of the conditional distri-
bution. In particular, tangible assets significantly contribute to the Risk in the
upper part of the distribution, whereas intangible assets are insignificant at the
upper tail only. Also, Z, Lev and Growth are insignificant for the whole distribu-
tion. Another important aspect of the model is that it explains from 30 to 40%
of the variability of Risk (see, Pseudo R2).
Figure 4.12: Non-linear Environmental Disclosure on Risk
Notes: The grey area corresponds to confidence intervals calculated with 1,000 bootstrap repli-
cations. The dash line represents the OLS estimations with its confidence intervals (dot lines).
The control variables are not reported for brevity but are available upon request.
Turning to hypothesis 2, quantile regressions reveal that disclosure and Risk
exhibit a negative and heterogeneous association with risk as suggested by the
slack resource argument. Figure 4.12 and table 4.23 jointly identify that higher
disclosure significantly reduces the Risk. This is apparent at the upper part of
the distribution, while the lower tail is insignificant with a coefficient close to null.
The lower tail represents firms with low idiosyncratic risk and therefore perfectly
diversified activities; such investments are unaffected by the environmental dis-
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closure. The practical implications of this finding are particularly interesting.
Environmental disclosure is valued by the investors and thus higher degree of
diversification can be attained with a portfolio of disclosing firms. While, if the
market is frictionless Merton (1987) (idiosyncratic risk is not priced), investors
would be indifferent for environmental disclosure. Confirming the above, equality
test shows that environmental disclosure coefficients have statistical differences
across the conditional distribution. Therefore, we cannot reject that environmen-
tal disclosure heterogeneously affects idiosyncratic risk (H2).
Overall, by testing the two hypotheses the following conclusions can be drawn:
(1) environmental disclosure has a significant and negative impact on idiosyncratic
risk; (2) the relationship is a subject of a different degree of independence across
the conditional probability distribution; (3) this finding confirms hypotheses 1 and
2 and hence the negative theoretical framework enriched with the slack resource
argument is more appropriate to model the relationship.
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4.4.3 Robustness checks
In order to check the sensitivity and accuracy of the results, we substitute some
variables from the initial specification (see, eq. 4.11) and we repeat the same
regression procedure. In particular, we use two alternative dependent variables.
First, firm’s total risk also matters as it is indicated by Bouslah et al. (2013);
Benlemlih et al. (2016). Total risk (T.Risk) is consisted by systematic and id-
iosyncratic risk components and can be defined as the annualised standard devi-
ation of the daily stock returns. Second, we also consider an alternative approach
to approximate idiosyncratic risk. Fama and French (2015) propose a five fac-
tor capital asset pricing model.25 In eq. (4.10), the authors remove the MOMt
component and add two new terms as shown bellow:
Ri,t−Rf,t = βi+βi,1(Rm,t−Rf,t)+βi,2SMBt+βi,3HMLt+βi,4RMWt+βi,5CMAt+ui,t,
(4.14)
where RMW is the difference of stock returns between robust and weak profitabil-
ity firms and CMA is the return of low over high investment firms. By running
OLS regressions to eq. (4.14), the five-factor idiosyncratic risk (5.Risk) is the
annualised standard deviation of the residuals.
Additionally, previous literature commonly uses accounting profitability ra-
tios to examine the disclosure-performance relationship; instead of ROA, we add
Tobin’s Q (Q) as a measurement of market-based profitability indicator (Konar
and Cohen, 2001; Broadstock et al., 2018). Lastly, intangible assets attempted
to capture a part of R&D expenses which have been argued to be of a major im-
portance of the examination (Konar and Cohen, 2001; Elsayed and Paton, 2005;
25An interesting extension of this analysis would be to examine the crash risk of stock returns.
Jin and Myers (2006) show that stock price crashes as accumulated negative firm-specific infor-
mation suddenly becomes publicly available. The authors measure the firm-specific information
by detecting changes in the R2 of CAPM regressions. Based on that, an alternative approach to
measure idiosyncratic risk would be through a synchronicity measure. Stock price synchronicity
is defined as the R2 from asset pricing regressions and this shows the amount of information
reflected in stock prices (Hutton et al., 2009). It can be simply measured as: ln( 1−R
2
R2 ).
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Duqi et al., 2015). R&D was not included in our primary analysis due to the high
number of missing values (similarly to Delmas et al., 2015).
Table 4.24 presents the robustness checks, columns 1, 2 and 3 report the
random effect, Sys-GMM and median regression results respectively and the de-
notation a and b indicates that the dependent variable is either the idiosyncratic
risk from the 5-factor model or the total risk. In terms of the idiosyncratic risk of
the 5-factor model, our results are qualitative similar with the previous estima-
tions. Interestingly, results cannot support a relationship between environmental
disclosure and total risk. Since we have established that disclosure has an impact
on idiosyncratic risk, it can be implied that disclosure and the systematic risk
component are irrelevant (Benlemlih et al., 2016). We extend our analysis by ex-
cluding British firms. This is mainly done because the sample is over-represented
by British firms and it is rational to consider a post-Brexit scenario. Previous lit-
erature shows that British firms are environmental sensitive (Salama et al., 2011)
and thus this is how the negative sign (Disc-Risk) dominates. However, results
reported in table 4.25 remain robust for the rest of the European firms.
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Table 4.24: Robustness Checks I. Full-sample
Random effect Sys-GMM Quantile(.50)
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
Variable 5.Risk T.Risk 5.Risk T.Risk 5.Risk T.Risk
5.Riskt−1 0.340***
(0.109)
T.Riskt−1 0.418***
(0.101)
Disc -0.0650*** -0.0673** -0.0381** -0.0125 -0.0356*** -0.0241*
(0.0252) (0.0285) (0.0174) (0.0204) (0.0134) (0.0174)
Z -0.816*** -0.773*** -0.403*** -0.339** -0.479*** -0.347***
(0.173) (0.178) (0.143) (0.160) (0.0769) (0.080)
Lev 0.00020 0.00026 -0.000011 -0.0000099 0.000595 -0.0000264
(0.00016) (0.00017) (0.000082) (0.00012) (0.000112) (0.0002)
R&D 0.0248 0.1188 0.296* 0.550*** -0.027 0.0782
(0.277) (0.30) (0.167) (0.190) (0.135) (0.166)
Tang 0.292*** 0.307*** 0.138* 0.130 0.180 0.1482
(0.10) (0.105) (0.0756) (0.0849) (0.531) (0.352)
Q -1.497** -0.843 -1.665*** -2.185*** -1.456*** -1.873***
(0.529) (0.591) (0.404) (0.481) (0.325) (0.356)
LogTA -1.815*** -1.08** -1.458*** -1.420*** -1.579*** -1.029***
(0.385) (0.455) (0.308) (0.348) (0.2242) (0.247)
Growth -0.0121 -0.00987 -0.00518 0.00452 -0.010 -0.00639
(0.0232) (0.0197) (0.0189) (0.0184) (0.0126) (0.0129)
Cons 46.84*** 37.63*** 32.06*** 29.91*** 43.70*** 37.52***
(3.835) (4.277) (4.702) (4.817) (2.222) (2.692)
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Country Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
AR(1) [0] [0]
AR(2) [0.591] [0.9]
Instr 31 31
H-J [0.376] [0.061]
R2 0.597 0.682 0.383 0.421
Obs 1708 1708 1668 1668 1708 1708
Standard errors are in parenthesis, p-values in brackets. Standard errors are robust correcting
for heterogeneity. Disclosure’s significance is based on one-tailed test. Hansen J-test (H-J) re-
ports the instrument validity. AR(1) and AR(2) show the first and second order auto-correlation
respectively. The number of instruments (Instr) is reported. All variables listed are defined in
Table 4.19. ***,**,* significance level at 1%,5%, 10%.
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Table 4.25: Robustness Checks II. Sub-sample without British Firms.
Random effect Sys-GMM Quantile(.50)
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
5.Risk T.Risk 5.Risk T.Risk 5.Risk T.Risk
5.Riskt−1 0.397***
(0.130)
T.Riskt−1 0.474***
(0.107)
Disc -0.0744*** -0.0707** -0.0544*** -0.0272 -0.0478*** -0.0216
(0.0270) (0.0317) (0.0199) (0.0206) (0.0159) (0.0190)
Z -0.819*** -0.795*** -0.320* -0.260 -0.455*** -0.414***
(0.248) (0.260) (0.176) (0.181) (0.122) (0.146)
Lev 0.00214 0.00270 0.00265 0.00203 0.000253 0.00133
(0.00315) (0.00324) (0.00380) (0.00181) (0.00103) (0.00123)
R&D 0.431 0.481 0.376** 0.489*** 0.525*** 0.536***
(0.310) (0.341) (0.179) (0.172) (0.156) (0.186)
Tang 0.291** 0.324** 0.0859 0.0827 0.173** 0.185*
(0.134) (0.140) (0.0904) (0.0934) (0.0874) (0.105)
Q -1.804*** -1.170* -1.830*** -2.190*** -1.884*** -2.421***
(0.621) (0.666) (0.517) (0.517) (0.450) (0.538)
LogTA -2.301*** -1.536*** -1.445*** -1.234*** -2.174*** -1.767***
(0.439) (0.533) (0.359) (0.334) (0.226) (0.270)
Growth -0.0321** -0.0252 -0.0178 0.00105 -0.0138 -0.0121
(0.0155) (0.0160) (0.0141) (0.0149) (0.0125) (0.0149)
Cons 47.77*** 38.95*** 31.06*** 28.62*** 47.51*** 48.50***
(4.157) (4.665) (5.779) (5.438) (3.489) (4.171)
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Country Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
AR(1) [0] [0]
AR(2) [0.477] [0.961]
Instr 31 31
H-J [0.57] [0.501]
R2 0.6019 0.6891 0.3948 0.4349
Obs 1325 1325 1291 1291 1325 1325
Standard errors are in parenthesis, p-values in brackets. Standard errors are robust correcting
for heterogeneity. Disclosure’s significance is based on one-tailed test. Hansen J-test (H-J) re-
ports the instrument validity. AR(1) and AR(2) show the first and second order auto-correlation
respectively. The number of instruments (Instr) is reported. All variables listed are defined in
Table 4.19. ***,**,* significance level at 1%,5%, 10%.
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4.5 Conclusion
This paper examines the environmental disclosure - idiosyncratic risk relationship
for a panel of 288 EU manufacturing firms. In the main analysis, we use four
factor model (Carhart, 1997) to extract the idiosyncratic risk of the firms, while
the environmental disclosure score has been retrieved from Bloomberg database.
Relevant empirical literature along with the economic theory suggest that environ-
mental actions and financial performance exhibit an endogenous and non-linear
relationship. For this reason, panel, dynamic panel and quantile regressions with
the inclusion of different set of control variables attempt to shed light on the
examination.
Our empirical investigation confirms the generic hypothesis that it is less risky
to be informative. More particularly, the findings demonstrate that environmental
disclosure heterogeneously reduces idiosyncratic risk. This result is robust under
different specifications and it is consistent with a large part of literature that
acknowledges the importance of high environmental visibility (Dawkins and Fraas,
2011; Matsumura et al., 2014; Ben-Amar and McIlkenny, 2015). For this reason,
regulators should further advance environmental sensitivity and firms should be
encouraged to increase their environmental transparency because eventually this
engagement can be described as “win-win” situation; monitoring climate change
risk (Stern, 2007) and decreasing idiosyncratic risk.
Furthermore, our results underline the prominent role of transparent infor-
mation on the financial markets. The comprehensive and articulated picture of
environmental disclosure on idiosyncratic risk suggests that the negative theo-
retical framework is more suitable to frame the relationship. Therefore, it can
be extracted that management should consider to provide transparent environ-
mental information as a means of cost-less risk reduction. At the same time,
environmental disclosure seems to reveal a unique dimension of idiosyncratic risk
which can potentially enhance our understanding about the information content
of idiosyncratic risk (e.g., Fu, 2009; Wu et al., 2016).
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The main limitation of the study is that the score of environmental disclosure
is assumed to be objective (Nollet et al., 2016; Benlemlih et al., 2016). Future
study should investigate the quality of environmental actions that are disclosed by
firms. An alternative interesting avenue for future research would be to construct
an environmental disclosure index and conduct a similar examination controlling
for a larger number of countries and industries. Moreover, a greater number
of risk measurements (as dependent variables) might be dis-similarly correlated
with a larger number of environmental performance variables (as independent
variables) (see for example meta-analysis, Horvathova, 2010; Albertini, 2013;
Endrikat et al., 2014).
In turn, future studies could concentrate on whether portfolios with disclosing
assets have generally more diversified risk from non-disclosing asset-portfolios.
Furthermore, investigating the relationship between disclosure and systematic
risk might also be a interesting area of future study. On a final note, our study
motivates further research relating to diversification under complete or incomplete
environmental information (see, Merton, 1987; Ang et al., 2006; Fu, 2009).
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5 Third empirical Chapter: Temperature Variations and Sys-
temic Risk
5.1 Introduction
Understanding the empirical relationship between climate change and financial
markets is gaining much prominence within the recent climate - finance literature.
Literature has shown that temperature is a risk factor that can erratically affect
economic activity (Dell et al., 2014; IPCC, 2014). At the same time, the persistent
trend of rising temperature has been spreading uncertainty to the whole finan-
cial system and thus it significantly contributes to systemic risk (e.g., Battiston
et al., 2017). The systemic risk element of temperature has a twofold justifica-
tion. First, variations of temperature can trigger a direct revaluation of climate
sensitive assets. Particularly, equity losses can occur due to direct exposures to
climate shocks such as natural catastrophes, changes in climate policy and in-
creased energy costs (ESRB Advisory Scientific Committee, 2016). Second, firms
that possess climate sensitive assets could affect the financial system given their
high interconnection with other businesses, thereby increasing systemic risk indi-
rectly (Battiston et al., 2017). For instance, on one hand, temperature could affect
agricultural output (i.e., direct impact of temperature) (Schlenker and Roberts,
2009), while on the other, agricultural firms that experience abnormal losses due
to weather conditions might subsequently transmit uncertainty to their coun-
terparts or to other industries with which they trade (i.e., indirect impact of
temperature) (Miranda and Glauber, 1997). Amid climate change, radical un-
certainty26 impedes the capacity of financial markets to operate efficiently. The
reason is that investors’ expectations about future environmental regulations and
26Radical uncertainty hypothesis has been described by Aglietta and Espagne (2016) and
defined as collective prudential actions that minimise the probability of occurrence of unforeseen
events due to high uncertainty. For instance, investors might be driven away from climate
sensitive firms (selling climate sensitive stocks) because they anticipate unexpected climate
events.
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climate change events are highly disparate and therefore climate sensitive assets
are impossible to be reevaluated instantaneously (Aglietta and Espagne, 2016;
Karydas and Xepapadeas, 2019). Instead, what can be observed, historically, is
investors’ reaction upon temperature changes. With these in mind, our overrid-
ing priority is to investigate whether systemic risk is conditioned on temperature
changes. At the same time, we also address other noteworthy questions such as:
Is climate uncertainty priced in financial markets? How much is the cost for the
financial system? Do we have only losers or also gainers? What is the optimal
temperature for the normal operation of financial markets?
As far as the motivation of our study is concerned, it should be noted that
in this paper, we combine knowledge from (i) the effects of temperature on stock
markets and (ii) the broader systemic risk literature. The first strand of litera-
ture concentrates mainly on how temperature innovations influence stock market
returns (e.g., Cao and Wei, 2005; Bansal and Ochoa, 2011; Novy-Marx, 2014;
Donadelli et al., 2017b; Balvers et al., 2017). This strand has mainly identi-
fied that temperature has macroeconomic risk characteristics that affect stock
market returns. A possible explanation has been given by labour productivity
scholars. In particular, Hsiang (2010); Donadelli et al. (2017b); Letta and Tol
(2018) underscore that temperature and productivity are negatively related and
this could potentially lead to financial turmoil, considering that their interaction
might change the components of aggregate supply and demand. (ESRB Advisory
Scientific Committee, 2016; Dafermos et al., 2017). By contrast, Cao and Wei
(2005) offers an alternative justification by claiming that temperature variations
can affect financial behaviour as temperature has been found to cause psycholog-
ical disturbances.
The second strand of the literature highlights the importance of systemic risk
on the financial stability; especially during financial crises (e.g., crisis 2007-2009)
when financial stability seems quite vulnerable to rises in systemic risk. Systemic
risk does not only affect financial markets but it can also have severe consequences
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to the real economy (Galati and Moessner, 2013). For this reason, policymakers
and researchers have developed analytic tools in order to measure and predict rises
in systemic risk (e.g., Engle and Manganelli, 2004; White et al., 2015; Adrian and
Brunnermeier, 2016). Accordingly, the main objective of these tools is to stress
the equilibria generated by exogenous shocks. Empirical examples are abundant,
for instance, Reboredo and Ugolini (2015) who study systemic risk dependency
across European sovereign debt markets, Mensi et al. (2017a) find that oil price
volatility generates systemic risk to currencies and vice versa. Along a similar
vein, de Mendonça and da Silva (2018) show that liquidity, profitability, leverage,
as well as, interest rates, all have an important role in triggering systemic risk
fluctuations in the financial sector.
In this regard, to empirically examine if temperature shocks affect systemic
risk, we follow the Conditional Value at Risk (CoV aR) literature (Adrian and
Brunnermeier, 2016). CoV aR is a systemic risk measure that is robust to spillover
effects and distribution assumptions and is defined as the spread between the
Value at Risk of the financial system and that of an institution under distress.
The attractiveness of CoV aR lies in its ability to pinpoint the root of economic
crises, while computationally can be easily facilitated through a quantile regres-
sion framework. The motivation of using CoV aR stems from the fact that some
firms might be affected by climate change while others not. This method offers
a unique potential to identify both which asset has the highest risk exposure
and the interconnectedness of this asset with other assets across the financial sys-
tem. Given that temperature can directly trigger macroeconomic alterations (Dell
et al., 2014), climate-sensitive firms inevitably absorb the initial shock emerging
from these alterations and transmit it even further, generating spillovers to the
whole economy. Hence, with the use of CoV aR, we can examine the Value at
Risk dependency on temperature fluctuations.
Our study provides the following main contributions. First, while previous lit-
erature investigates whether temperature affects stock market returns (Cao and
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Wei, 2005; Bansal et al., 2016; Apergis and Gupta, 2017; Balvers et al., 2017),
this is the first study, to the best of our knowledge, to empirically investigate if
temperature has an impact on systemic risk. Our study is motivated by prior
literature underlining the systemic element of climate change (Aglietta and Es-
pagne, 2016; ESRB Advisory Scientific Committee, 2016; Battiston et al., 2017).
Second, the study provides strong evidence from the European Union; an area
highly committed to climate change mitigation. Contrary to existing literature
that uses lower frequency data, we use 28 years of daily data that might directly
account for both short-term and long-term temperature effects. That is, either
quarterly or annual data cannot fully detect temperature variations because cru-
cial information about temperature is cancelled out. Thus, CoV aR can measure
the maximum daily losses attributed to changes in temperature. Finally, we
decompose temperature as suggested by the climate change literature (Vecchio
and Carbone, 2010; Ji et al., 2014) and thus we provide a more meaningful and
articulate picture of temperature effects. More particularly, the decomposition
employed in this study implies that we provide evidence about the unexpected
temperature variations on the systemic risk of firms.
The main findings of the study indicate that, in a panel data sample of
600 firms for 7305 trading days in 17 different EU countries from 1/1/1990 to
29/12/2017, temperature has a prominent role in affecting the 99% daily and
monthly CoV aR. In particular, we document that temperature has weak non-
linear effects on the financial markets. Moreover, we observe that temperature
shocks contain a systemic risk factor that strongly increases the losses of the firms.
What is more, cold shocks have negative contribution to systemic risk, while the
effects of hot shocks appear positive. Alternative model specifications, such as
different systemic risk and temperature shock proxies as well as lower frequency
examination, establish the robustness of the results with some small variations
across different industries. Particularly, in line with Balvers et al. (2017), we
demonstrate that manufacturing firms seem to be the ones mostly affected by
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temperature variations.
The findings of the study are very important to promote the climate- finance
research. Scholars can monitor climate-sensitive firms that have spillover effects
to the whole financial system. IPCC (2014) forecasts higher frequency and mag-
nitude of extreme weather events and rising temperatures. For this reason, our
study pinpoints a possible way to measure the climate systemic impact of firms
and thus to help the financial system to be equipped with adequate tools and
knowledge in view of further climate change deterioration.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 5.2 outlines the
previous climate change - financial literature and states the hypotheses. Section
5.3 presents the data, the CoV aR methodology, the temperature components
and the testable regressions. In Section 5.4, results are reported. Section 5.5
summarises and concludes.
5.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses
5.2.1 Systemic Risk
We commence this section by presenting a brief review of the literature of sys-
temic risk. Systemic risk can be defined as the increase in losses due to the
spreading of financial distress across firms (Engle and Manganelli, 2004; Adrian
and Brunnermeier, 2016). There is a large body of literature that proposes dif-
ferent methods in order to model systemic risk. Assessing systemic risk has been
highlighted especially during financial crises (Galati and Moessner, 2013).
Value at Risk (V aR) is the most widespread measure of losses due to its
simplicity. The V aR for any firm given can be written as:
Pr(X i ≤ V aRqi) = q%,
where X i is the stock return losses of a firm i for which V aRqi is defined and
q% is the quantile of the probability distribution, where the upper tail of the
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distribution denotes the highest financial losses. However, V aR is not sufficiently
focused on systemic risk and this is because V aR is a sample of returns of a
firm i at isolation. Thus, V aR neglects the spillover effects which are responsible
for spreading the risk. Another problematic setting in V aR computation is that
financial time-series are highly skewed; indicating that V aR will underestimate
or overestimate the actual risk. As described by (Angelidis et al., 2007), in
order to forecast the risk accurately, V aR modelling needs to accommodate non-
symmetrical fat tails.
Dealing with the skewness of the returns, Giot and Laurent (2003) propose
univariate and multivariate ARCH models based on skewed student distribu-
tion. Furthermore, Engle and Manganelli (2004) use a combination of quantile
regressions with GARCH models in order to allow for relaxation of any distri-
bution assumption, but at the same time this method assumes that systemic
risk has a short autoregressive memory. Similarly, White et al. (2015) propose a
method that utilises vector autoregressive models simultaneously with the associ-
ated quantile of stock returns. This method is robust to outliers and also tailors
different variables in order to deal with the spillover effects.
The most recent contributions to V aR modelling underline the importance of
spillover effects (e.g., Girardi and Tolga Ergün, 2013; Reboredo et al., 2016; Mensi
et al., 2017b; Karimalis and Nomikos, 2018). In the influential study of Adrian
and Brunnermeier (2016), the V aR of the whole financial sector is conditional on
one particular firm under distress; this is known in the risk literature as CoV aR.
CoV aR can be easily measured by quantile regressions. ∆CoV aR which is the
main risk measure of this analysis, is the difference between the CoV aR of a
firm under distress and the CoV aR of the median state of this firm. Adrian
and Brunnermeier (2016) show that ∆CoV aR is a robust method which can
capture the tail dependency of stock returns and more importantly the sensitivity
of ∆CoV aR can be tested by accommodating different micro and macro risk
variables.
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5.2.2 Temperature and Economy
We now move on to discuss why temperature is a macroeconomic risk factor. Ris-
ing global temperature can have an impact on the economy and activate macroe-
conomic alterations. Fankhauser and Tol (2005); Stern (2007); Du et al. (2017);
Colacito et al. (2018) argues that climate change will have a direct effect on
countries’ GDP due to the fact that they have to bear the consequences of the
extreme weather events, such as rainstorms, extreme temperatures and floods.
Having quantified this effect, Horowitz (2009) documents that 1◦C of increase in
average temperature would decrease the world GDP by 3.8%. Heal and Kriström
(2002); Dell et al. (2014); Donadelli et al. (2017a); Arbex and Batu (2018) under-
line that temperature shocks are inevitably connected with agricultural outcome,
health, tourism, productivity, energy consumption, research & development and
to some extent the economic performance of firms. Schlenker and Roberts (2009)
identify that temperature changes can have an impact on the agricultural prod-
ucts due to the fact that crop yields can thrive under certain circumstances. Their
findings indicate that different temperature change scenarios can decrease the av-
erage crop yield from 30% to 82% by the end of the century. Moreover, Deschenes
(2014) underscores that the direct recipient of climate change is humans and the
main threat is whether humans will be able to adapt to the new environment or
not. According to World Health Organization27 (2016) the direct cost to health
will be 2-4 billion USD annually by 2030 due to the increasing number of deaths
caused by the climate change. Letta and Tol (2018) find a strongly negative
relationship between total factor productivity and temperature. Donadelli et al.
(2017b) support that temperature shifts have a long run negative effect on labour
productivity. Hsiang (2010) finds that increasing temperature by 1◦C can have
negative effect of 2.4% on labour productivity. Similar finding is supported by
Graff Zivin and Neidell (2014) who identify that a temperature rise reduces the
hours worked in industries.
27Retrieved from http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs266/en/
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Besides, literature supports that temperature is a risk factor that affects the
economy. Dafermos et al. (2017) underline that global warming can bring financial
instability because it affects directly the components of aggregated demand for
energy. Therefore, to some extent macroeconomic consequences are attributed
to climate change, however the main challenge is to test if temperature risk is
transmitted to financial markets.
5.2.3 Temperature and Financial Markets
Before turning to the empirical climate - finance literature, it is sequential to un-
derstand the link between stock price movements and temperature. This link can
be summarised in four main points: (1) evidence from psychological literature
shows that temperature affects investors’ mood (Kamstra et al., 2003; Cao and
Wei, 2005); (2) temperature acts as a reminder and increases investors’ concerns
about the imminent de-carbonised policies (Karydas and Xepapadeas, 2019); (3)
extreme temperatures increase energy consumption in order to maintain standard
working conditions and (4) temperature shocks act as a systematic negative pro-
ductivity shock, which in turn affect the stock valuations (Balvers et al., 2017;
Donadelli et al., 2019).
A summary of the empirical literature is given by Table 5.26. In the semi-
nal contributions of Kamstra et al. (2003); Cao and Wei (2005), a stock market
anomaly was observed; high temperature causes apathy towards financial mar-
kets while cold temperature is followed by higher risk-taking. Temperature-stock
anomaly is also supported by Novy-Marx (2014) who states that the global warm-
ing can be used as a proxy because it has a significant role in predicting financial
performance anomalies.
Additionally, Bansal and Ochoa (2011) present that temperature is a source of
aggregated risk and they identify a temperature beta in the stock market which
is the risk exposure of stocks to the temperature. They perform cross sectional
regressions for different portfolios sorted by country and their results indicate that
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countries closer to Equator hold a strong and negative temperature risk premium
but moving away from Equator the effect becomes positive. Negative beta is
followed by higher stock returns, implying that there is a higher compensation for
assets that are exposed to higher temperatures. Bansal et al. (2016) add long-run
temperature shifts in their analysis in order to separate the long from the short run
effect of the temperature. They, overall, find that temperature risk has a negative
effect on equity valuations. Similarly, Balvers et al. (2017) examine the effect of
temperature shocks on the cost of equity. By taking different portfolios and
incorporating temperature shocks in asset pricing models, the authors identify
that temperature is a risk factor that has significant and negative effect on firms’
stock returns that operate in climate sensitive industries. Also, their findings
suggest that 0.22% of the total cost of equity is attributed to temperature risk.
Therefore, it can be argued that temperature is an aggregated risk factor that
influences the stock returns depending on the geographical latitude (Bansal and
Ochoa, 2011) and the industry (Balvers et al., 2017). Temperature negatively
affects productivity and therefore the results are not surprising since productivity
shocks play a crucial role in equity valuations (Garlappi and Song, 2016). In align
with the theory of finance, temperature risk can be categorised as a risk factor
that has a negative effect on equity evaluations (Chen and Wang, 2012).
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Table 5.26: Literature between stock returns and temperature
Authors Method Area Period Results
Kamstra et al.
(2003)
OLS
US, Canada, Britain,
Germany, Sweden,
Australia, Japan
New Zealand and
South Africa
Daily data from
January 4, 1928 to
December 29, 2000
Higher temperature slightly
increases stock returns for
US, New Zealand and South
Africa. Rest foreign stock market returns
are unaffected by temperature
Cao and
Wei (2005)
OLS
US, Canada, Britain,
Germany, Sweden,
Australia, Japan
and Taiwan
Daily data from
January 2, 1989 to
December 31, 1999
Lower temperature leads to
higher stock returns and higher
temperature to both higher or
lower stock returns
Bansal and
Ochoa (2011)
OLS
38 countries and
global temperature
Annual data from
1929 to 2009
Equity returns and temperature
have high risk in countries closer to
Equator while the risk is low in
countries away from the Equator
Novy-Marx
(2014)
OLS New York
Monthly data from
July 1973 to
December 2012
Low and high temperatures
have an abnormal predictive
power of the financial markets.
Bansal et al.
(2016)
OLS US
Annual data from
1934 to 2014
Temperature has a negative
effect on equity prices
Balvers et al.
(2017)
OLS US
Monthly data from
April 1953 to May 2015
Temperature causes higher risk
returns and higher cost of capital
Apergis and
Gupta (2017)
GARCH
New York temperature
and South African
stock returns
Daily data from
January 2, 1973 to
December 31, 2015
New York temperature has a
statistically significant
negative effect on the
stock returns in South Africa
Donadelli et al.
(2017b)
VAR US
Annual data from
1950 to 2015
High temperature increases
the equity volatility and
has negative correlation
with market returns
Donadelli et al.
(2019)
OLS UK
Annual data from
1900 to 2015
Temperature volatility carries
a positive risk premium
in the equity market
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5.2.4 Temperature Information
Before proceeding to state our hypotheses, it is important to investigate the dif-
ferent temperature proxies used in relevant analyses and the information content
of temperature data.
There is a plethora of proxies about the temperature effects. While, Kamstra
et al. (2003) employ daily raw temperature data as predictive variable of stock
returns, most of the studies use temperature anomaly. Temperature anomaly is
defined either as the difference between the daily temperature and the average
historic temperature, or as the innovations of temperature, when lower frequency
data are examined (Cao and Wei, 2005; Novy-Marx, 2014; Bansal et al., 2016;
Apergis and Gupta, 2017; Donadelli et al., 2017b, 2019). This method eliminates
the seasonality of the raw temperature data but at the same time, it contains
information about both the trend and temperature shocks. Temperature trend
and shocks are two different components which is imperative to be separated;
according to IPCC (2014), temperature trend follows a linear gradual increase and
can be observed for the last 150 years, while temperature shocks are more extreme
since about 1950. Dealing with the different temperature components, Balvers
et al. (2017) decompose the monthly temperature series and obtain temperature
shocks. Even though, their paper estimates shocks through detrended analysis,
they neglect to distinguish between cold and warm shocks as it was previously
suggested by Cao and Wei (2005); Novy-Marx (2014). Temperature shocks can
be either cold or hot and can have significantly different economic consequences
Dell et al. (2012).
Notwithstanding the use of lower frequency temperature data in the climate
- economy literature (Hsiang, 2010; Dell et al., 2012; Du et al., 2017; Colac-
ito et al., 2018), climate - finance studies tends to use higher frequency data
(Kamstra et al., 2003; Cao and Wei, 2005; Apergis and Gupta, 2017). This can
be explained by the unavailability of higher frequency on macroeconomic and,
sometimes, temperature data (particularly in developing countries) as well as,
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there are conceptually different research objectives between economy and finance
scholars.
To provide more insights about temperature information, we now turn our at-
tention to climate change literature. Daily temperature records are characterised
by nonlinearities. By using monthly or annual aggregated data, critical infor-
mation could be unseen and reduce temporal resolution (Vecchio and Carbone,
2010). For this reason an empirical decomposition on daily data can provide
us with meaningful information. As Vecchio and Carbone (2010) explain tem-
perature contains three equally important components; (i) trend, (ii) seasonality
and (iii) anomaly. Trend is usually referred as the gradually increase in the av-
erage temperature which is a linear function that can vary over time (Ji et al.,
2014). Seasonality is an oscillatory factor with constant frequency (≈ 365 days)
and it is probably the least important component in terms of the information
contained. In contrast, the anomaly component corresponds to the temperature
variation, which is the unexpected temperature deviations from the detrended
and deseasonalised mean temperatures.
5.2.5 Hypotheses of the Study
According to Dell et al. (2014), temperature can be seen as a macroeconomic
risk variable which can potentially affect not only different economies but also
individual firms. We extend this concept and, particularly, the unedited research
question we posit is whether and, if so, how systemic risk responds to temperature
changes. For instance, assume that a highly leveraged firm experiences losses from
unanticipated temperature changes. This may impair the firm’s ability to meet its
financial obligations, and pose a threat to the financial system as a whole (ESRB
Advisory Scientific Committee, 2016). To put it differently, we ask whether a
firm’s losses that result from temperature changes can be causal of losses to other
firms within the industry or the economy.
Synchronously, Horowitz (2009); Schlenker and Roberts (2009); Dell et al.
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(2012, 2014); Aglietta and Espagne (2016); Du et al. (2017) underline the impor-
tance of nonlinear temperature effects on different economic activities. Aggregate
economic losses accelerate with increasing temperature; according to different
scenarios an average temperature increase beyond 2◦C would amplify economic
losses, while temperature increase below this threshold does not seem to cause
a sizeable reaction to the economy (IPCC, 2014). For a similar reason, if tem-
perature has nonlinear effects on the economy, then higher temperatures should
amplify investors’ concerns about climate change. Therefore, in the remainder of
this research, we explore a nonlinear relation between temperature changes and
systemic risk.
Hypothesis 1: Temperature has asymmetric effects on systemic risk.
It should be recognised that the multifaceted information content of tempera-
ture change might hinder a direct identification of its effects on the economy and
financial markets. Moreover, if information about temperature is regarded as a
significant pricing factor of stocks, then stock prices, returns and losses should
respond to unanticipated changes in temperature, rather than to trend or sea-
sonality. Therefore, to ascertain whether the asymmetric temperature effects are
driven by unanticipated changes to temperature, and to delve deeper into the
temperature-systemic risk nexus, we decompose the temperature variable into
trend, seasonality component and anomaly, as suggested by Vecchio and Car-
bone (2010); Balvers et al. (2017). Temperature anomaly should lead to gradual
devaluation of climate-sensitive assets (Bansal et al., 2016) and thus we expect
the entire financial system to be affected. As Jacobsen and Marquering (2009)
claim, raw temperature might be correlated with different seasonal patterns and
thus results might be driven by seasonal unobserved characteristics. For this rea-
son, similarly with Hypothesis 1, temperature anomaly should be an appropriate
measure to account for the potential asymmetries.
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Hypothesis 2: Temperature anomaly has asymmetric effects on systemic risk.
There is adequate literature to support that temperature shocks have an ef-
fect on the productivity of firms (see e.g., Hsiang, 2010; Graff Zivin and Neidell,
2014; Dafermos et al., 2017; Donadelli et al., 2017b). Productivity is depleted by
temperature shocks; in turn, productivity shocks can explain a large variation in
the cross section of stock returns (Garlappi and Song, 2016). To be more explicit,
temperature shocks should generate concerns to investors about global warming
and thus a positive impact of temperature shocks on systemic risk is expected.
It is worth noting that for its most part, the climate - finance literature does
not distinguish between hot and cold temperature shocks. Yet, in practice, tem-
perature shocks can either be positive (e.g. a heat wave) or negative (e.g., ex-
tremely low temperatures). Pilcher et al. (2002) puts forward the argument that,
on one hand, exposure to cold weather can negatively affect reasoning and mem-
ory tasks, while on the other, hot exposure reduces attentional and perceptual
tasks. Therefore, considering these distinct effects on performance, it would be
interesting to investigate whether temperature effects hold given that the present
study proceeds with a disaggregation of temperature shocks into hot and cold.
Based on the above, there are two main competing views on how hot or
cold shocks should influence systemic risk. The first view relates to energy con-
sumption. Authors such as Weagley (2018) maintain that extreme temperature
deviations are associated with higher risk taking in financial markets. Weagley
(2018) argues that this connection is justified by the additional energy needed in
order to cool or heat a particular place in the light of a temperature shock, which
can be regarded as an adverse shock to the demand for energy, and can be gen-
erally perceived as “bad” news by investors and traders. Therefore, continuous
and extreme temperature shocks would increase the energy demand and, in turn,
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firms would have to factor in their profit functions higher long-term operational
cost to maintain standard working conditions.
Hypothesis 3: Hot and Cold temperature shocks should increase systemic risk.
The second view relates to the psychological literature. More particularly,
Heal and Kriström (2002); Cao and Wei (2005) identify that extreme tempera-
tures are connected not only with different levels of productivity but also with
psychological effects. Particularly, Cao and Wei (2005) find that cold temper-
ature causes aggression and high risk-taking, while hot temperature can affect
the mood of investors by causing either aggression or apathy and thus, either
high or no risk-taking. In general, aggressive investors will tend to engage in
more risky investments. As a result, investors will submit more demand orders
for risky stocks, which will lead to an increase in stock prices and returns, and
a decrease in the scale of losses. In turn, lower losses are associated with lower
levels of systemic risk. Therefore, according with the psychological literature, it
would not be surprising if hot and cold shocks decrease systemic risk.
5.3 Research design
5.3.1 Sample
The sample consists of 600 European firms that are included in STOXX 600 In-
dex from the period 1/1/1990 to 29/12/2017. Firms are coming from 10 different
industries from 17 different countries (see, Table 5.27). All the data are in daily
frequency, making a strongly balanced panel of 4,383,000 firm-day observations.
The mean temperature and the precipitation for all 17 different locations have
been retrieved from the European Climate Assessment & Dataset (ECA&D)28.
We match the firms’ main market location with the closest weather station in
28https://www.ecad.eu/
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order to extract the weather data (see, panel C in Table 5.27). The stock market
returns are available at Datastream, while the macroeconomic data are collected
from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. We choose this period of examination for
the subsequent two reasons. First, financial and weather daily data are scarce be-
fore this period. Second, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),
that are the two most prominent actions against climate change, were established
relatively to this period.
A critical issue is the frequency of the data. In the climate-economy literature,
temperature is commonly approximated with low frequency data (monthly, quar-
terly, annually) (Colacito et al., 2018); this is because climate change is a long
term phenomenon which systematically affects macroeconomic conditions (e.g.
Dell et al., 2014). However, in the case of financial markets, the situation is dif-
ferent. Due to the technology advances, high frequency traders react instantly to
relevant news (O’Hara, 2015). Another example that further stresses the debate
between low and high frequency data, is that if one day of the month is very hot
and another day very cold, then the monthly aggregated result would be down-
ward biased (Vecchio and Carbone, 2010). Therefore, the higher the frequency
of data, the more precise results we obtain. Although, daily data are used is the
main analysis, we also consider monthly data in order to test whether long-run
temperature shifts can shape the perception of investors in the financial markets.
On the contrary, someone might argue that algo-traders (high-frequency trading)
can react within seconds to weather news. However, this is an argument that we
cannot test since the highest frequency provided by the weather stations is daily.
This might be a promising area for future investigation.
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Table 5.27: Industry, Country and Weather Stations
Panel A: Industry composition
Industry Number of Firms Percentage
1. Consumer Goods 74 12.33
2. Financials 138 23
3. Health Care 49 8.17
4. Oil & Gas 20 3.33
5. Technology 28 4.67
6. Industrials 123 20.5
7. Consumer Services 71 11.83
8. Basic Material 47 7.83
9. Telecommunications 21 3.5
10. Utilities 29 4.83
Panel B: Country composition
Country Number of Firms Percentage
1. Switzerland 51 8.5
2. United Kingdom 160 26.67
3. France 90 15
4. Netherlands 29 4.83
5. Belgium 15 2.5
6. Germany 75 12.5
7. Spain 29 4.83
8. Denmark 22 3.67
9. Norway 13 2.17
10. Italy 30 5
11. Sweden 44 7.33
12. Austria 7 1.17
13. Finland 17 2.83
14. Ireland 9 1.5
15. Czech Republic 2 0.33
16. Portugal 4 0.67
17. Luxembourg 3 0.5
Total 600
Panel C: Weather Stations
Country Market Ecad ID and Station Name
1. Switzerland Zurich 244 ZUERICH/FLUNTERN
2. United Kingdom London 1860 HEATHROW
3. France Paris 38 PARIS - MONTSOURIS
4. Netherlands Amsterdam 161 DE KOOY
5. Belgium Brussels 944 BIERSET
6. Germany Frankfurt 2761 M-FLUGHAFEN
7. Spain Madrid 230 MADRID - RETIRO
8. Denmark Copenhagen 116 KOEBENHAVN
9. Norway Oslo 193 OSLO BLINDERN
10. Italy Milan 242 LUGANO
11. Sweden Stockholm 10 STOCKHOLM
12. Austria Vienna 16 WIEN
13. Finland Helsinki 28 HELSINKI KAISANIEMI
14. Ireland Dublin 121 DUBLIN PHOENIX PARK
15. Czech Republic Prague 27 PRAHA-KLEMENTINUM
16. Portugal Lisbon 229 BADAJOZ
17. Luxembourg Luxembourg 203 LUXEMBOURG AIRPORT
Note: Firms are allocated to industries according to the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB). Ecad ID is
the weather station identifier as listed in the www.ecad.eu database.
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5.3.2 ∆CoV aR
In this sub-section, we define systemic risk as the contribution of Value at Risk
(VaR) of one firm to the Value at Risk of the industry, in which this firm operates.
For example, how HSBC Bank PLC under distress can transmit instabilities to the
whole financial sector in the EU. In this study, a firm under distress is reflected
in the 99% of the losses distribution. This part of the distribution represents
the highest daily expected losses, which can easily be computed through the
traditional V aR method. An alternative procedure to control for V aR, which is
robust to outliers, spillover effects and is directly associated with systemic risk,
is proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016):
Pr(Xj|C(X i) ≤ CoV aRj|C(Xi)q ) = q%, (5.15)
where Xj is industry return losses conditional on the losses of a particular firm i
(X i) at any part of the distribution (i.e. q = 99%). CoV aRj|C(X
i) is the Value at
Risk of the industry j conditional on some event C(X i) of institution i. CoV aR
can be implicitly estimated by running the following quantile regression:
Xjq = a
i
q + β
i
qX
i + uiq, q ∈ (0, 1), (5.16)
where the predictive values of Xjq are the Value at Risk of financial system con-
ditional on X i. Therefore CoV aRiq = X̂
j
q and CoV aR
i
q is the V aR of j condi-
tional on V aR of i at any q given. Additionally, to more effectively approximate
systemic risk we use the ∆CoV aR measure, which is the change in CoV aR of
institution i at q = 99% to its median state (q = 50%). The median state of any
institution can be estimated by running the Equation 5.16 at q = 50% and then
saving its fitted values (CoV aR
j|V aRi50
q ). In other words, we run Equation 5.16
twice at q=99% and at q=50%, and save the fitted values. Then, ∆CoV aR can
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be measured as shown in Equation 5.17:
∆CoV aRiq = CoV aR
i
q − CoV aRj|V aR
i
50
q . (5.17)
5.3.3 Temperature Decomposition
We focus on the short-term temperature variations related to the 28 years time-
span of our sample. In order to extract the short behaviour of temperature,
we consider time-series decomposition. In the traditional time-series decomposi-
tion, the data can be a product of three components as shown by Zarnowitz and
Ozyildirim (2006):
Tempt = Trendt + Seasont + Anomt, (5.18)
where t denotes the time, Temp is the time series of the raw temperature data,
Trend is the trend-cycle component, Season is the seasonality and Anom is the
anomaly component. The frequency of the seasonality can be easily defined as
a 365 day cycle by including all weekend temperatures and excluding the 29th
of February when the year is leap. We repeat this procedure for the 17 different
market locations over the 28 years of our sample period.
The trend-cycle component contains the long-term temperature characteris-
tics and it corresponds to A persistent temperature increase. We are now able
to remove the seasonality from the raw temperature data. Finally, anomaly is
defined as the unexpected temperature variations for any given day of our sample.
It is important to underline that superscript t is retained if only t corresponds to
market calendar day.
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5.3.4 Empirical Model
Having defined ∆CoV aRiq (hereafter, ∆CoV aRi,t), we are now in a position to
examine if higher temperature can incite extreme losses of firms. Hence, we add
a nonlinear setting in the following regression:
∆CoV aRi,t = γ0 + γ1∆CoV aRi,t−1 + γ2Tempk,t + γ3Temp
2
k,t + γ4Precik,t + γ5Mont
+ γ6Jant + γ7TEDt + γ8Creditt + γ9Mar.Rt + γ10V olt + γ11Y ieldt+
γ12Sizei,t +
28∑
φ
δ ∗ Y earφ +
17∑
k
θ ∗ Countryk +
10∑
p
λ ∗ Industryp + εi,t,
(5.19)
where, i and t denotes the firm and day respectively with i = 1, ..., 600 and
t = 01/01/1990, ..., 29/12/2017 (7305 trading days), k corresponds to the geo-
graphical market location with k = 1, ..., 17, p is the industry with p = 1, ..., 10
(see, Table 5.27 Panel A and B) and φ is the year with φ = 1990, ..., 2017. We
add an autoregressive term of systemic risk (∆CoV aRi,t−1) to account for the
short memory of systemic risk. Following Apergis and Gupta (2017); Donadelli
et al. (2017b), we add precipitation (Preci) as an alternative weather proxy and
it is measured as the millimetres of water fallen at a particular site for any day
given. We also use Monday dummy (Mon) and January dummy (Jan) in order
to capture some seasonal effects (Zhang and Jacobsen, 2013; Apergis and Gupta,
2017). We then follow the finance literature and we add some important deter-
minants of systemic risk (White et al., 2015; Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2016).
TED, which is defined as the difference between the 3 month LIBOR rate and
Treasury bill rate, can capture the short term liquidity risk. Credit is the spread
between Moody’s Baa corporate bond and the 10-year treasury bond. TED and
Credit are known to capture variations of stock returns. Market return (Mar.R)
as the daily return of STOXX 600 Index. Equity volatility (V ol) is defined as the
22-day rolling standard deviation of the daily stock market return. Y ield presents
the 10-year government bond yields for the European Union which is available in
a monthly frequency. Finally, we include Size which is defined as the logarithm
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of the last daily market value of each firm. Our model also includes year, country
and industry dummies in order to absorb the remaining heterogeneity of systemic
risk.
Equation 5.19 is tested with pooled OLS and it can provide an answer about
Hypothesis 1. The standard errors are robust correcting for heteroskedasticity.
Our model is free of multicollinearity according to the variance inflation factor
(VIF) test and we also perform augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test for all
variables in order to observe the auto-correlation of our data29. Finally as shown
in Figure 5.13 the error term is normally distributed.
Figure 5.13: Histogram of Residuals
To answer Hypothesis 2, Temp and Temp2 are substituted with (i) the Trend
to identify the deterministic process of the temperature data and (ii) the anomaly
(Anom) and the sqaured value of anomaly (Anom2) as stochastic temperature
components.
∆CoV aRi,t = ξ0+ξ1∆CoV aRi,t−1+ξ2Trendk,t+ξ3Anomk,t+ξ4Anom
2
k,t+Z
′B+εi,t,
29Non-stationary data are transformed into stationary by taking their first difference (D.).
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(5.20)
where Z is a vector that contains all of the remaining explanatory variables ap-
pearing in Equation 5.19.
Finally, answering Hypothesis 3 demands to incorporate hot and cold temper-
ature shocks. We calculate positive and negative temperature shocks, in line with
Weagley (2018). A simplified way to calculate these shocks is through the energy
needed to cool or heat a place, which can be approximated similar to a standard
temperature derivative contract. Such a contract would consider that for tem-
peratures more than 18◦C, any workplace needs to be cooled, while the place
needs to be heated if the temperatures are less than 18◦C. Based on this logic,
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange trades weather derivative contract around this
threshold (65 Fahrenheit degrees).
CDDk,t = Max{Tempk,t − 18, 0},
HDDk,t = Max{18− Tempk,t, 0},
(5.21)
where CDD is the cooling degree day and HDD is the heating degree day. In
other words, if CDD=0 then it indicates that this is a cold day, while if CDD>0
this day is hot. Therefore, in Equation 5.19, Temp and Temp2 are substituted
with either CDD or HDD:
∆CoV aRi,t = ψ0 + ψ1∆CoV aRi,t−1 + (ψ2CDDk,t or ψ3HDDk,t) + Z
′B + εi,t,
(5.22)
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5.3.5 Descriptive Statistics
Table 5.28 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables of the study. 99%
∆CoV aR takes values from 0.43% to 7% with higher values indicating higher
systemic risk. Temp variable represents the raw temperature data. The 600 firms
of our sample experience an average temperature of 10.6◦C. A more articulated
picture, of the variables of interest, is shown in Figures 5.14 and 5.15, while a
more detailed picture of the temperature components is shown in Figure 5.16.
Interestingly, for the 28 years of our examination the temperature has increased
by 0.6 ◦C (see, Trend in Figure 5.16). Also, Anom variable reports minimum
value of -22.25 and maximum of 13.2; displaying the most extreme unexpected
cold and hot temperatures respectively. In terms of the distribution, apart from
the temperature variables that are very close to satisfy the normality conditions,
the rest of the variables are not normally distributed. Furthermore, comparing
the mean, 1st percentile (Q1) and 99th percentile (Q99), we can conclude that
our analysis does not seem to have extreme outliers except from the market
capitalisation (Size), which is also a sign of the heterogeneity of our sample.
At a first glance, in line with our expectations, temperature seems to have
a quadratic effect on systemic risk (Figure 5.17). In order to provide a clearer
picture of the relationship, we proceed to examine each one of our Hypotheses.
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Table 5.28: Descriptive statistics and Auto-correlations
mean std min max skew kurt Q1 Q99
unit root
(p-value)
Xi -0.00028 0.0233 -1.3437 1.7918 0.776 98.039 -0.061 0.060 0
Xj 0.00018 0.0127 -0.1486 0.1359 0.142 11.497 -0.0342 0.0373 0
99% ∆CoV aR 3.251 0.046 0.434 7.007 0.749 97.458 3.123 3.377 0
99% ∆eCoV aR 39 72.2 0.001 1180 4.392 29.826 0.2337 364 1*
PC1 ≈ 0 1.2162 -43.053 57.391 0.2957 20.5319 -3.2413 3.5099 0
hj,i 0.0135 0.0213 0.000 0.9213 7.0469 88.826 0.0003 0.1033 0
Temp 10.622 6.984 -23.300 33.800 -0.093 2.810 -5.500 26.000 0
Trend 10.619 1.916 5.805 17.789 0.309 4.600 6.213 15.777 1*
Season -0.006 5.845 -13.902 12.823 0.114 1.816 -9.918 10.982 0
Anom -0.077 3.204 -22.254 13.209 -0.186 3.671 -8.179 7.352 0
CDD 0.4762 1.5367 0.000 15.8 4.063 21.3937 0.000 8.000 0
HDD 7.8538 6.2396 0.000 41.3 0.5313 2.6966 0.000 25.500 0
Preci 2.211 4.960 0.000 176.800 6.483 90.669 0.000 21.700 0
Mon 0.200 0.400 0.000 1.000 1.500 3.250 0.000 1.000 0
Jan 0.085 0.279 0.000 1.000 2.979 9.875 0.000 1.000 0
TED 0.0049 0.0037 0.0009 0.0458 3.301 22.354 0.00140 0.002 0
Credit 0.0237 0.00759 0.012 0.0616 1.623 7.673 0.0138 0.0557 1*
Mar.R 0.0002 0.011 -0.079 0.094 -0.245 9.050 -0.033 0.030 0
Vol 0.009 0.005 0.002 0.047 2.187 10.403 0.003 0.028 0
Yield 0.0508 0.0267 0.00613 0.1114 0.624 2.636 0.0077 0.11 1*
Size 12 22 0.001587 360 4.49295 31.1174 0.063009 110 0.99*
Notes: ∆eCoV aR and Size are compressed to millions of Euro. Augmented Dickey-Fuller test is reported as unit root test. (*)Asterisk denotes
that the panel is not stationary but the first difference is. Xi is the return losses of firm i and Xj is the industry losses. ∆CoV aR is calculated as
shown in Equation 5.17. ∆eCoV aR = Size x∆CoV aR. PC1 is calculated as shown in Appendix 6.6 and hj,i is calculated as shown in Appendix
6.6. Temp is the raw temperature data. Trend, Anom and Season are the decomposed temperature series as shown in Equation 5.18. CDD is the
cooling degree day. HDD is the heating degree day. Preci is the precipitation in millimetres of water. Mon is the Monday dummy and Jan the
January dummy. TED is the difference between the 3-month LIBOR and Treasury bill rate. Credit is the spread between Moody’s Baa corporate
bond and 10-year treasury bond. Mar.R is the total market return of the STOXX 600 Index. V ol is the 22-day rolling standard deviation of the
total market return. Y ield is the 10-year yield of the EU bond. Size is the market capitalisation for every firm.
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Figure 5.14: Temperature, ∆CoV aR and Interconnectedness.
Temperature corresponds to the average raw temperature data as recorded by the 17 weather
stations. 99% ∆CoV aR is the average ∆CoV aR of the 600 firms of our sample and hj,i is the
average dynamic conditional covariance of our sample and is calculated as shown in Appendix
6.6.
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Figure 5.15: Macro Variables
168
Figure 5.16: Temperature Series Decomposition
The decomposition is based on Equation 5.18. The data used are the weighted temperature
records as retrieved by the 17 weather stations. The moving average of temperature anomaly has
been calculated as the 260-day rolling average of the absolute values of temperature anomaly;
the right vertical axis scales the red line.
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Figure 5.17: 99% ∆CoV aR-Temperature
The line shows a quadratic regression between 99% ∆CoV aR and temperature with no other
covariates. Our full sample is used for the calculations.
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5.4 Empirical Results
5.4.1 Regression Analysis
Table 5.29 reports the OLS regression results based on Equations 5.19 and 5.20,
with dependent variable 99% ∆CoV aR. The total number of observations reaches
approximately 2.75 million while the R-squared is more than 20%. The economic
interpretation of ∆CoV aR is similar to the interpretation of the correlation coeffi-
cients (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2016). Most of the the control variables appear
significant, with the January dummy, market return and market capitalisation be-
ing the ones decreasing systemic risk, while precipitation, Monday dummy, TED,
credit risk, volatility and yield are associated with higher ∆CoV aR. However,
the lagged ∆CoV aR, precipitation and volatility do not affect the systemic risk.
Column 1 indicates that higher temperature (Temp) is associated with higher
systemic risk. Columns 2 provides direct support of Hypothesis 1, that temper-
ature has nonlinear effect on systemic risk. The coefficients of both linear and
squared terms of temperature are statistically significant with the former being
positive while the latter is negative, indicating that temperature-risk relationship
follows an inverted U-shaped curve. This finding confirms our expectations and
thus we can conclude that temperature has positive and asymmetric effects on
the daily losses of firms (Hypothesis 1).
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Table 5.29: Daily Data. Temperature on ∆CoV aR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆CoV aRt−1 0.000557 0.000540 0.000669 0.000653 0.000674 0.000672
(0.00227) (0.00227) (0.00227) (0.00227) (0.00227) (0.00227)
Temp 0.0000423*** 0.0000811***
(0.00000394) (0.00000968)
Temp2 -0.00000184***
(0.000000406)
Anom 0.0000165** 0.0000131*
(0.00000791) (0.00000795)
Anom2 -0.00000499***
(0.00000149)
D.Anom 0.00000997
(0.0000108)
D.Anom2 0.00000712***
(0.00000168)
EU.Anom 0.0000356***
(0.0000118)
EU.Anom2 0.00000481
(0.00000296)
D.Trend -1.976* -1.971* -1.964*
(1.036) (1.036) (1.036)
D.EU.Trend -40.20**
(18.69)
Preci 0.00000255 0.000000840 0.00000436 0.00000408 0.00000450 0.00000464
(0.00000508) (0.00000509) (0.00000508) (0.00000508) (0.00000509) (0.00000508)
Mon 0.000850*** 0.000851*** 0.00107*** 0.00107*** 0.00107*** 0.00559**
(0.0000654) (0.0000654) (0.000131) (0.000131) (0.000131) (0.00221)
Jan -0.000344*** -0.000287*** -0.000668*** -0.000642*** -0.000670*** -0.000677***
(0.000104) (0.000105) (0.0000993) (0.0000995) (0.0000993) (0.0000993)
TED 0.00141*** 0.00139*** 0.00134*** 0.00133*** 0.00132*** 0.00133***
(0.000184) (0.000184) (0.000184) (0.000184) (0.000183) (0.000183)
D.Credit 0.00932*** 0.00927*** 0.00964*** 0.00962*** 0.00970*** 0.00972***
(0.00116) (0.00116) (0.00116) (0.00116) (0.00116) (0.00116)
Mar.R -1.822*** -1.822*** -1.823*** -1.823*** -1.823*** -1.823***
(0.00331) (0.00331) (0.00331) (0.00331) (0.00332) (0.00331)
Vol 0.254 0.252 0.230 0.233 0.229 0.229
(0.484) (0.484) (0.484) (0.484) (0.484) (0.484)
D.Yield 0.000877*** 0.000888*** 0.000776*** 0.000798*** 0.000767*** 0.000762***
(0.000147) (0.000147) (0.000147) (0.000147) (0.000147) (0.000147)
D.Size -0.134*** -0.134*** -0.134*** -0.134*** -0.134*** -0.134***
(0.00935) (0.00935) (0.00935) (0.00935) (0.00937) (0.00935)
Cons 3.248*** 3.248*** 3.248*** 3.248*** 3.248*** 3.251***
(0.00738) (0.00738) (0.00738) (0.00738) (0.00739) (0.00744)
Year YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry YES YES YES YES YES YES
Obs 2,754,821 2,754,821 2,750,000 2,750,000 2,749,118 2,750,000
R2 20.82 20.82 20.83 20.83 20.83 20.83
Notes: The results are based on Equations 5.19 and 5.20. The dependent variable is 99% ∆CoV aR. Robust standard errors
reported in the parentheses, *,**,*** 10%, 5% and 1% significant level. D. indicates the first difference of the variable. Temp
is the raw temperature data.Anom is the value of the temperature anomaly and Trend is the trend from the decomposed
temperature series (Eq. 5.18). EU.Anom is difference between the Anom of the firm’s market location and the average EU
Anom as recorded by the 17 weather stations. EU.Trend is the average EU trend from the 17 market locations. Preci is
the precipitation in millimetres of water. Mon is the Monday dummy and Jan the January dummy. TED is the difference
between the 3-month LIBOR and Treasury bill rate. Credit is the spread between Moody’s Baa corporate bond and 10-year
treasury bond. Mar.R is the total market return of the STOXX 600 Index. V ol is the 22-day rolling standard deviation of
the total market return. Y ield is the 10-year yield of the EU bond. Size is the market capitalisation for every firm. The
total number of estimates (i.e model 1) are 11 independent variables, 28 years, 17 countries and 10 industries (66); vif test
shows no multicollinearity.
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In columns 3-6 (Table 5.29), we add the decomposed temperature time series
to test Hypothesis 2 (temperature anomaly). We consider three different spec-
ifications of temperature anomaly, (1) the temperature anomaly (Anom) from
the decomposed temperature series, (2) the first difference of Anom (D.Anom=
Anomk,t-Anomk,t−1) and (3) a relative measure of temperature which is the dif-
ference between the Anom and the average European anomaly (EU.Anom =
Anom−ΣK=17k=1 Anom/K) . In column 3, temperature anomaly seems to increase
∆CoV aR at 5% level of significance. Moving to column 4, we witness that tem-
perature anomaly and systemic risk follow an inverted U-shaped curve. When
testing for the innovations in temperature anomaly (D.Anom and D.Anom2 in
column 5) and the average EU anomaly temperature (EU.Anom and EU.Anom2
in column 6), both seem to monotonically increase systemic risk of firms. This
finding indicates that the temperature-risk relationship is both positive and non-
linear and thus there is a strong evidence to support that temperature variations
can influence the perception of financial markets about climate change. Thus far,
Hypothesis 2, that temperature anomaly has an asymmetric effect on systemic
risk, can be partially supported.
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Table 5.30: Monthly Data. Temperature on ∆CoV aR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆CoV aRt−1 0.00698 0.00605 0.0163*** 0.0163*** 0.0168*** 0.0262***
(0.00451) (0.00451) (0.00443) (0.00443) (0.00448) (0.00453)
Temp 0.0000195*** 0.00000154
(0.000000749) (0.00000190)
Temp2 0.000000838***
(8.54e-08)
Anom 0.000170*** 0.000235***
(0.00000885) (0.0000106)
Anom2 0.0000588***
(0.00000425)
D.Anom 0.0000588***
(0.0000110)
D.Anom2 -0.000199***
(0.0000199)
EU.Anom 0.000167***
(0.0000107)
EU.Anom2 0.0000606***
(0.00000446)
D.Trend 1.176*** 1.018*** 1.188***
(0.0782) (0.0792) (0.0782)
D.EU.Trend 0.00449***
(0.000244)
Preci -0.00000267 -0.00000250 0.00000257 0.000000131 0.00000320 0.000000219
(0.00000222) (0.00000222) (0.00000221) (0.00000222) (0.00000221) (0.00000222)
Jan -0.000280*** -0.000309*** -0.000460*** -0.000423*** -0.000517*** -0.000286***
(0.0000117) (0.0000119) (0.0000100) (0.0000107) (0.00000987) (0.0000127)
TED 0.00186*** 0.00212*** 0.000548*** 0.000820*** 0.000498*** 0.00169***
(0.000105) (0.000106) (0.0000858) (0.0000917) (0.0000859) (0.0000989)
D.Credit 0.0000139 0.0000138 -0.00000398 -0.00000130 -0.00000744 -0.0000247***
(0.00000931) (0.00000931) (0.00000935) (0.00000935) (0.00000934) (0.00000934)
Mar.R -0.966*** -0.966*** -1.058*** -1.035*** -1.082*** -1.030***
(0.0101) (0.0101) (0.00948) (0.00970) (0.00955) (0.01000)
Vol -0.00669*** -0.00642*** -0.00528*** -0.00522*** -0.00544*** -0.00318***
(0.00104) (0.00104) (0.00105) (0.00104) (0.00105) (0.00104)
D.Yield 0.0000398** 0.0000436** 0.0000513*** 0.0000478*** 0.0000555*** 0.0000104
(0.0000172) (0.0000172) (0.0000173) (0.0000173) (0.0000173) (0.0000172)
D.Size -0.0000183*** -0.0000184*** -0.0000181*** -0.0000181*** -0.0000181*** -0.0000178***
(0.00000208) (0.00000208) (0.00000208) (0.00000208) (0.00000208) (0.00000208)
Cons 3.228*** 3.231*** 3.195*** 3.196*** 3.194*** 3.166***
(0.0146) (0.0146) (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0145) (0.0147)
Year YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry YES YES YES YES YES YES
Obs 144,647 144,647 144,395 144,395 144,395 144,395
R2 14.50 14.55 14.41 14.48 14.27 14.46
Notes: The results are based on Equations 5.19 and 5.20. The dependent variable is 99% ∆CoV aR. Robust standard errors
reported in the parentheses, *,**,*** 10%, 5% and 1% significant level. D. indicates the first difference of the variable. Temp
is the raw temperature data.Anom is the value of the temperature anomaly and Trend is the trend from the decomposed
temperature series (Eq. 5.18). EU.Anom is difference between the Anom of the firm’s market location and the average EU
Anom as recorded by the 17 weather stations. EU.Trend is the average EU trend from the 17 market locations. Preci is
the precipitation in millimetres of water. Mon is the Monday dummy and Jan the January dummy. TED is the difference
between the 3-month LIBOR and Treasury bill rate. Credit is the spread between Moody’s Baa corporate bond and 10-year
treasury bond. Mar.R is the total market return of the STOXX 600 Index. V ol is the 22-day rolling standard deviation of
the total market return. Y ield is the 10-year yield of the EU bond. Size is the market capitalisation for every firm.
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Spillover effects from a firm to the financial markets might need some time
to be observed, similarly, temperature effects are commonly categorised as long-
term phenomena. To ascertain whether the frequency of the data can potentially
moderate the results, we aggregate daily data to a monthly frequency by taking
the median values of every month. Table 5.30 reports the monthly estimations.
Results are more positive compared to the daily data estimations (Table 5.29).
Particularly, higher temperatures significantly increase systemic risk (columns 1
and 2), the shape of this relationship appears steeper and hence Hypothesis 1 is
partially supported. Regarding Hypothesis 2, both Anom and EU.Anom strongly
increase systemic risk, as both level and quadratic terms are positive, while tem-
perature innovations (D.Anom) seem to exhibit inverted U-shaped curve with
the ∆CoV aR. Surprisingly, when examined daily data, the relationship appeared
both positive and asymmetric, while in monthly examination, the positive sign
dominates. A possible explanation is that the temperature changes have adverse
long-term aspects while in the short-term this effect is weaker.
Furthermore, Table 5.31 presents the results on Hypothesis 3, regarding hot
and cold temperature shocks. Columns 1 and 2 report the hot shock (CDD)
and the cold shock (HDD) estimations, respectively. Columns 2 and 4 also test
for nonlinear CDD and HDD. Our results suggest that hot shocks have linear
and positive association with systemic risk, while the effect of cold shocks are
strongly negative. Particularly, higher CDD by 1◦C can increase systemic risk by
0.0000277% at 10% level of significance, while the same increase in HDD report
a coefficient of -0.000051 at 1% level. Taken together, the results indicate that
high temperatures are detrimental for the financial system, but low temperatures
are not. At the same time there is not enough evidence to support nonlinear
temperature shock effects. Additionally, there is a mixed evidence regarding the
view which is the most appropriate to justify the temperature shock - systemic
risk relationship; either energy consumption or psychological effects. Our findings
indicate that the former is related to hot shocks, while the latter to the cold
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shocks. Particularly, hot shocks increase systemic risk, as stated in Hypothesis
3, while cold shocks decrease systemic risk, opposing Hypothesis 3.
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Table 5.31: Daily Data. Temperature Shocks on ∆CoV aR
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆CoV aRt−1 0.000644 0.000644 0.000542 0.000538
(0.00227) (0.00227) (0.00227) (0.00227)
CDD 0.0000277* 0.0000445
(0.0000162) (0.0000402)
CDD2 -0.00000233
(0.00000500)
HDD -0.0000510*** -0.0000280**
(0.00000444) (0.0000113)
HDD2 -0.00000124**
(0.000000577)
Preci 0.00000434 0.00000433 0.00000175 0.00000107
(0.00000508) (0.00000508) (0.00000508) (0.00000509)
Mon 0.000840*** 0.000840*** 0.000852*** 0.000852***
(0.0000654) (0.0000654) (0.0000654) (0.0000654)
Jan -0.000663*** -0.000661*** -0.000301*** -0.000282***
(0.0000995) (0.0000996) (0.000105) (0.000105)
TED 0.00133*** 0.00133*** 0.00141*** 0.00140***
(0.000184) (0.000184) (0.000183) (0.000184)
D.Credit 0.00966*** 0.00966*** 0.00926*** 0.00925***
(0.00116) (0.00116) (0.00116) (0.00116)
Mar.R -1.823*** -1.823*** -1.822*** -1.822***
(0.00331) (0.00331) (0.00331) (0.00331)
Vol 0.230 0.230 0.258 0.255
(0.484) (0.484) (0.484) (0.484)
D.Yield 0.000776*** 0.000777*** 0.000885*** 0.000889***
(0.000147) (0.000147) (0.000147) (0.000147)
D.Size -0.134*** -0.134*** -0.134*** -0.134***
(0.00935) (0.00935) (0.00935) (0.00935)
Cons 3.248*** 3.248*** 3.249*** 3.249***
(0.00738) (0.00738) (0.00738) (0.00738)
Year YES YES YES YES
Country YES YES YES YES
Industry YES YES YES YES
Obs 2,754,821 2,754,821 2,754,821 2,754,821
R2 20.82 20.82 20.82 20.82
Notes: The results are based on Equation 5.22. The dependent variable is 99% ∆CoV aR. Robust standard
errors reported in the parentheses, *,**,*** 10%, 5% and 1% significant level. D. indicates the first difference of
the variable. CDD is the cooling degree day and HDD is the heating degree day. Preci is the precipitation in
millimetres of water. Mon is the Monday dummy and Jan the January dummy. TED is the difference between
the 3-month LIBOR and Treasury bill rate. Credit is the spread between Moody’s Baa corporate bond and
10-year treasury bond. Mar.R is the total market return of the STOXX 600 Index. V ol is the 22-day rolling
standard deviation of the total market return. Y ield is the 10-year yield of the EU bond. Size is the market
capitalisation for every firm.
177
Table 5.32: Monthly Data. Temperature Shocks on ∆CoV aR
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆CoV aRt−1 0.0133*** 0.0102** 0.00779* 0.00520
(0.00442) (0.00444) (0.00451) (0.00452)
CDD 0.0000742*** 0.000184***
(0.00000390) (0.00000816)
CDD2 -0.0000197***
(0.00000132)
HDD -0.0000202*** -0.0000493***
(0.000000815) (0.00000236)
HDD2 0.00000166***
(0.000000123)
Preci 0.00000312 -0.00000297 -0.00000229 -0.00000337
(0.00000220) (0.00000223) (0.00000222) (0.00000222)
Jan -0.000433*** -0.000403*** -0.000283*** -0.000308***
(0.00000959) (0.00000971) (0.0000118) (0.0000119)
TED 0.00133*** 0.00173*** 0.00171*** 0.00219***
(0.0000950) (0.0000990) (0.000103) (0.000105)
D.Credit -0.00000162 0.00000339 0.0000118 0.0000131
(0.00000933) (0.00000931) (0.00000931) (0.00000930)
Mar.R -1.061*** -1.030*** -0.970*** -0.953***
(0.00951) (0.00954) (0.0101) (0.0101)
Vol -0.00550*** -0.00546*** -0.00663*** -0.00627***
(0.00105) (0.00104) (0.00104) (0.00104)
D.Yield 0.0000333* 0.0000367** 0.0000368** 0.0000426**
(0.0000173) (0.0000173) (0.0000172) (0.0000172)
D.Size -0.0000181*** -0.0000182*** -0.0000183*** -0.0000184***
(0.00000208) (0.00000208) (0.00000208) (0.00000208)
Cons 3.208*** 3.218*** 3.226*** 3.234***
(0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0147) (0.0147)
Year YES YES YES YES
Country YES YES YES YES
Industry YES YES YES YES
Obs 144,647 144,647 144,647 144,647
R2 14.33 14.49 14.44 14.54
Notes: The results are based on Equation 5.22. The dependent variable is 99% ∆CoV aR. Robust standard
errors reported in the parentheses, *,**,*** 10%, 5% and 1% significant level. D. indicates the first difference of
the variable. CDD is the cooling degree day and HDD is the heating degree day. Preci is the precipitation in
millimetres of water. Mon is the Monday dummy and Jan the January dummy. TED is the difference between
the 3-month LIBOR and Treasury bill rate. Credit is the spread between Moody’s Baa corporate bond and
10-year treasury bond. Mar.R is the total market return of the STOXX 600 Index. V ol is the 22-day rolling
standard deviation of the total market return. Y ield is the 10-year yield of the EU bond. Size is the market
capitalisation for every firm.
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In order to provide evidence about the aggregated temperature shock effects,
we transform our daily data into a monthly frequency. Table 5.32 reports esti-
mations based on monthly data. It seems that the level coefficients for CDD and
HDD remain positive and negative, respectively, in line with the daily examina-
tion. Surprisingly, the quadratic coefficients follow a different pattern than the
one in the daily analysis. Hot shocks and systemic risk exhibit an inverted U-
shaped curve, while cold shocks and systemic risk exhibit a U-shaped curve. Daily
analysis clearly shows that temperature shocks have linear effect while monthly
analysis demonstrates that this effect is asymmetric. It can be suggested that
hot (cold) shocks are not adequately approximated, for instance if one day of the
month is very hot while the other is very cold then the median effect is negligible
(Vecchio and Carbone, 2010). Therefore, the results might be downward biased
when lower frequency temperature shocks are examined.
Even though, extreme temperatures might be associated with higher energy
consumption and thus one would expect a higher systemic risk, this is only true
for the hot shocks. These findings can have a threefold explanation, in line with
Cao and Wei (2005); Bansal et al. (2016); Apergis et al. (2016).
First, consistently with the energy-consumption-based view, hot weather is
expected to increase demand and prices of electricity (Hypothesis 3). In turn,
high energy prices may increase operational costs of firms, and eventually these
firms may incur losses. The results imply that an imminent increase in electricity
prices can be considered by stock market investors and traders as ”bad” news.
Subsequently, investors and traders tend to sell off stocks, which leads to a prop-
agation of losses within and across the industries, which in turn destabilises the
financial system. Thus, the results are supportive of the view, which postulates a
negative relation between hot shocks and systemic risk. However, if hot weather
causes apathy among stock market traders and investors, they are likely not to
engage in riskier investments. Even if hot temperature causes aggression, Griffitt
and Veitch (1971) assert that such aggression can be causal of an increased anti-
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social behaviour, which is not necessarily consistent with individual risk-taking.
On the contrary, it can even lead to increased pessimism about future stock prices
and returns, which can further translate into heightened risk aversion (Lucey and
Dowling, 2005). Risk-averting investors tend sell off riskier stocks, which trigger
a collapse (rise) in stock prices and returns (losses). The ensuing losses can prop-
agate within and across the industries, and give rise to higher levels of systemic
risk.
We now turn to cold shocks, which are expected to increase systemic risk, if
the energy-consumption based view holds. However, the results do not accord
with Hypothesis 3. Instead, they agree with the second view, which builds on in-
vestor psychology to predict a negative relation between cold temperature shocks
and systemic risk. According to Cao and Wei (2005), lower temperatures are
associated with increased risk-taking as investors become more aggressive. As
a result, investors tend to buy risky assets. These purchases, in turn, drive up
(down) stock prices and returns (losses), and are associated with a bull market
stance. Therefore, the net effect on investors’ risk preferences depends upon the
balance between concerns about increasing energy demand and/or other psycho-
logical factors. Arguably, the latter dominates the former, which manifests in a
negative effect of HDD. This leads to lower losses from securities trading, which
are transmitted within the industry, in which the firm operates, and across to
other industries of the economy.
Yet another explanation, which caters to both hot and cold shocks, under-
scores the geographical location. In this regard, Bansal et al. (2016) advocate
that countries with hotter climate also perform poorly in terms of financial de-
velopment and are not well equipped to deal with adverse shocks. Therefore, hot
shocks might negatively affect countries such as Italy, Spain and Portugal as their
financial markets are quite vulnerable to exogenous shocks (Engle et al., 2014).
By contrast, cold shocks, occurring mainly in the northern Europe coincide with
markets that have higher financial stability.
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5.4.2 Portfolio Analysis
Climate change is a risk factor that should have more detrimental effect on indus-
tries such as Agriculture, Health Care and Manufacturing and less detrimental
effect on Services (Schlenker and Roberts, 2009; Deschenes, 2014; Balvers et al.,
2017). In order to test the sensitivity of the previous results, we construct indus-
try portfolios. Ten portfolios are constructed in respect to Table 5.27 Panel A.
Then, we run regressions separately for every portfolio to observe the tempera-
ture effects within each industry. According to Dell et al. (2014); Balvers et al.
(2017), we expected to identify some variations of the results depending on how
vulnerable the industry is to weather patterns. Table 5.33 presents the results
for Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3. First, in column 1, temperature (Temp) coefficient is
positive for 9 portfolios and in 6 of them is statistically significant, the squared
term (Temp2) is negative in 8/10 portfolios while it is only significant in 3 port-
folios. The results illustrate that temperature asymmetrically affect the losses of
Financials, Health Care and Oil & Gas portfolios, while 4 portfolios (Technol-
ogy, Consumer Services, Telecommunications and Utilities) are unaffected and 3
portfolios (Consumer Goods, Industrials, Basic Materials) are linearly affected.
Second, in order to test Hypothesis 2, we now pay attention to the decomposed
temperature coefficient, namely Anom (column 2). As it is shown, on average,
Consumer Goods, Oil & Gas and Basic Materials are significantly affected by the
temperature anomaly; findings are in line with Balvers et al. (2017) who under-
line the direct detrimental temperature effects on the manufacturing sector. Even
though, we can partially support Hypothesis 1 about the nonlinear effect of tem-
perature, we are unable to support the same for the temperature anomaly when
examined at a sector level. Overall, results indicate that higher temperatures
increase systemic risk.
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Table 5.33: Industry Portfolios
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Portfolio: Temp Temp2 Anom Anom2 CDD HDD Obs ≈ R2 ≈
Consumer 0.0000994*** -0.00000125 0.0000389* -0.00000616 0.000101* -0.0000855*** 355,000 16.4
Goods (0.0000346) (0.00000138) (0.0000228) (0.00000424) (0.0000568) (0.0000145)
Financials 0.0000462** -0.00000209** 0.0000124 -0.00000336 -0.0000314 -0.00000391 647,000 26.5
(0.0000193) (0.000000823) (0.0000160) (0.00000306) (0.0000408) (0.00000898)
Health 0.0000793** -0.00000333** 0.0000245 0.00000156 -0.0000447 -0.0000159 217,000 13.9
Care (0.0000325) (0.00000146) (0.0000264) (0.00000505) (0.0000713) (0.0000141)
Oil & 0.000190*** -0.00000526** 0.000195*** -0.00000494 0.000131 -0.0000670** 89,000 21.9
Gas (0.0000575) (0.00000218) (0.0000508) (0.00000939) (0.000101) (0.0000297)
Technology 0.0000681 -0.00000237 -0.0000228 -0.00000667 -0.000252** -0.0000325 131,000 20.8
(0.0000508) (0.00000224) (0.0000431) (0.00000747) (0.000117) (0.0000251)
Industrials 0.000102*** -0.00000117 -0.0000111 -0.0000101*** 0.000100** -0.0000964*** 609,000 20.3
(0.0000186) (0.000000818) (0.0000164) (0.00000302) (0.0000450) (0.00000930)
Consumer 0.0000194 0.000000697 -0.0000204 -0.000000776 -0.00000360 -0.0000450*** 289,000 21.2
Services (0.0000315) (0.00000134) (0.0000245) (0.00000488) (0.0000713) (0.0000142)
Basic 0.000116*** -0.00000166 0.0000536* 0.00000358 0.000295*** -0.0000953*** 205,500 23.8
Material (0.0000317) (0.00000145) (0.0000279) (0.00000489) (0.0000821) (0.0000162)
Telecom- -0.00000283 -0.00000152 -0.0000885* -0.00000196 -0.000198* 0.0000274 85,500 22.5
munications (0.0000456) (0.00000193) (0.0000471) (0.00000819) (0.000117) (0.0000254)
Utilities 0.0000152 0.000000825 0.0000221 -0.00000988 0.000108* -0.0000291 125,000 21.2
(0.0000393) (0.00000137) (0.0000312) (0.00000657) (0.0000563) (0.0000182)
Notes: The results are based on Equations 5.19, 5.20 and 5.22. The dependent variable is 99% ∆CoV aR. Robust standard errors reported in the parentheses, *,**,*** 10%,
5% and 1% significant level. The rest of control variables are not reported here for brevity but are available upon request. Temp is the raw temperature data. Anom is the
value of the temperature anomaly (Eq. 5.18). CDD is the cooling degree day and HDD is the heating degree day.
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The importance of analysing very cold and hot temperatures has been also
underlined by Luterbacher et al. (2004), whose results show that extreme temper-
atures can affect the economy. In columns 3 and 4 in Table 5.33, regression results
are reported based on Equation 5.22 for different industries, using 99% ∆CoV aR
as dependent variable. This table provides further evidence regarding Hypothesis
3. In line with previous estimations, hot shocks (CDD) have significantly positive
effects on different industries (4 out of 10 industries) while cold shocks (HDD)
decrease systemic risk (5 out of 10 industries). On average, there is a robust
evidence that Consumer Goods, Industrials, Basic Materials and Utilities are in-
dustries that are most vulnerable to hot shocks; in line with Dell et al. (2014);
Balvers et al. (2017). While, Consumer goods, Oil & Gas, Industrials, Consumer
Services and Basic Materials can benefit from lower temperatures. Results also
show that industries such as Technology, Consumer Services and Telecommunica-
tions are not negatively affected by temperature effects. This finding implies that
temperature shocks can influence the investment climate, particularly when cli-
mate sensitive firms are considered. Therefore, institutional investors and traders
make investment decisions based on two principles; (i) how industries are contin-
gent on climate change and (ii) cold weather is “good” news while hot weather
is ‘bad” news for the financial markets.
5.4.3 Robustness Checks
The degree of interconnection in stock returns can be seen as a proxy for return-
spillover effects between a firm and the financial system (Billio et al., 2012)30.
To corroborate our results, we use two additional dependent variables as mea-
sures of interconnectedness. First, we focus on the endogenous risk between firm
and industry losses by taking the first principal component (PC1) (see more in
Appendix 6.6). Second, we compute the dynamic conditional covariance (hj,i) in
30An alternative methodology could be based on the study of Diebold and Yilmaz (2009).
Their study provides a simple and intuitive measure of interdependence of asset returns and/or
volatilities. In particular, the advantage of this framework is that it facilitates non-crisis and
crisis episodes.
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an endogenous system, constituted by losses of firm i and industry j (see more
in Appendix 6.6). Because hj,i already accounts for the dynamics in the model,
the autoregressive variable is omitted. Also, both variables account for a degree
of volatility in the market and therefore volatility (V ol) variable is excluded in
order to avoid any simultaneity problem.
The results are reported in Table 5.34, columns 1-4 and columns 5-8 show the
estimations for PC1 and hj,i, respectively. In line with the previous estimations,
PC1 appears to confirm Hypothesis 1 and reject Hypotheses 2; temperature and
PC1 exhibit an inverted U-shaped curve (Temp and Temp2 coefficients are pos-
itive and negative respectively, in column 1); the effect of temperature anomaly
on PC1 does not follow a nonlinear pattern, but this linearly increases (column
2). Regarding Hypothesis 3, hot shocks (CDD) increase the interconnection of
the financial markets (column 3), but cold temperatures (HDD) seem to decrease
this interconnection (column 4). In terms of hj,i, the results appear qualitatively
similar with the previous specifications. The conditional covariances between a
firm and its industry are equally affected by temperature effects, importantly, the
only difference with PC1 estimations, is that both raw temperature and temper-
ature anomaly monotonically increase the firm-industry interconnection (see hj,i
in columns 5 and 6).
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Table 5.34: Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PC1 hj,i
PC1t−1 0.0292*** 0.0342*** 0.0342*** 0.0339***
(0.000957) (0.000573) (0.000576) (0.000575)
Temp 0.00120*** 0.000000684
(0.000176) (0.00000216)
Temp2 -0.0000243*** 0.000000968***
(0.00000744) (9.40e-08)
Anom 0.000249* 0.00000769***
(0.000137) (0.00000200)
Anom2 -0.00000662 0.00000178***
(0.0000261) (0.000000357)
D.Trend -59.51*** -0.396
(17.47) (0.251)
CDD 0.00113*** 0.0000911***
(0.000353) (0.00000410)
HDD -0.000882*** -0.0000203***
(0.0000782) (0.00000107)
Preci 0.0000418 0.0000782 0.0000845 0.0000437 0.00000480*** 0.00000496*** 0.00000554*** 0.00000371***
(0.0000994) (0.0000907) (0.0000909) (0.0000908) (0.00000141) (0.00000140) (0.00000140) (0.00000141)
Mon 0.0178*** 0.0151*** 0.00781*** 0.00819*** 0.0000701*** 0.000111*** 0.0000658*** 0.0000708***
(0.00122) (0.00224) (0.00111) (0.00111) (0.0000166) (0.0000328) (0.0000166) (0.0000166)
Jan -0.00336* -0.00551*** -0.00521*** -0.000562 -0.000538*** -0.000684*** -0.000629*** -0.000524***
(0.00199) (0.00178) (0.00178) (0.00190) (0.0000293) (0.0000276) (0.0000276) (0.0000295)
TED 0.0230*** -0.0606*** -0.0605*** -0.0605*** 0.00698*** 0.00694*** 0.00696*** 0.00696***
(0.00342) (0.00309) (0.00309) (0.00311) (0.000259) (0.000259) (0.000259) (0.000259)
D.Credit 0.100*** -0.119*** -0.122*** -0.128*** -0.00129*** -0.00115*** -0.00118*** -0.00131***
(0.0228) (0.0193) (0.0195) (0.0194) (0.000356) (0.000356) (0.000357) (0.000356)
Mar.R -81.39*** -77.04*** -77.01*** -77.01*** 0.0190*** 0.0187*** 0.0188*** 0.0190***
(0.0700) (0.0631) (0.0636) (0.0633) (0.00103) (0.00103) (0.00103) (0.00103)
D.Yield 0.0144*** 0.0354*** 0.0354*** 0.0371*** -0.00487*** -0.00492*** -0.00489*** -0.00487***
(0.00266) (0.00247) (0.00247) (0.00248) (0.000137) (0.000137) (0.000136) (0.000137)
D.Size -2.164*** -1.986*** -1.988*** -1.968*** -0.00213*** -0.00213*** -0.00212*** -0.00214***
(0.148) (0.140) (0.140) (0.139) (0.000650) (0.000650) (0.000650) (0.000650)
Cons -0.00666 0.0889*** 0.0842*** 0.0907*** -0.00701*** -0.00680*** -0.00687*** -0.00667***
(0.00484) (0.00469) (0.00444) (0.00446) (0.000118) (0.000121) (0.000119) (0.000121)
Year YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Obs 2,673,025 2,696,545 2,673,025 2,673,025 2,630,428 2,626,327 2,630,428 2,630,428
R2 57.83 57.92 57.83 57.83 44.96 44.95 44.96 44.96
Notes: The results are based on Equations 5.19, 5.20 and 5.22 by substituting ∆CoV aR with either PC1 or hj,i. PC1 is the first principal component of industry and
firm losses (see Appendix Appendix C) and hj,i is the dynamic conditional covariance between a firm and its industry (see Appendix D). Robust standard errors reported
in the parentheses, *,**,*** 10%, 5% and 1% significant level. D. indicates the first difference of the variable. Temp is the raw temperature data. Anom is the value of the
temperature anomaly (Eq. 5.18) and Trend is the trend from the decomposed temperature series (Eq. 5.18). CDD is the cooling degree day and HDD is the heating degree
day. Preci is the precipitation in millimetres of water. Mon is the Monday dummy and Jan the January dummy. TED is the difference between the 3-month LIBOR and
Treasury bill rate. Credit is the spread between Moody’s Baa corporate bond and 10-year treasury bond. Mar.R is the total market return of the STOXX 600 Index. Y ield
is the 10-year yield of the EU bond. Size is the market capitalisation for every firm.
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5.4.4 Additional Results
In order to provide more plausible results, we consider the ∆eCoV aR method-
ology. In Equations 5.19, 5.20 and 5.22, we remove Size variable since it is used
to compute the ∆eCoV aR, which in turn is our new alternative dependent vari-
able. Therefore, ∆eCoV aRi,t = Sizei,t × ∆CoV aRi,t. The e sign denotes the
change of the size of the firm in Euro amounts conditional on any variable. Size
is the market capitalisation of any firm i at any day t and ∆CoV aR is defined
as previously. We also consider both the 99% and 95% ∆eCoV aR in order to
measure a reasonable confidence interval of the losses. To attain stationarity,
in line with Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016), we normalise the ∆eCoV aR by
the cross-sectional average market capitalisation and our new measure is now
expressed in basis points. In contrast with the ∆CoV aR, the ∆eCoV aR takes
into account the size of every institution which is closely related to the “Too big
to fail” suggestion, indicating that poor performance of large firms would have
amplified negative consequences to the financial system.
The results are reported in Table 5.35, where columns 1-4 use 99% ∆eCoV aR
and columns 5-8 use 95% ∆eCoV aR as dependent variable. As shown, ∆eCoV aR
is substantially different from ∆CoV aR. In column 1, Temp is positive and sig-
nificant at 1% but Temp2 is insignificant. The Temp coefficient of 0.147 implies
that an increase in temperature by 1◦C would increase ∆eCoV aR by 0.147 basis
points of daily market equity losses at the 99% quantile. In column 2, Anom
is positive and its squared term is negative, representing an inverted U-shaped
curve, confirming Hypothesis 2. Regarding CDD and HDD, results illustrate
that hot shocks increase and cold shocks decrease systemic risk (Hypothesis 3).
Particularly, the impact of temperature shocks is estimated to cause daily losses
ranging between -0.303 and 0.239 basis points. This findings show that temper-
ature is priced in financial markets. Despite the relatively “small” effect, we can
claim that information about climate change is appreciated by investors. Specif-
ically, it can be implied that low temperatures are perceived as ”good” news,
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while high temperatures as ”bad” news for the financial market. Overall, results
can be explained by the climate change uncertainty, expectations about increas-
ing energy demand and by psychological factors. Hence, investors are highly
uncertain about the probability distribution of future payoffs, since their future
expectations are based on current weather events.
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Table 5.35: OLS regressions on ∆eCoV aR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
99% ∆eCoV aR 95% ∆eCoV aR
∆eCoV aRt−1 -0.366*** -0.366*** -0.366*** -0.366*** -0.458*** -0.458*** -0.458*** -0.458***
(0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.00590) (0.00590) (0.00590) (0.00590)
Temp 0.147*** 0.237***
(0.0490) (0.0605)
Temp2 0.00284 0.00170
(0.00192) (0.00235)
Anom 0.190*** 0.239***
(0.0301) (0.0362)
Anom2 -0.0105** -0.0148***
(0.00485) (0.00573)
D.Trend 9346.5*** 9426.4**
(3492.8) (3756.4)
CDD 0.157** 0.160*
(0.0736) (0.0906)
HDD -0.221*** -0.303***
(0.0339) (0.0410)
Preci -0.0172 -0.0201 -0.0229 -0.0214 -0.0215 -0.0246 -0.0285* -0.0258
(0.0162) (0.0161) (0.0162) (0.0161) (0.0173) (0.0172) (0.0173) (0.0172)
Mon -0.493** -1.557*** -0.507** -0.485** -0.652*** -1.722*** -0.671*** -0.642***
(0.211) (0.525) (0.211) (0.211) (0.231) (0.529) (0.231) (0.231)
Jan 0.783*** 0.769** 0.783*** 0.779** 0.238 0.219 0.239 0.234
(0.304) (0.304) (0.304) (0.304) (0.356) (0.356) (0.356) (0.356)
TED -2.840*** -2.856*** -2.859*** -2.838*** -4.173*** -4.198*** -4.200*** -4.171***
(0.455) (0.455) (0.455) (0.455) (0.570) (0.570) (0.570) (0.570)
D.Credit -57.66*** -57.75*** -57.68*** -57.68*** -73.46*** -73.57*** -73.48*** -73.47***
(3.293) (3.295) (3.294) (3.294) (4.128) (4.130) (4.129) (4.129)
Mar.R -2045.8*** -2045.5*** -2045.5*** -2045.5*** -2835.2*** -2834.8*** -2834.7*** -2834.9***
(10.48) (10.49) (10.48) (10.48) (12.81) (12.81) (12.81) (12.81)
Vol 55.60** 55.04** 55.27** 55.66** 100.9*** 100.1*** 100.4*** 100.9***
(23.50) (23.51) (23.50) (23.50) (29.40) (29.40) (29.40) (29.40)
D.Yield -1.812*** -1.799*** -1.812*** -1.807*** -3.078*** -3.064*** -3.080*** -3.073***
(0.454) (0.454) (0.454) (0.454) (0.493) (0.493) (0.493) (0.493)
Cons 1.288** 0.539 1.317*** 1.298*** 1.189* 0.439 1.227** 1.199*
(0.500) (0.557) (0.500) (0.500) (0.618) (0.683) (0.618) (0.618)
Year YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Obs 2,753,672 2,748,810 2,753,672 2,753,672 2,753,672 2,748,810 2,753,672 2,753,672
R2 15,72 15,71 15,72 15,72 24.34 24.33 24.34 24.34
Notes: The alternative dependent variable is either 99% ∆eCoV aR or 95% ∆eCoV aR, where ∆eCoV aR = Size x ∆CoV aR. Robust standard errors reported in the
parentheses, *,**,*** 10%, 5% and 1% significant level. D. indicates the first difference of the variable. Temp is the raw temperature data. Anom is the value of the
temperature anomaly (Eq. 5.18) and Trend is the trend from the decomposed temperature series (Eq. 5.18). CDD is the cooling degree day and HDD is the heating degree
day. Preci is the precipitation in millimetres of water. Mon is the Monday dummy and Jan the January dummy. TED is the difference between the 3-month LIBOR and
Treasury bill rate. Credit is the spread between Moody’s Baa corporate bond and 10-year treasury bond. Mar.R is the total market return of the STOXX 600 Index. V ol is
the 22-day rolling standard deviation of the total market return. Y ield is the 10-year yield of the EU bond.
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5.5 Discussion and Conclusions
The purpose of this paper is to examine if systemic risk is conditioned on tem-
perature changes. Systemic risk is measured by making use of the ∆CoV aR
methodology (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2016), while temperature data are re-
trieved from the closest weather stations to the firms’ main market locations.
Using a sample of 600 European firms listed in STOXX 600 Index for 7305 trad-
ing days in 17 different financial markets, we find that temperature has a versatile
effect on the losses of firms. To be more explicit, in line with existing climate
change literature, we decompose the temperature series to (i) trend, (ii) seasonal-
ity and (iii), anomaly components. In turn, we make the following assumptions:
(1) temperature has asymmetric effects on systemic risk, (2) similarly tempera-
ture anomaly has nonlinear effects on systemic risk and (3) hot and cold shocks
are detrimental for the financial system. On general principles, all of our hypothe-
ses can be partially supported to some extent, under all different specifications;
however, we do record certain deviations among industries.
Our results provide support to the argument that temperature affects systemic
risk. Specifically, raw temperature data and temperature anomaly seem to either
increase or exert nonlinear effect on systemic risk. We argue that these asym-
metries can be explained on the basis of decomposed temperature factors. For
instance, on the one hand we show, in line with the psychological literature, that
cold temperature shocks significantly decrease the ∆CoV aR, while, on the other,
we have adequate evidence to support, in line with the energy consumption view,
that hot shocks positively influence systemic risk. More importantly, the portfo-
lio analysis demonstrates that the manufacturing sector is strongly influenced by
temperature changes (Balvers et al., 2017), while Technology, Telecommunica-
tions and Consumer Services firms seem to be unaffected by the climate. Finally,
a numerical example based on the alternative measure of systemic risk, that is
∆eCoV aR, suggests that 1◦C temperature change can increase systemic risk by
up to 0.24 basis points.
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Our study is important for many different stakeholders, as it provides informed
insights in connection with the impact of climate change. While proposing hedg-
ing strategies and adaptation mechanisms is rather challenging, this paper un-
derscores that the examination of the climate-finance relationship should receive
priority and be further promoted. In addition, given the sample market of our
study, our findings are quite useful to European firms that operate in relatively
developed and well-informed markets and have the capacity to secure themselves
against climate change (e.g., by purchasing weather derivatives)31. An interesting
avenue for future research, would be to investigate how financial markets react
to temperature changes in developing countries (Dell et al., 2012).
In turn, our findings can have important research implications. Scholars can
gauge the effect of climate change on the financial system. The intuition for using
∆CoV aR is because of its unique capability to identify, among others, systemic
climate sensitive firms that could potentially affect the entire financial system.
Therefore, future studies should also investigate the particular characteristics of
these firms. Our findings also suggest that temperature variations are priced in
financial markets. This finding could be important for the asset pricing literature
(Apergis and Gupta, 2017). It can be suggested that market participants fear the
regulatory pressure rising from changes in climate patterns (Balvers et al., 2017);
this can be an alternative channel that helps rationalise our results.
On a final note, the main limitation of this study is the assumption that
temperature recorded on a firm’s primary market location affects the activity
and the performance of investors and employees, respectively; thus contributing
to higher levels of risk. However, it is also true that firms are able to mitigate
this impact by diversifying activities to different countries or even continents
that are subject to very different weather patterns. In this regard, gathering
temperature data from multiple business locations might help resolve this issue.
In line with the arguments put forward above, our results do not apply to all
31See more information about weather derivatives in Perez-Gonzalez and Yun (2013).
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the financial markets. EU is an area adherent to environmental regulations (e.g.
emissions trading scheme) and thus investors might be highly driven by climate
change effects. As Bansal and Ochoa (2011) assert, heterogeneous temperature
effects depend on geographic location. For this reason, similar studies should be
conducted about different areas of the world, such as the United States, in to
order to determine (and compare) the accuracy of our findings.
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6 Conclusion
The purpose of this thesis was to examine if climate change effects can distort
the financial performance of European firms. Arguably, different economic the-
ories underline that this connection is plausible and rather negative. Empirical
results follow suit, indicating that immediate actions should be taken in order to
secure both the firms and the wider financial system by an imminent stronger
climate change crisis. Thus, the study attempts to enhance our understanding
of climate change effects on FP. Researchers in the field can use the study as a
handbook in order to familiarise themselves and consider future ideas about this
interdisciplinary topic. To this end, not only theoretical but also managerial and
regulatory implications are discussed.
The remainder of this Chapter is structured as follows. The main findings of
every empirical chapter are summarised separately, recommendations and impli-
cations are also listed. Then this Chapter syntheses the main conclusion from all
three empirical investigations combined. This Chapter tabulates the limitations
of the thesis and finally proposes directions for future studies.
6.1 First Empirical Chapter: Environmental and Financial Performance
6.1.1 Findings
The first empirical chapter (Chapter 3) examines the effect of EP on FP using a
sample of 288 manufacturing EU firms from 2005 to 2016. Quantile and two-stage
quantile regressions have been used to examine this relationship in different part
of the FP distribution (Lee, 2007). The main results that merge from this chapter
is that (i) EP has always a positive effect on FP, (ii) EP has heterogeneous effect
across the conditional distribution and (iii) high profitability firms and EP are
endogenously related. Overall, the results suggest that instrumental stakeholder
theory can well explain the relationship between EP and FP.
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Particularly, the relationship between EP and the associated FP quantiles
exhibits a U-shaped curve. The schematic representation of EP follows a slightly
steady process at the middle of the distribution and increases at the lower and
higher FP quantiles. Irrespective of the part of the distribution, EP coefficients
are always positive and significant. Our findings are in line with the majority
of the studies (e.g Lewandowski, 2017; Trumpp and Guenther, 2017), but it
contradicts previous research in the EU area (Wagner, 2005). The fact that the
sign of the relationship has changed can be attributed to the strict environmental
regulations during the examined period.
Moreover, two-stage quantile regressions are employed to deal with the po-
tential endogeneity. In the first stage, EP model uses EU ETS participation and
ISO adoption as its instruments. These two variables are conceptually chosen
because arguably they exogenously determine EP (see Section 3.3.4). In turn,
EP model provides with two very interesting results. First, EU ETS does not
seem to motivate firms to perform environmentally better and second ISO either
decrease or has no effect on the FP of the firms.
In the second stage FP model is examined, showing that the relationship
between EP and FP is endogenous. Particularly, we have strong evidence that
highly profitable firms can afford an investment in EP and thus this positive sign
might be influenced primarily by the high FP. Having controlled for endogenous
estimates with instrumental variable approach, the results remain robust. On
the contrary, we do not observe the same problem for firms with low profitability,
indicating that endogeneity is conditional on the profitability levels.
6.1.2 Implications
The finding that the participation in the EU ETS decreases the EP of firms
is quite discouraging. The very low carbon price creates disincentives for firms
to operate greener and thus they prefer to purchase their extra emissions; this
finding should generate regulatory concerns. For this reason, policymakers should
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develop ease and cheap ways for firms to finance their green projects and increase
the cost for firms to pollute, otherwise these firms do not have sufficient motives
for climate change adaptation.
In addition, the role of ISO is still unclear. Environmental management is done
for symbolic purposes and it does not really improve the EP of firms (Misani and
Pogutz, 2015). Nevertheless, the main result show that firms clearly benefit from
superior EP and thus managers should consider ways in order to increase their
EP, which in turn will improve their overall FP.
A research implication of this chapter is that scholars should start considering
the use of more sophisticated techniques, such as non-parametric. As it is shown,
firms with different profitability have different characteristics and the efficacy of
EP might be primarily affected by the ability of these firms to implement their
investments successfully. On the top of that, the fact that endogeniety is more
intense for highly profitable sample of firms, indicates that examining only the
mean of the conditional distribution might provide us with a distorted picture
of the reality. This problematic setting can be solve with instrumental and non-
parametric approaches.
6.2 Second Empirical Chapter: Environmental Disclosure and Idiosyn-
cratic Risk
6.2.1 Findings
The second empirical chapter (Chapter 4) investigates if environmental disclos-
ing assets can affect the idiosyncratic risk for a panel of 288 EU manufacturing
firms for the period 2005-2016 (same sample with the first empirical chapter).
Idiosyncratic risk is measured from the residuals of the five factor model (Fama
and French, 2015), while environmental disclosure is retrieved from Bloomberg
database. The main results indicate that it is less risky to be informative. Also,
environmental disclosure has heterogeneous effect across different parts of idiosyn-
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cratic risk distribution. This finding is robust under different specifications and is
in line with the largest part of literature (Dawkins and Fraas, 2011; Matsumura
et al., 2014; Ben-Amar and McIlkenny, 2015).
The results indicate the prominent role of environmental disclosure on the
financial markets and that environmental information is of paramount impor-
tance for the market participants. Particularly, the negative coefficient of the
relationship suggests that the dominant theoretical framework is adhering with
the legitimacy or stakeholder theory. Overall, a portfolio enriched with disclosing
firms can decrease the overall risk of this portfolio and at the same time, the same
return is maintained.
6.2.2 Implications
Regulators as well as firms should further promote the environmental disclosure.
Environmental transparent information can help regulators to monitor climate
change risk (Stern, 2007) and at the same time firms can enjoy lower levels of
risk; “win-win” situation. Therefore, the management should consider to pro-
vide transparent environmental information as means of cost-less risk reduction.
Simultaneously, environmental disclosure seems to explain a high proportion of
the variations of idiosyncratic risk, indicating that researchers should include
environmental disclosure as determinant of idiosyncratic risk in their analysis.
6.3 Third Empirical Chapter: Temperature and Systemic Risk
6.3.1 Findings
The third empirical chapter (Chapter 5) examines the effect of temperature on
the systemic risk using a sample of 600 EU firms listed in STOXX 600 Index
from the period 1/1/1990 to 29/12/2017. Temperature data have been retrieved
from the weather station closer to the firm’s market location. Then, tempera-
ture is decomposed to trend, seasonality and anomaly, with anomaly being the
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main independent variable. Systemic risk has been constructed by employing the
∆CoVaR methodology of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016).
The results show that (i) raw temperature has asymmetric effects on systemic
risk; (ii) temperature anomaly has either positive or inverted U-shape relation
with systemic risk; (iii) hot temperature shocks increase while (iv) cold tempera-
ture shocks decrease the systemic risk. In addition, portfolio analysis shows that
manufacturing industries are the ones mostly affected by the variations of temper-
ature, in line with Balvers et al. (2017). Using different variables to approximate
systemic risk, the results appear very robust. Finally, an alternative measure
of systemic risk, ∆eCoV aR, shows that an increase of 1 degree of Celsius can
increase systemic risk by 0.24 basis points.
6.3.2 Implications
The engagement of field research in the climate-finance literature remains uneven
and therefore the chapter aims to further promote this nascent literature. The
chapter motivates scholars to further examine this relationship. Particularly,
we provide a method that researchers can use to gauge the effects of climate
change on the financial system. This can be done with the ∆CoVaR methodology.
The unique capability of ∆CoVaR is that it can accommodate different micro
and macro variables and measure the impact of these variables on the systemic
risk. Based on this principal, the chapter finds that temperature is priced in
financial markets and market participants take seriously into consideration the
extreme temperature movements. The finding that climate change effects are
not only limited to the real economy (see, Dell et al., 2014) but these effects
are appreciated in the financial system, should generate some regulatory and
managerial concerns.
The results of the study are very important for policy-makers. In particular,
policy-makers can monitor climate-sensitive firms that have spillover effects to
the whole financial system. IPCC (2014) forecasts higher frequency of extreme
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weather events and rising temperatures. For this reason, our study can be a useful
handbook for micro-prudential policy. Measuring the climate systemic impact of
firms can help financial system be equipped with adequate tools and knowledge
towards climate change. In the long-run a micro-prudential policy would result
to macro-prudential effectiveness within the climate change content. Prevention
is the most prominent method to manage systemic risk and thus to secure finan-
cial stability. In other words, policy-makers can detect “environmental sensitive
firms” and regulate upon them in order to ensure the financial stability.
The chapter can have additional implications for many other stakeholders, as
it provides valuable insights about an unexplored relationship between climate
change and financial markets. The finding that temperature can destabilise the
financial system should be taken into account by the firms. While, proposing
hedging strategies and adaptation mechanisms is rather challenging, one sugges-
tions for the European firms, as they operate in a developed and well-informed
markets and have the capacity to secure themselves, would be to purchase weather
derivatives. Equally useful is the fact that managers can now measure their firm’s
exposure to temperature changes and probably estimate more precisely their fu-
ture cash flows.
6.4 Synthesis
All three empirical chapters considered, two important conclusions can be de-
rived. First, climate change, as externality, is undoubtedly harmful for the firms.
Climate change can be induced within firms in a form of environmental regula-
tions and/or investors concerns’ about weather alterations, whereby their effects
are highly detrimental on firm’s performance. This result can be directly ob-
served in Chapter 5 (temperature-systemic risk), which is in line with the previous
climate-economy literature (e.g, Hart and Ahuja, 1996; Stern, 2007; Dell et al.,
2014). Having re-established this connection for the climate-finance literature
afresh (Bansal and Ochoa, 2011), our results lead to the second major conclusion
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of this thesis. This is the benefit from investing in environmental practises. Un-
deniably, results from Chapters 3 (EP-FP) and 4 (Disc-Risk) demonstrate that
environmental investments (i.e. decreasing carbon emissions and disclosing en-
vironmental information) can establish long-term objectives, incorporate societal
concerns and develop advanced technology for firms, which in turn firms will gain
and sustain competitive advantage (Porter, 1991). Although, climate change has
indeed profound impact on the firms’ output, this is a unique opportunity for
these firms to distinguish and signal their environmental responsible actions to
the society. Eventually, lower firm’s emissions (investing in EP, Chapter 3) and
effective measurement of firm’s carbon footprint (disclosing transparent environ-
mental information, Chapter 4) would lead to increase financial performance and
stabilise the global warming. Global warming under control also indicates higher
financial stability (Chapter 5). In other words, this can be described as “win-win”
situation, superior financial performance - effective climate change mitigation.
6.5 Limitations
The main limitation of this thesis is that environmental and other climate change
variables are scarce. This scarcity is because there is no specific reporting stan-
dards, especially in the past, and the environmental disclosure of firms is mainly
done voluntarily. On one hand, this scarcity is a major disadvantage for the first
empirical chapter, which mainly uses carbon emissions in its primary investiga-
tion. On the other hand, the non-disclosure still reflects some information which
can potentially be evaluated in the financial markets, hence this can turn to an
advantage for the second empirical chapter.
Furthermore, both Chapter 3 and 4 employ the same sample, which includes
EU manufacturing firms from 2005 to 2016. Large polluters have attracted the
attention to regulators and investors and for this reason, investigating the en-
vironmental actions of these firms is quite intriguing. On top of that, recently,
EU has become an area highly committed to deal with the climate change and
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therefore various stakeholder may overreact on such environmental practises. For
this reason, our results should not be generalised for the whole population but
are rather referred to a specific location and sector in a specific time-period.
A limitation in Chapter 3 is related to the estimation method. While previ-
ous studies use parametric techniques such as panel data estimations (e.g. fixed
effects model, System GMM etc) to evaluate the EP - FP relationship, we employ
a non-parametric technique. Our method can have main advantages compared to
previous literature, as mentioned in Chapter 3, however, an important disadvan-
tage is that we do not exploit the dynamic nature of the data. Panel techniques
use both the time and cross-section nature of the data, while our method can
merely accommodate the latter. This difference might result to contradicting
findings.
A crucial limitation in Chapter 4 is the main independent variable, namely
environmental disclosure, which is assumed to be objective. Even though, envi-
ronmental disclosure accounts for the transparency of environmental information,
it is an opaque measure constructed by Bloomberg. Thus, we cannot confidently
argue that in case of using different measures for environmental disclosure, the
results would be robust. Even if, this measure is not objective, Bloomberg dis-
closure scores have attracted the attention of many stakeholders and at least one
can argue that our results indicate the influence of these scores on the perception
of the investors about climate change.
Last but not least, in Chapter 5, we match the temperatures from the local
weather station closer to the firm’s market location. However, the assumption
that these temperatures affect the risk of the firms might be unrealistic. This
is because firms might have diversified activities to different countries or even
different continents where the weather patterns might be substantially different
from their main market location. Finally, as mentioned above regarding Chapters
3 and 4, results are based on a sample of EU firms; EU has signed many environ-
mental regulations (eg. EU ETS) and thus investors might be highly driven by
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the climate change effects. We expect that the same investigation in a different
area (e.g. US) would give statistically different results.
6.6 Direction for future studies
Concluding this thesis, some potential avenues for future research are offered.
First, some general recommendations are presented and second we propose some
ideas in order to extend each one of the three empirical chapters.
The effect of green news on the financial market is a promising area for future
research (see Section 2.5). For instance, Ramiah et al. (2015) examine environ-
mental announcements made by the previous president of the US Obama on the
stock returns. It would be interesting to examine the same for the announcements
made by president Trump. In addition, there are many studies that examine the
macroeconomic uncertainty, measured by the number of related articles, on the
financial markets. It would be equally interesting to construct an environmental
uncertainty index, from relevant articles, and test how this influences the financial
markets.
In addition, there is an upcoming literature regarding climate change and
stock market returns (Bansal and Ochoa, 2011). What has been neglected from
this literature is the role of options/futures market (see Section 2.5). If rising
temperatures affect the stock market valuations then this effect should also be
observed in the options market. Therefore, a future study should explore the
effect of either the environmental performance of firms or weather patterns on the
options evaluation. Options reflect future expectations about the stock market
and therefore it would be interesting to test if options can absorb part of climate
change uncertainty.
Moreover, a proposition has been made to construct an environmental per-
formance composite index and then test this index with different business metric
indicators (see Chapter 2 and Appendix A). Because different measures provide
with alternated results (Albertini, 2017), an environmental performance compos-
200
ite index might include different environmental variables (e.g carbon emissions,
environmental disclosure etc) and thus it would capture a more articulated picture
of what we call “environmental performance”.
Regarding Chapter 3 (EP-FP), by considering a greater number of industries,
it would be useful to examine in future research the effect of EP on FP with a
similar non-parametric method, therefore, an essential next step is to confirm any
variation of results among industries. In close relation to that, the US would be an
interesting area for future research. Previous parametric studies in the US report
positive results between EP and FP (Matsumura et al., 2014), therefore the tails
of the FP distribution of US firms could provide some additional insights on this
relationship. Also, gathering more variables (instruments) to better approximate
the EP could by useful and at the same time this will strengthen the accuracy
of our results. A last suggestion for this chapter, which can be quite challenging,
is to model the EP-FP relationship by using synchronously both dynamic and
non-parametric techniques.
In a similar vein, a future study related to Chapter 4 (Disc-Risk) is to gather
more information about different countries and industries. What is more, a study
with greater number of risk-measurements and environmental disclosure variables,
could also be conducted to determine the robustness of our results. On a different
note, future studies could examine if indeed a disclosing portfolio of assets can
maintain the same return and at the same time exhibit lower risk comparing with
a non-disclosing portfolio. More broadly, research is also needed to explore the
diversification benefits under complete or incomplete environmental information
(Ang et al., 2006).
Finally, an interesting avenue for future research related to Chapter 5 (Temperature-
CoVaR) would be to investigate how financial markets react to temperature varia-
tions in developing countries, where the information asymmetries are greater than
in the EU. Also, according to Bansal et al. (2016), temperature is a risk factor
that heterogeneously affect different countries, for this reason different areas of
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the world, such as the US, would be interesting to be examined and compare the
results with our study. On a final note, a similar study should be conducted by
gathering temperature information from multiple business locations of the firms;
this would help us establish a greater accuracy of our results.
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Appendices
Appendix A
The appendix bellow proposes the construction of an environmental composite
index with principal component factor analysis and then the new variable is used
to test the relationship between FP and CER in a dynamic panel model.
Consider the following equation of financial performance (FP ) that takes into
account the time (t) by including cross section firm observations (i).
FPi,t = β0 +Q
′
i,tβ + CER
′
i,tγ + εi,t (6.23)
Where, β0 is the constant which is the unobserved firm-level effect and Q
′ repre-
sents a vector of other control variables that have been reported to play a crucial
role in the analysis (e.g. leverage, firm age, market share). Similarly, CER′
is a vector of k CER variables (e.g. see table 2.4) and ε is the error term. If
we used all the CER variables we would overcome the problem of selection bias
but at the same time our model would suffer from multicollinearity. So, a linear
model would provide biased estimations. For this reason, we use factor analysis
with PCA extraction which assumes that CER variables (cer1, .., cern) are corre-
lated. The variables have to be normalised with E(cerk) = 0 and σ
2(cerk) = 1,
k = 1, 2, ..., n. Also, the principal components should be uncorrelated (Z1, .., Zn),
with n the number of variables and so the number of extracted factors.
Z1 = a1,1cer1 + a1,2cer2 + ...+ a1,ncern
Z2 = a2,1cer1 + a2,2cer2 + ...+ a2,ncern
...
...
Zn = an,1cer1 + an,2cer2 + ...+ an,ncern
(6.24)
Once the factor loadings (am,k) are extracted from the rotated factors
32, we can
construct intermediate composite indices (Cj), j = 1, ..., y and y corresponds
to the retaining factors that have eigenvalues33 more than the unity. This step
involves the construction of weights (wn). The weights are equal to the squared
normalised values of the loadings (am,k) which aggregate the CER variables into
intermediate composite indicators (Cj). The wn express the proportion of the
variance that is explained by an indicator in each factor. The y intermediate
indices explain a proportion of the total variance (vn) of the extracted factors.
We can now proceed to aggregate Cj into constructing the overall composite index
32Factor rotation is a method which minimises the number of variables that have high scores
on a factor. Rotation can be obtained using, among others, the Oblimin or Varimax method.
33According to Kaiser criterion, factors, with less than 1 eigenvalue, make no sense to be
included in the analysis.
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of CER (OECD, 2008).
CCER =
y∑
j,k=1
Cj × vk (6.25)
Where (CCER) is the composite CER variable for every unit i in time t. This
method would allow us to capture all the different dimensions of CER variables
and we would overcome the problem of multicollinearity.
In addition, a system of generalised method of moments (sys-GMM), which
is proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998), can control for endogeneity in our
estimations. First, the standard GMM estimation is considered below:
FPi,t = Q
′
i,tβ + θ1CCERi,t + ei + ηi,t (6.26)
Where e denotes the individual firm-level effect and η is the error term, with e
and η being independent for each i over all t. The next step is to eliminate e by
taking the first difference of equation (6.26).
FPi,t−FPi,t−1 = (Q′i,t−Q′i,t−1)β+θ1(CCERi,t−CCERi,t−1)+(ηi,t−ηi,t−1) (6.27)
Moreover, equation (6.27) is instrumented with lagged values of the explana-
tory variables. However, lagged values are usually weak instruments and thus
sys-GMM combines the first-differenced estimator (eq. 6.27) with the estima-
tor in levels (eq. 6.26) in order to efficiently deal with the endogeneity. Lastly,
the methodology should be tested by using different FP indicators as dependent
variables.
The proposed methodology aims to answer the question; if it pays to be green,
for two reasons. First, different CER variables provide inconclusive results and
therefore a composite variable would be able to capture the maximum dimension
of the environmental data. Second, sys-GMM is valid for micro-economic appli-
cations such as the outcome of an investment, this is likely to be the case for
firms that engaging in environmental practices.
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Appendix B
Advised by the study of Qiu et al. (2016), Bloomberg environmental disclosure has
been constructed by 60 different items that have been retrieved by annual reports,
sustainability reports and company websites. The overall score is standardised by
industry. The 60 environmental items are not equally weighted, items appeared
in the top of table 6.36 receive relatively higher weights than items in the bottom.
So, the score captures both the quantity and quality of the disclosures.
Table 6.36: Environmental disclosure items
# #
1 Direct CO2 Emissions 31 Paper Recycled
2 Indirect CO2 Emissions 32 Fuel Used (Th Litres)
3 Travel Emissions 33 Raw Materials Used
4 Total CO2 Emissions 34 % Recycled Materials
5 CO2 Intensity (Tonnes) 35 Gas Flaring
6 CO2 Intensity per Sales 36 Number of Spills
7 GHG Scope 1 37 Amount of Spills (Th Tonnes)
8 GHG Scope 2 38 Nuclear % Total Energy
9 GHG Scope 3 39 Solar % Total Energy
10 Total GHG Emissions 40 Phones Recycled
11 NOx Emissions 41 Environmental Fines #
12 SO2 Emissions 42 Environmental Fines $
13 SOx Emissions 43 ISO 14001 Certified Sites
14 VOC Emissions 44 Number of Sites
15 CO Emissions 45 % Sites Certified
16 Methane Emissions 46 Environmental Accounting Cost
17 ODS Emissions 47 Investments in Sustainability
18 Particulate Emissions 48 Energy Efficiency Policy
19 Total Energy Consumption 49 Emissions Reduction Initiatives
20 Electricity Used (MWh) 50 Environmental Supply Chain
21 Renewable Energy Use 51 Management Green
22 Water Consumption 52 Green Building Policy
23 Water/Unit of Prod (in Litres) 53 Waste Reduction Policy
24 %Water Recycled 54 Sustainable Packaging
25 Discharges to Water 55 Environmental Quality Management Policy
26 Waste Water (Th Cubic Metres) 56 Climate Change Policy
27 Hazardous Waste 57 New Products - Climate Change
28 Total Waste 58 Biodiversity Policy
29 % Waste Recycled 59 Environmental Awards Received
30 Paper Consumption 60 Verification Type
These 60 items should not be strictly disclosed by every firm. For instance, the item “Phones
Recycled” is only relevant for telecommunications industry and so firms from different industries
are not penalised for not disclosing it.
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Appendix C
The appendix bellow proposes the construction of a measure of connectedness
with principal component analysis (PCA), methodologically similar to the study
of Billio et al. (2012).
Instead of running PCA among all institutions simultaneously, we focus on
the causal spillovers (endogenous risk) between a firm and its industry; we repeat
this procedure for all the firms in the sample (600). Particularly, the two variables
of interest are the firm (X i) and industry (Xj) losses. In the PCA, the number
of variables, that join the system, should be equal to the number of extracted
components, also variables should be correlated; in fact, the correlation between
(X i) and (Xj) is, on average, 48%. As shown below, the principal components
are new variables that combine the returns of firm i with the returns of industry
j:
PC1t = a1,1X
i
t + a1,2X
j
t
PC2t = a2,1X
i
t + a2,2X
j
t ,
(6.28)
where the weights a are chosen so that: (i) the components are uncorrelated and
(ii) the first component accounts for the maximum possible variance of the set
(OECD, 2008). The first component (PC1) is used as a measure of connectedness
and it is our alternative dependent variable. PC1 satisfies the Kaiser criterion
that components with more than 1 eigenvalue, make sense to be included in
the analysis. In this instance, PC1 explains 74% of the variability between the
returns of firms and their industries, with eigenvalue 1.48, while PC2 explains
the remaining 26 % with eigenvalue 0.52.
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Appendix D
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) build on a bivariate diagnonal VECH-GARCH
to estimate the conditional covariance between the firm and industry’s losses, an
alternative dynamic systemic risk measure. Similarly, we employ a parsimonious
DCC-GARCH(1,1) model to identify the dynamic conditional correlation and the
conditional covariance between the firm and industry’s returns; as proposed by
Engle (2002):
Xt = φ0 + ϕXt−1 + εt, εt = H
1/2
t vt, (6.29)
Xt ≡ (Xjt , X it)′ is a vector of daily return losses of j industry and i firm, εt
is a vector of random disturbance terms, vt is a vector of normal, independent
and identically distributed innovations, and Ht is the conditional variance and
covariance matrix, defined as:
Ht = D
1/2
t RtD
1/2
t =
(
hj,jt h
j,i
t
hj,it h
i,i
t
)
, (6.30)
where hj,it , the conditional covariance, is another measure of interconnection be-
tween firm and industry. It is conceptually similar to the alternative dynamic
approaches of Billio et al. (2012); Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016). Dt is a
diagonal matrix of conditional variances [Dt = diag(σ
j2
t ), σ
i2
t )] from the univari-
ate GARCH(1,1), and Rt is the time-varying quasicorrelation matrix, which is
calculated as:
Rt = diag(Qt)
−1/2Qtdiag(Q,t)
−1/2, (6.31)
Qt = (1− a− b)Q̄ + a(ut−1u
′
t−1) + b(Qt−1) (6.32)
and Rt has the following form:
Rt =
(
1 ρj,it
ρj,it 1
)
, (6.33)
where ut = D
−1/2
t εt and ut is used to estimate the parameters of the conditional
correlation, Qt is the time-varying covariance matrix of ut, Q̄ (Q̄ = E[utut
′
])
is the unconditional variance and covariance matrix of ut and parameters a and
b should be non-negative and less than unity in aggregate. The coefficients of
conditional mean and conditional variance models are estimated by maximising
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the log-likelihood function for any t observation as shown below:
lt = −
1
2
T∑
t=1
[klog(2π) + 2log(|Dt|) + εt
′
D−2t εt] +
1
2
T∑
t=1
[log|Rt|+ u
′
tR
−1
t ut − u
′
tut]
(6.34)
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Bebbington, J. and Larrinaga-González, C. (2008). Carbon trading: Accounting
and reporting issues. European Accounting Review, 17(4):697–717.
Belcourt, M. (2006). Outsourcing—The benefits and the risks. Human Resource
Management Review, 16(2):269–279.
Ben-Amar, W. and McIlkenny, P. (2015). Board Effectiveness and the Voluntary
Disclosure of Climate Change Information. Business Strategy and the Environ-
ment, 24(8):704–719.
Benlemlih, M., Shaukat, A., Qiu, Y., and Trojanowski, G. (2016). Environmental
and Social Disclosures and Firm Risk. Journal of Business Ethics, pages 1–14.
Berman, S., Wicks, A., and Kotha, S. (1999). Does stakeholder orientation mat-
ter? The relationship between stakeholder management models and firm finan-
cial performance. Academy of Management, 42(2):488–506.
Berrone, P. and Gomez-Mejia, L. (2009). The Pros and Cons of Rewarding Social
Responsibility at the top. Human Resource Management, 48(6):959–971.
Billio, M., Getmansky, M., Lo, A. W., and Pelizzon, L. (2012). Econometric mea-
sures of connectedness and systemic risk in the finance and insurance sectors.
Journal of Financial Economics, 104(3):535–559.
Blundell, R. and Bond, S. (1998). Initial conditions and moment restrictions in
dynamic panel data models. Journal of Econometrics, 87(1):115–143.
Bouslah, K., Kryzanowski, L., and M’Zali, B. (2013). The impact of the di-
mensions of social performance on firm risk. Journal of Banking and Finance,
37(4):1258–1273.
Broadstock, D. C., Collins, A., Hunt, L. C., and Vergos, K. (2018). Voluntary
disclosure, greenhouse gas emissions and business performance: Assessing the
first decade of reporting. The British Accounting Review, 50(1):48–59.
Broadstock, D. C., Managi, S., Matousek, R., and Tzeremes, N. G. (2019a). Does
doing “good” always translate into doing “well”? an eco-efficiency perspective.
Business Strategy and the Environment.
Broadstock, D. C., Matousek, R., Meyer, M., and Tzeremes, N. G. (2019b).
Does corporate social responsibility impact firms’ innovation capacity? the
indirect link between environmental & social governance implementation and
innovation performance. Journal of Business Research.
213
Brooks, C. and Oikonomou, I. (2018). The effects of environmental, social and
governance disclosures and performance on firm value: A review of the litera-
ture in accounting and finance. The British Accounting Review, 50(1):1–15.
Brown, N. and Deegan, C. (1998). The public disclosure of environmental perfor-
mance information – a dual test of media agenda setting theory and legitimacy
theory. Accounting and Business Research, 29(1):21–41.
Brunel, C. and Levinson, A. (2016). Measuring the stringency of environmental
regulations. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 10(1):47–67.
Busch, T. and Hoffmann, V. H. (2007). Emerging carbon constraints for corporate
risk management. Ecological Economics, 62(3):518–528.
Busch, T. and Hoffmann, V. H. (2011). How Hot Is Your Bottom Line? Linking
Carbon and Financial Performance. Business and Society, 50(2):233–265.
Busch, T. and Lewandowski, S. (2017). Corporate carbon and financial perfor-
mance: a meta analysis. Journal of Industrial Ecology, 22(4):745–759.
Buysse, K. and Verbeke, A. (2003). Proactive environmental strategies: A stake-
holder management perspective. Strategic Management Journal, 24(5):453–
470.
Bye, B. and Klemetsen, M. E. (2018). The Impacts of Alternative Policy Instru-
ments on Environmental Performance: A Firm Level Study of Temporary and
Persistent Effects. Environmental and Resource Economics, 69(2):317–341.
Cai, L., Cui, J., and Jo, H. (2016). Corporate Environmental Responsibility and
Firm Risk. Journal of Business Ethics, 139(3):563–594.
Cao, M. and Wei, J. (2005). Stock market returns: A note on temperature
anomaly. Journal of Banking and Finance, 29(6):1559–1573.
Carhart, M. (1997). On persistence in mutual fund performance. The Journal of
Finance, 52(1).
Chakrabarty, S. and Wang, L. (2013). Climate change mitigation and interna-
tionalization: The competitiveness of multinational corporations. Thunderbird
International Business Review, 55(6):673–688.
Chapple, L., Clarkson, P., and Gold, D. (2013). The cost of carbon: Capital
market effects of the proposed emission trading scheme (ETS). Abacus, 49(1):1–
33.
Chen, N. and Wang, W.-T. (2012). Kyoto Protocol and capital structure: a
comparative study of developed and developing countries. Applied Financial
Economics, 22(21):1771–1786.
214
Christensen, B. and Prabhala, N. (1998). The relation between implied and
realized volatility. Journal of Financial Economics, 50(2):125–150.
Clark, C. E. and Crawford, E. P. (2012). Influencing climate change policy: The
effect of shareholder pressure and firm environmental performance. Business
and Society, 51(1):148–175.
Clarkson, P. M., Li, Y., Pinnuck, M., and Richardson, G. D. (2015). The Valua-
tion Relevance of Greenhouse Gas Emissions under the European Union Carbon
Emissions Trading Scheme. European Accounting Review, 24(3):551–580.
Clarkson, P. M., Li, Y., Richardson, G. D., and Vasvari, F. P. (2011). Does it
really pay to be green? Determinants and consequences of proactive environ-
mental strategies. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 30(2):122–144.
Coban, S. and Topcu, M. (2013). The nexus between financial development
and energy consumption in the EU: A dynamic panel data analysis. Energy
Economics, 39:81–88.
Colacito, R., Hoffmann, B., and Phan, T. (2018). Temperature and Growth: A
Panel Analysis of the United States. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
51(April).
Connelly, B. L., Certo, S. T., Ireland, R. D., and Reutzel, C. R. (2011). Signaling
theory: A review and assessment. Journal of management, 37(1):39–67.
Conrad, C., Rittler, D., and Rotfu, W. (2012). Modeling and explaining the
dynamics of European Union Allowance prices at high-frequency. Energy Eco-
nomics, 34(1):316–326.
Cordeiro, J. J. and Sarkis, J. (1997). Environmental proactivism and firm perfor-
mance: Evidence from security analyst earnings forecasts. Business Strategy
and the Environment, 6:104–114.
Cormier, D. and Magnan, M. (2015). The Economic Relevance of Environmental
Disclosure and its Impact on Corporate Legitimacy: An Empirical Investiga-
tion. Business Strategy and the Environment, 24(6):431–450.
Dafermos, Y., Nikolaidi, M., and Galanis, G. (2017). A stock- flow-fund ecological
macroeconomic model. Ecological Economics, 131:191–207.
Dahlmann, F., Branicki, L., and Brammer, S. (2019). Managing carbon aspi-
rations: The influence of corporate climate change targets on environmental
performance. Journal of business ethics, 158(1):1–24.
Daniel, F., Lohrke, F., and Fornaciari, C. (2004). Slack resources and firm per-
formance: a meta-analysis. Journal of Business Research, 57(6):565–574.
215
Dawkins, C. and Fraas, J. W. (2011). Coming Clean: The Impact of Environ-
mental Performance and Visibility on Corporate Climate Change Disclosure.
Journal of Business Ethics, 100(2):303–322.
De Burgos Jimenez, J. and Cespedes Lorente, J. J. (2001). Environmental per-
formance as an operations objective. International Journal of Operations and
Production Management, 21(12):1553–1572.
De Jong, A., Kabir, R., and Nguyen, T. T. (2008). Capital structure around
the world: The roles of firm- and country-specific determinants. Journal of
Banking and Finance, 32(9):1954–1969.
de Mendonça, H. F. and da Silva, R. B. (2018). Effect of banking and macroeco-
nomic variables on systemic risk: An application of ∆COVAR for an emerging
economy. North American Journal of Economics and Finance, 43:141–157.
de Villiers, C. and van Staden, C. J. (2010). Shareholders’ requirements for
corporate environmental disclosures: A cross country comparison. The British
Accounting Review, 42(4):227–240.
Dell, M., Jones, B. F., and Olken, B. A. (2012). Climate Shocks and Economic
Growth: Evidence from the Last Half Century. American Economic Journal:
Macroeconomics, 4(3):66–95.
Dell, M., Jones, B. F., and Olken, B. A. (2014). What Do We Learn from
the Weather ? The New Climate–Economy Literature. Journal of Economic
Literature, 52(3):740–798.
Delmas, M. a., Etzion, D., and Nairn-Birch, N. (2013). Triangulating Environ-
mental Performance :. The Academy of Management Perspectives, 27(3):255–
267.
Delmas, M. A., Nairn-Birch, N., and Lim, J. (2015). Dynamics of environmental
and financial performance: The case of greenhouse gas emissions. Organization
and Environment, 28(4):374–393.
Deschenes, O. (2014). Temperature, human health, and adaptation: A review of
the empirical literature. Energy Economics, 46:606–619.
Diebold, F. X. and Yilmaz, K. (2009). Measuring financial asset return and
volatility spillovers, with application to global equity markets. The Economic
Journal, 119(534):158–171.
Diemont, D., Moore, K., and Soppe, A. (2016). The Downside of Being Responsi-
ble: Corporate Social Responsibility and Tail Risk. Journal of Business Ethics,
137(2):213–229.
216
Dixon-Fowler, H., Slater, D., Johnson, J., Ellstrand, A. E., and Romi, A. M.
(2013). Beyond “does it pay to be green?” A meta-analysis of moderators of
the CEP–CFP relationship. Journal of Business Ethics, 112(2):353–366.
Dobler, M., Lajili, K., and Zeghal, D. (2014). Environmental Performance, Envi-
ronmental Risk and Risk Management. Business Strategy and the Environment,
23(1):1–17.
Donadelli, M., Gruning, P., Juppner, M., and Kizys, R. (2017a). Global Tem-
perature Risk, R&D Expenditure, and Growth. SAFE WP No. 188. Bank of
Lithuania WP No. 09/2018.
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